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
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THE CONTRAST AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NEW ORTHODOXY AND THE OLD.

THERE are two questions that press, sooner or later, upon every new movement in theology: the questions of contrast and kinship with what has hitherto been regarded as the true rendering, in terms of philosophy, of the Christian Faith. It is the purpose of this article to consider the theological movement known by the somewhat unsatisfactory designation of the New Orthodoxy in relation to the Old or Calvinistic Orthodoxy. If a movement has in it nothing distinctive, it is a delusion; and if it has nothing in common with the supreme historic forms in which Christianity has been moulded, it is most assuredly a snare. Since there is in the community, under free and almost unimpeded course, this new type of Christian thought, it may be worth while to inquire how far it is a revolt from a given and outgrown philosophy of Christianity, and how far it remains in profound and loyal accord with essential and permanent Christianity. Our duty, therefore, is twofold,—to mark a radical contrast, and to illustrate a fundamental agreement.

I.

THE CONTRASTED PHILOSOPHIES OF THE OLD ORTHODOXY AND THE NEW.

There are many friendly minds to whom the new movement in theology is only a new spirit, not a radical reconstruction of thought. There are many able men numbered in this camp who do not in the least suppose that their comrades have undergone a fundamental change in the philosophy of Christianity.

These men have emerged from submission to a provincial type of opinion, have grown into breadth and tolerance of feeling, and into new methods in the statement and application of truth. They are conscious of an increase of spiritual freedom and power; they are marching with the progress of the day; they stand out against all repressive tendencies; they are opposed to narrowness and bigotry; they refuse sympathy or countenance to purposes and policies that would obstruct the best and most characteristic movements of the time. Still in no sense do they feel that in all this a change is implied in the structure of theological opinion. To this large and most respected class of ministers and scholars the change is simply one of sentiment. They fail their brethren in the practical emergency and crisis and discover then an embarrassing limitation of sympathy. It is like John Bright in the Gladstone cabinet, unaware of any discord in the principles of statesmanship between himself and his chief, until it becomes necessary to bombard Alexandria.

On the other hand, a large number of conservative preachers and thinkers see all manner of philosophical depravity in the New Orthodoxy. It is the rolling in from early heathenized Christianity and modern latitudinarian Germany of a fog that obliterates old distinctions of everlasting moment, that covers and conceals the grand outlines of moral order, and that transforms day into night. Constructive unitarianism and inferential naturalism, with many other crimes following in logical and irresistible sequence, are indictments framed against it. This extraordinary accusation secures apparent justification whenever a popular and inspiring leader like Dr. Lyman Abbott emphasizes, for the sake of comity and in deference to the call of circumstances, points of agreement and alliance with forms of thought distinctly unhistoric in their treatment of Christianity.

Both these divergent views of the New Orthodoxy are instructive, both throw light upon its character; each covers a half truth. In a profound sense there is nothing new. The eternal Gospel has been in the mind of the church from the beginning. There has ever been that in the Christian faith which suffers neither variableness nor shadow of turning. Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Christianity is still trinitarian; it is historic Christianity in respect of its facts and leading and conquering principles. In another part of this article, this aspect of the New Orthodoxy will receive attention and emphasis. The triune nature of God, the reality of the Incarnation, the fact

of the divine reconciliation through the death of Christ, the new order in the soul through faith in a personal Redeemer, the power of the Holy Spirit, the sublime truth of the kingdom of God and the forms of grace and retribution within its boundless reach, are the heart and inspiration of every trustworthy representative of this new mode of theological thought. This fundamental identity with historic Christianity and profound fidelity to it, characteristic of the New Orthodoxy, demands something like adequate statement and emphasis.

Our first emphasis, however, must be given to the other side. Between the New Orthodoxy and the Old there are differences and oppositions that are radical. Until these are clearly stated, the metaphysics of the present movement cannot be discerned or understood; nor can the occasion for unjust accusation and imputation be wholly removed. While, therefore, some of the friends of the new thought declare that there is really no fundamental change, but only the prevalence of a broader and better spirit; while many of its enemies assert that there is in fact nothing left by which to identify the faith of to-day with the faith of history, it may not be amiss to raise the question, How do the philosophies of the Old Orthodoxy and the New stand to each other?

Before the analysis is attempted, a word seems needful concerning the genesis of this new thing. The theological impulse has been increased from many sources. There have entered into it a larger knowledge and a profounder sense of the development in history, a more intelligent view of the Bible, better exegesis, an influence from evolutionary science by no means slight, an expansive spirit from literature, moral earnestness from reforms, catholicity of purpose from the splendid missionary enterprise of the time, above all a clearer consciousness of the bearing of the person of Christ upon all human problems. Still, these are the things upon which the new power has nourished itself rather than the power itself; the forms from which it has gathered might. Viewed as source, these things are secondary, not primary. Theology is philosophy, and a new philosophical impulse is at the heart of the revolt from the Old, is at the heart of the devotion to the New Orthodoxy. A more adequate philosophy has been found, it is believed, for the support of the interests and activities and hopes of Christian people. In the necessity for this more adequate philosophy is the real genesis of the new movement. Let any minister recall the theological class-room in his seminary days;

let him review the course of thought taught there. The innumerable objections of reason and the blazing hostilities of conscience over some of the most fundamental of the old positions will be easily remembered. No man ever accepted original Calvinism, or any of its later forms, otherwise than on faith. Yet Calvinism is professedly a system of reason, a philosophy of revelation. In other days, the revolt of the young mind was suppressed. It was suppressed partly by authority, partly by the feeling, — Who is sufficient for these things? — partly by the joy of Christian service and the development of that devoutness and trust in which all intellectual difficulties are transcended. Within twenty years, however, there has been, in the colleges and universities of the country, a vast increase in philosophical interest. This interest at first took the form of study of the great systems of thought in the past. This bred the critical habit and power. The limitations of Plato were discovered, the unsolved problems of Aristotle. The English thought represented in Locke and Berkeley and Hume was analyzed, its value found, its error and incompleteness ascertained. The French thought from Descartes to Spinoza and the German from Leibnitz to Kant have received equal study and devotion. Everywhere the question has been, What is the chaff of system and pretended completeness to the wheat of real and permanent and prophetic thought? This great course of study could not fail to issue in a settled and competent critical habit, could not fail to address itself to that form of philosophy known as theology. Why should Augustine and Calvin and Edwards go unchallenged when Descartes and Hume and Kant must submit to the knife of critical analysis? In a philosophical age theology must take its chance among other forms of reasoned thought. The battlefield includes them all. Only the fittest in any system of opinion can ultimately survive, however long it may be shielded by ignorance or cowardice. Theology is good only in so far as it is a real answer to tormenting questions, only in so far as it contains a true account of the redemptive process in Christianity, only in so far as it exhibits in approximately adequate form the vast relationships of God's family on earth and the supernal relation between the Heavenly Father and the human child. Whether philosophical study preceded theological, or was subsequent to it, the critical habit was inevitable; and where faith was profoundest and life richest the reconstruction of thought became a corresponding necessity. The New Orthodoxy is born therefore of a philosophical rejection of the Old. It is proper

to term it a development, since it is a growth out of past forms of thought, but it is a development that supersedes and discredits as an authority that from which it is said to have come. Let us see if this position is capable of verification.

Passing by all practical contrasts of thought, such as those between an external and an inward view of faith, a mechanical and a vital construction of Christianity, a legal and an ethical approach to the problems of theology, an overdone individualism and a wholesome socialism, a provincial and an ecumenical outlook, we come at once to the pure philosophy of the old scheme and the new. The philosophy of Calvinism is conveniently given in the famous five points: absolute predestination, total depravity, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and perseverance of saints. The scheme is wholly partialistic. In it God sincerely contemplates only the selection of a number. The gospel is not a gospel for mankind. The call of the Spirit is not to the race. God's intention includes only a remnant. This is the grim logic of Calvinism avowed or unavowed, its horrible finality for the world.

Modified Calvinism introduces new departures: free will, unlimited atonement, salvation through the essential Christ, a mysterious and extra-Christian scheme for the rescue of infants, idiots, and heathen, a negative decree for the lost instead of a positive, and other small liquidations of a similar character. Philosophically, however, modified Calvinism is no relief and no improvement. Homiletical advantages it doubtless has, but philosophical it has none. A vast multitude are still excluded from the sincere and merciful purpose of God, and are on the way to condign punishment, with the divine neglect and the momentum of the universe as officer in charge. What matters it to the criminal under sentence of death that his cell and fare are somewhat improved over those of his predecessors, and that the terms in which he is addressed are a trifle more humane, so long as the great fact remains that the gallows sternly and implacably awaits him. Philosophically, modified Calvinism is as deep a horror as unmodified Calvinism. Consistent Calvinism is atheism, so far as the writer of this article can make out. Against Calvin's God and his scheme of creation and government the whole heart and conscience of men cry out. That cry may be suppressed as the voice of the devil, and the coerced soul henceforth submit to the Calvinistic prison-house. Or that cry may be understood as God's witness in the soul, clearer and more authoritative than any voice of human opinion, interpreted by all that is highest in the

Bible, vindicated by the voice of Christ as the veritable utterance of God, and supported by all that is deepest and most sacred in human life. A new conception of God follows, and a new scheme of thought as an approximate apprehension of God's concern with mankind in history and in society. Thus a new meaning has been given to consistent Calvinism. Calvin's idea of a sovereignty of power has become a sovereignty of righteousness. The New Orthodoxy finds its first thought in an absolute Being, — absolute in love as in power, — constraining, by his infinite excellence, the homage and the trust of the universe. This may be viewed as a development from Calvin's thought, or a transformation of it, or a substitute for it. This is the primal antithesis between the Old Orthodoxy and the New; and out of this other antitheses follow in swift and pointed succession.

The purpose of God positively and sincerely extends to and includes all mankind. God really means to redeem the race. The creation of man is in this eternal intention. There is no supralapsarian and sub-lapsarian casuistry in the divine counsels, no attempt by virtue of sheer Almightyness to make the worse appear the better reason. The creation is in Christ, the redemption is in Christ, and God's purpose is clear and pure, and for the righteousness of every soul, from everlasting to everlasting.

Another antithesis is found in the matter of depravity. The Old Orthodoxy made the alienation from God induced by sin all but absolute. The original creation was undone; regeneration was virtually a new creation. Where sin abounded grace did not much more abound. The apostle was in error. The curse was greater than the blessing, the penalty of connection with the first man vaster than the benefit from organic union with the Lord from heaven. In the New Orthodoxy all this is reversed. The alienation consequent upon sin is awful, but the original affinity with God is unbroken. The light is older and stronger than the darkness. The new habit of evil is fearful, but the primitive divine constitution of man is only overlaid, not annihilated. The tendency downward is, indeed, appalling; but the pull upward is in eternal counterbalance. Man's essential nature remains unchanged; he is a prodigal son, but still a son. The resurrection of his native constitution is his supreme need. That revival of the implicit and buried plan of God to clearness, authority, and sovereignty must be the regeneration of which Christ speaks. The sin, terrible as it is, is less vital than the profounder affections and affinities of the soul; it is secondary compared with the primal

heart of man ; it is factitious and acquired compared with the native and immutable plan of the human spirit.

The next antithesis is an old one, that between limited and unlimited atonement. How thinkers who believed in the strictly partialistic character of the divine purpose could advance the idea of a universal provision of divine mercy, a provision for which vast multitudes were never created, and which in their case never could be applied, is one of the mysteries of the human mind that cannot be explained. A Scotch preacher, in closing a discourse on repentance, is reported to have said, that inasmuch as God had not decreed all men to salvation, therefore Christ had not died for all, therefore the Holy Spirit was not given to all, therefore the invitation "Come unto Me" was not for all ; but inasmuch as the preacher did not know who the elect were, he felt disposed to make the invitation general. Much horror has been excited by the courage of this man. He was simply honest and logical. He believed in the sincerity of God, and therefore could not believe that the author of a limited purpose of eternal life could be the author of an unlimited atonement for life. He was right, and the whole history of unlimited atonement driven side by side with limited election is that of a winged horse harnessed with some foul monster of earth. "Be not unequally yoked with unbelievers : for what fellowship have righteousness and iniquity ? Or what communion hath light with darkness ? And what concord hath Christ with Belial ?" We may be thankful for the splendid protests in Great Britain and America against a vicious exegesis, and against part of a heartless theory. Doubtless the more philosophical of these protestants, like McLeod Campbell, had other heresies. Still, the emancipation of the Atonement was only one article of faith, and although of immeasurable practical benefit and radiant with promise of other good things to come, it was no philosophical advance. It was an interloper. It had no right to be, in the scheme of New England and other popular theologies. It had right to be in the scheme of God, and so stood out solitary, but immovable, in the thought of the church, until other ranges of the Divine Reality were seen to be in consonance with it.

The fourth antithesis concerns irresistible grace. Here the opposition between the old thought and the new is less marked. In the old thought, grace is always irresistible, and where it does not appear in the new life of the soul, the just inference is that it is not applied. In the new thought, grace is held to be

temporarily resistible, the inference being that God does not leave any man without witness of himself, especially those living under the full impact of Christian civilization, and that where the spiritual life is non-existent it is because the love of God is resisted. The old view of grace was of a Napoleonic march, crushing opposition along the whole line, and issuing in unbroken and overwhelming victories. The new view, cherished by many under the form of a faint hope, is of a Washingtonian triumph, a triumph through retreat, a rescue wrought out through disaster, a consummation of the sublime purpose of redemption through prolonged and open and apparently invincible defiance, a movement of God in human history and life temporarily resistible, ultimately irresistible. To many this is the really dreadful aspect of the New Orthodoxy considered as philosophy. It looks as if all men were within the circle and under the sweep of redemptive power. And is it a crime against the Creator of the world to hint at such a thing, an outrage upon the Redeemer of the world to hope or imagine that He will eventually succeed, the sin against the Holy Ghost to dream that He may ultimately lift the cross that Christ lifted out of the heart of God and plant it forever in the heart of purified humanity? If the absolute triumphs of righteousness should be the truth, would moral motive for the present be wanting? Is the certainty of defeat a more exhilarating incentive than the vision of victory? Is the temporal sympathy of God a more inspiring form of divine help than the eternal? Then let us have close corporations and heresy trials and methods of ministerial fellowship patterned after the boycott, that we may fight effectually this monster of unregenerate hope.

"Peace ; come away : we 'do him wrong
To sing so wildly."

The New Orthodoxy is not guilty, after all, of the supreme offense of asserting that all men will assuredly be saved. Its scheme of the divine intention, the divine revelation, the divine operation and movement is, indeed, all in that direction. Would any Christian have it otherwise? The ship is headed westward, and now and then the prow seems to dip in the splendor of setting suns. Still, the goal reached and the movement upon it are different things, the far-away harbor and the ship at sea.

The possibility of disaster always shadows the incomplete. Besides, this is a world in process of redemption, and man, as he fights here for his own soul, and for the souls of his fellow-men,

is not supremely anxious to know what the general and grand consummation shall be. Practical issues of immediate and tremendous moment call his mind from undue and unprofitable concern about ultimate things. The battle is on between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, spiritual life and spiritual death, and the Christian warrior asks with the utmost seriousness whether the cause of man has an Infinite ally. His supreme concern is to know whether God is really on the side of righteousness, whether the stars in their courses fight against evil, whether the order and power of the universe are in the interest of goodness, whether all God's intentions, manifestations, acts of mercy and movements of grace, are inclusive of the whole family of man, whether our humanity, endeavor, and hope may look for standard and inspiration to his perfect Fatherly Love.

II.

THE NEW ORTHODOXY AND THE NICENE CREED.

The ideas of permanence and change, being and becoming, rest and movement are both essential to a full and adequate thought of the world. Yet nothing is more infrequent in human belief than the balance of these great forces, the conservative and the progressive, that which holds firmly and thankfully by the past, and that which is hospitable toward the future and eager to entertain its larger and better life. The famous remark of Parmenides, "the flying arrow rests," is but the paradoxical expression for the idea of fixedness as the sole fact in the universe; a dead conservatism being the result. Another Greek thinker takes his stand upon the opposite fact, and sums up the character of the universe as an eternal becoming; his aphoristic expression for this incessant change of all things being, "It is impossible to bathe twice in the same stream." It is one of the many marks of greatness in the ninetyeth psalm that in it the two ideas are united:—

"Lord, thou hast been our dwelling-place
In all generations.
Before the mountains were brought forth,
Or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world,
Even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.
Thou turnest man to destruction;
And sayest, 'Return, ye children of men.'"

The two conceptions are first set in contrast and then carried into sublime reconciliation in the prayer:—

"And let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us."

These, then, are the two great determinative ideas in the religious sphere, as in the philosophical, and the separation of them the inevitable cause of one-sidedness. Over-emphasis of the permanent in religion, the fixed in Christianity, issues in fanatical antipathy to all progress; while over-emphasis of the idea of progress defeats itself and ends in despair. Ecclesiastes in his classic expression of the unrest of life is mournfully representative for our time: "One generation goeth and another generation cometh. . . . The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he ariseth. The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it turneth about continually in its course and the wind returneth again to its circuits. All things are full of weariness." And so the melancholy refrain goes on, because there is nothing permanent, because there is no eternal resting-place for the intellect and heart of man.

Now if pressed to a preference, it must be said that the abiding side of the Christian faith is infinitely the more important, for the simple reason that it is the mind of all the generations of belief against one. When at cross purposes, the consciousness of the foremost man of genius is as nothing in the presence of the consciousness of humanity. That in which the mind of the church has rested for nearly two thousand years, in which she has found a pavilion in all calamitous times, a conquering energy for every opportunity, a patience equal to every trial, and the sufficient grace of God under all limitation, is immeasurably greater than the modifications of faith as it is run through the ampler and nobler intelligence of the advancing centuries. Even under the tempest when the sea is most vexed and the scene wildest, the disturbance and fury are but on the surface when set in contrast to the untroubled and fathomless depths below; so in the most important controversies, in the most agitated and angry condition of the religious world, the points at issue between Christian believers are insignificant when measured against their sublime and immutable agreements.

There is reason for the deepest regret that this movement within the circle of the fixed and certain should not go on with hearty consent and exultant sympathy on the part of all disciples of Christ; as the change of plan, the revision of strategy, the reorganization of troops goes on within the camp as a quiet and necessary process, while the massive and splendid antagonisms of the army are leveled against the hosts that menace its existence. When one

considers the tremendous things at issue between believers and unbelievers, the existence and character of God, the nature of man as a spiritual being, the great question of the supernatural, the possibility of revelation, incarnation, and redemption, the disagreements among Christian thinkers seem almost trivial. General Gordon's religious opinions were definite enough and peculiar enough, certainly; yet in the heart of the vast antipathies of practical atheism amid which he lived, any sincerely religious man seemed to him profoundly akin. If the Church could but know the wilderness of unbelief in which she is campaigning, if she could but guess at the boundless antagonisms in the centres where she is set, how eager her sympathies would become toward all sincere believers, how great her unity of spirit, how vast her bonds of peace, how completely healthy and exempt from all compulsions would be the flow of faith and power within her large and happy heart.

Here, indeed, we have a substantial test of the true and the false in the apprehension of the Christian faith. How large is its possession of the permanent, and what is its success and power in disclosing through its newer forms the immutable in the faith of the Christian centuries? That is the test to which every theology must submit. Philosophies that are all a becoming, that leave out of account the still and changeless heart of the universe, although possessed, it may be, of relative values, as systems they are unfaithful and misleading. So in theology. Whenever the new breaks with the old, whenever it lightly esteems history, puts on the form of a supreme contrast to all that has been hitherto deemed essential and divine, lays such emphasis upon progress as to leave no place for rest, becomes so infatuated with change as to destroy the continuity of the Christian centuries, and to disperse forever the glorious identities of Christian belief in all ages, there we have a theology in which the error must be immeasurably in excess of the truth.

The New Orthodoxy does not break with history. It holds the old faith in new forms. Its movement is not in contradiction of any principle of faith ever declared by the church, but in logical development and fulfillment of all. It is the old faith in a better form, not in the best, —

"The best is yet to be."

The supreme developments, under a Christian reason sufficiently enlightened, are reserved for the future. Meanwhile this genera-

tion of believers has its task, to receive in its ampler meanings the divine heritage, and to hand it on with those meanings rendered somewhat more explicit and mighty. Having dealt with their contrasts, our purpose now is to indicate the identity of the New Orthodoxy with the Old on one point, namely, the teaching of the Nicene Creed concerning Jesus Christ. This indication of identities will take the form of comment upon the value of the venerable symbol as a confession of faith for the church to-day.

To the question whether this ancient symbol contains a doctrine of the Godhead to which no addition can be made, which is complete and entire, wanting nothing, there need be no hesitation in giving a negative answer. The relation of the Father and the Son in the Godhead is that upon which the creed lays supreme emphasis, and it will be readily admitted, we think, by those who attach most value to it, that its fundamental conception of sonship might have told for more than it has. But aside from the question of the formal completeness of the Nicene Creed, certain considerations may be adduced in support of its title to the veneration in which it is held.

1. The creed vindicates by implication the kinship of God and man. This merit of the Nicene symbol has been recognized by writers as wide apart in genius and general opinion as the late Dr. Hedge and Carlyle. The accomplished Unitarian theologian was never weary of bearing testimony to his sense of the value of the philosophical idea of God embodied in the Nicene Creed, and the statement is current as his that in asserting the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, the creed vindicated, against a hopeless dualism, the essential kinship of humanity to God. Carlyle in his later years saw that in the conflict between Arius and Athanasius Christianity itself was at stake. "If the Arians had won, it would have dwindled away to a legend."¹ To the same effect is the remark of the late Professor Thomas Hill Green, that "the common characteristic of all such philosophy as is not either skeptical or materialistic is, that it makes human thought potentially divine. Whether or no this philosophy be actually generated from the dogma of the church, it is at least certain that between this dogma and itself it finds merely a difference of form."² The Nicene Creed is thus recognized by minds entirely free from blinding prepossessions, as giving utterance to the profoundest and most precious truth in the consciousness of man, the truth that men

¹ See *Life in London*, vol. ii. p. 395.

² See *Christian Dogma*, vol. iii. p. 173.

are the offspring of God, made in God's image, and in constitution kindred to the divine.

But this service of the creed should, it would seem, fasten attention upon the mode in which it was rendered. It is not as a mere idea or dream of some "divinely gifted man" that this conception of the essential kinship of God and man is asserted or implied in the creed. It has recognition and place there through the great historic fact of the Incarnation. The Son of God "for us men and for our salvation came down and was made flesh and became incarnate." The sublime faith that God and humanity are not aliens but friends rests no longer upon a merely ideal basis, but upon history, the history of the unique union of God and man in the person of the Lord Jesus Christ.

But here the supreme difficulty emerges. If God and man are akin, can there be any other than a difference in degree between Christ and the other sons of God? In answer to this it may be said, that if God is the unity of the world, there must be a sense in which all things are akin to Him, and in which there is no difference in kind in the universe. Granting, then, that all things are in a certain sense akin to God, that all lie in the unity of his infinite life, the question comes whether there are not inside of this unity contrasts that are practically absolute. There are the contrasts of matter and spirit, necessity and freedom, animal life and moral life, that will be generally admitted as practically final. In the sphere of human endowment there are differences so great that they are best designated as differences in kind; those, for example, between a Beethoven and persons incapable of telling one note from another, or between a Shakespeare and men destitute even of the power of appreciating poetry. Genius marks a difference in kind over men of talent, to say nothing of what it does over men of no talent. Inside the all-embracing unity of God there are many contrasts that are, to all intents and purposes, final. The truth is, pure individuality is always a difference in kind, and there are as many such differences as there are distinct human beings in the world.

Having found these differences in kind among the common sons of God, it is difficult to see why it should surprise or shock us to find them in their supreme form in the divine Son. It is not necessary that He should belong wholly to our category; nor is it necessary that we should be able to classify Him. If the reverent study of his person brings into clear light certain fundamental and irreducible contrasts to the other children of God, why

should we hesitate to confess them? Knowledge is simply classification, and all men admit that genius is beyond definition, classification, knowledge. We can recognize, but we cannot understand it. Up to a certain point Jesus Christ is knowable, that is, He is classifiable as a man. But there is in Him an assumption of vision, a manifestation of power, a freedom from moral defect, a certainty in goodness, a mass and quality of being that transcend all human categories. Looking at this from the side of reason we can only indicate it. Here is Christ's antithesis to humanity. The venerable creed, speaking to faith in the name of the record of the Lord's life, in the name of Christian experience and of the speculation that goes beyond exact knowledge, declares this transcendence of Christ to be his eternal Sonship.

Finite and infinite stand to each other in relations both of likeness and contrast, and the relation of contrast we must not ignore. It is impossible by adding to man to make him God. Any conception, like that recently advanced by a brilliant writer, that makes God simply an infinite man, and man a finite God, introduces confusion under cover of clearness. The fact that God and man are akin does not involve identity, nor does it preclude infinite difference. Similarly the fact that Jesus and his brethren are akin does not compel us to assert that we are or that we ever shall be all that He is. It is easy to miss the wealth of the universe by an exclusive journey along the lines of kinship, to remain unconscious of the infinite wealth stored in the eternal contrasts in God the Father and in Christ the Son to humanity. The consubstantiality of man with God implied in the Nicene Creed leaves unimpugned the reality of the incarnation of God in a special man by which the common tie is revealed, and leaves room within the common kinship between earth and heaven for the unique relation between the eternal Father and the eternal Son.

2. Another reason for the veneration in which this creed is held is found in its magnificent assertion of the ethical character of God. It has been criticised as too metaphysical, as dealing too much in the conceptions of substance and essence. Its characteristic word, *homoousian*, has been charged as being of unethical import. But a sympathetic study of the creed would seem to obviate this criticism. Its great ideas are of God the Father Almighty and Jesus Christ the Son of God. The paternal relation and the filial is the central, the one from which the predicates of co-essentialness and co-eternity take their meaning and importance. Back into the Godhead, as part of its sublime and ineffable life, are

carried the conceptions that make human life ethical, and that give it the highest claim to a significance that transcends the interests and expediencies of a day. Here, indeed, we come upon one of the most momentous of all questions: Is the term Father merely a fine name carried back from human relations and given in vague and vain compliment to the Infinite Being, who has sent into history no authoritative token that He is a Father at all, or who became a Father only with the advent of the race upon this planet? It is a mighty venture to call the Absolute Being Father apart from the sonship of Jesus Christ; it is impossible to vindicate, or make real the eternal Fatherhood in the Godhead, except in union with the eternal Sonship. Aside from the practical question that constantly presses, — Where on the broad fields of history is there any sufficient sign of the Fatherhood of God when once the divine sonship of Jesus Christ has been swept away as incredible? — the very idea of Fatherhood as a fact in the Godhead is imperiled, nay, becomes impossible where there is a denial of sonship as a living reality in the divine being. If we are to have an ethical basis for human life in the nature of God, we must have a faith capable of expression through the Nicene symbol. God is love, we exultantly cry, and the faith is one that the world will ever cling to; but love is impossible in the heart of a bare unit except under the form of that self-regard that comes perilously near supreme self-conceit. The trinitarian conception of God is far enough from being simple, has in it, indeed, unfathomable mysteries; but it does vindicate the ethical character of God and make eternal love a possibility in the Godhead. The eternal distinctions in the Godhead really covered, truly represented, and veraciously interpreted by the terms Father and Son and Spirit make faith in the eternal Love intelligible, and provide for the whole relational and therefore ethical life of mankind a ground in the being of the Infinite.

3. The Nicene Creed is dear to the church of to-day as the symbol of the working forces of Christianity, of New Testament thought about the relation of the Son to the Father, and the thought on the same subject implicit in the Christian experience of these nineteen centuries. The late Dr. Hatch, in his valuable historic analysis, sets in relations of contrast the Christianity of Christ and that expressed in the Nicene symbol. The primitive faith is regarded as antithetic to the developed faith of the church of the fourth century. The brilliant Hibbert lecturer does not commit himself either to the theory that the primitive alone is

pure, or to the converse proposition that the developed form is provisionally legitimate. We should like to know where such a thinker would have placed himself and how he would have related the history and results of Christian thinking to the presence of the Spirit in the world. The impulse to the Christian thinkers of the fourth century out of the philosophical environment was no doubt vast, but the inward impulse was vaster far, the impulse from Christian experience, and from the study of the Gospels and Epistles. The term Son of God as used in the first three Gospels could not but arrest thought and call for explanation. A human sonship shared with all men would become clear, an official sonship peculiar to Jesus as the Messiah could not escape notice, an ethical sonship in the sense of perfect conformity with the Father's will could not be overlooked, and as background and support of this a metaphysical sonship could hardly remain long unrecognized. To the influence of the synoptical Gospels we must add, of course, the influence of the fourth Gospel and that of the great Epistles. The result of New Testament study for most believers then as now was that the personality of Jesus, as portrayed in the authentic records of Christianity, demands a category other than the merely human, and this demand is met, if not with finality, yet with enduring significance by the Nicene Creed.

There is besides the demand of the Christian life. That life is indeed a life from God, but it is a life mediated by Jesus Christ, and the Mediator never ceases to be a unique factor in it. To explain away the middle term of Christian life, the Lord Jesus, to say that the Mediator is but a temporal expedient or necessity, or to reduce Him to the category of other mediators of the wisdom and love of God, is to do violence to the best life of nineteen centuries. The trinitarian conception is not imposed upon Christian experience, but is implicit in it, and it becomes explicit in the light of the New Testament records. That conception is as essential to the continued life of the church as it was essential to the first. That conception essential to the earliest life of the church and essential to all subsequent life finds epochal recognition and expression in the great creed of Nicea.

4. This creed is valued for a fourth and final service, because it embodies a conception of God that saves his intelligence. We have remarked that the ethical in the divine character is secured by this conception. Love is communion and necessitates some sort of reciprocity in the life of God, and this again calls for a

view of God not solitary but social. We have said the Godhead must be social if it would be ethical; we now say it must be of this constitution if it would be intelligent. We are obliged to carry back our theory of knowledge and apply it to the Infinite. Either the world is his eternal uncreated other, in which case He is not absolute, or there must be, if knowledge is to be ascribed to Him, society of some ineffable kind in the being of God. Ego and non-ego, subject and object, enter into and constitute all knowledge here, and according to our thought the Divine Being must eternally differentiate himself into subject and object, a subject and object that eternally blend in the divine knowledge. This is but a hint at the philosophical necessity for that conception of God embodied in trinitarianism. Mere deism soon drops intelligence from the Supreme Being, and swiftly subsides into impersonal principle or law, and this in turn surely vanishes in atheism.

We have tried, in the foregoing discussion, to indicate the fundamental differences and agreements between the type of theological opinion now coming into power and that current in other days. While we dwell with thankfulness upon the contrasts presented, and are profoundly grateful for emancipation from some of the traditions of the elders, we are even more concerned to emphasize the identities in the faith of our time and all time. While the New Orthodoxy clears itself of much of the opinion of the past, it still holds devoutly by the theology of the Nicene Creed, parts with no essential principle of inherited and cherished belief, maintains a true continuity of thought with the Christian centuries, and rejoices in its privilege of carrying into more adequate expression the faith of the world in the absolute love of God. It is at this point of the more adequate expression of the world's faith in the perfect goodness of God that the venerable creed becomes of so much moment. For it cannot be doubted that there is a most serious need for an authoritative voice out of the Infinite, for a truly accredited and wholly trustworthy representative of the character of God upon the fields of time. Were we sure of the Christly character of God, we should be at rest upon all the great problems of life; and in proportion as men are able to believe in the Christly character of God, it may be affirmed that they are full of hope for the world. The great question after all is about God and how He stands affected to humanity. All settlements this side of that are no settlements; all problems must be pushed to their ultimate form in the question concerning the divine disposition toward man-

kind. We may take Jesus as the ideal man, and declare that we shall venture to construe the infinite mystery in terms of Christly love, and among orthodox and heterodox alike this is perhaps the common procedure. This generalization from the finite to the infinite, from a Jesus wholly and merely human to the character of the eternal, is a stupendous risk. We need something better than this, a soldier out of the heart of the Eternal and co-eternal with Him, to put himself at the head of our battle. The need, of course, does not create the reality, the human demand the divine supply; but it suggests to an optimistic mind the possibility of discovering, through a profounder appeal to Jesus Christ, a wider study of the contrasts of his character to the other children of God set in connection with the higher dreams and expectations of mankind, and a richer personal surrender to his spirit, that He is indeed the Eternal Son of the Father, and that when He declares "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father" He is speaking out of a consciousness commissioned to represent God.

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APPLIED CHRISTIANITY: WHO SHALL APPLY IT FIRST?¹

It is always a pleasant task, this making our neighbor better. In the first place, it gives us a very comfortable appreciation of the superior position from which we reach our kind hands, or throw our kind advice down to him. Again, we think how the world of spectators is admiring our Christian charity, while we picture to ourselves the fervent gratitude of those whom our gracious attention has uplifted. Lastly, we are not unmindful of the wisdom which declared that bread cast upon the waters shall

¹ Mr. Clark, son of Rev. N. G. Clark, D. D., died in 1891, at the age of twenty-seven. The following article was the last work of his pen. It had been preceded by several papers of a like nature published in *The Atlantic Monthly*. The literary work of Mr. Clark exemplified the remark which he often made to his father in expressing his desire to live,—"That he might pay back to the world what the world had done for him." The present article not only reveals the personal characteristics of the mind of the writer: it is typical of the aim of the better mind of his generation, as the more earnest of our younger men are seeking to interpret Christianity to themselves and to their time. [Ed.]

return after many days. For even so our sermonizing may yet return to us in dividends, if our newly Christianized employees, when we announce a reduction in wages, shall turn the other cheek, remembering the Scriptural injunction, and propose an increase of working-hours as well. There is no doubt that Christianity pays when we can get it into others, and we should not be human if, of the two methods, precept and example, we did not prefer to employ the former and to witness the latter. Applied Christianity, however, is commonly understood to mean Christianity shown by ourselves toward others; for Christianity ought certainly to be regarded as a centrifugal, not a centripetal force. Still, it is much easier to appreciate how uncomfortable the wickedness of other people makes us, than to realize how much practical Christianity on our part might do for them. Accordingly, many of us honestly persuade ourselves that, if only the masses could be gathered into churches, and there be taught the religion of content with their unequal lot in this life in anticipation of happiness beyond, our duty to them would be performed, society would be established on a firm basis, and, of course, only incidentally, the annoyance we now often suffer through the restlessness of the lower classes would cease. Moreover, the Scripture itself declares: "The poor ye have always with you;" and it would be idle to attempt to render that saying false. Nevertheless, one more disposed than the present writer to be cynical might remark that it certainly is a very pleasing idea to Christianize the working-classes, and thereby teach them to bear with patience the burdens we impose; but it were better to Christianize ourselves and cease to impose the burdens.

Are we, then, the more fortunate members of society, indifferent to our duty and selfish even in our charity? That is by no means a fair indictment. But it is the way we appear, and must appear, until we come to a better understanding of the condition of society, and extend our philanthropy into more effective channels. My purpose is to set forth in part the facts and the needs of the present situation; taking, for once, no account of the beam in our brother's eye, but only of the mote in our own.

As to the facts, it is, indeed, not true that those who are now uppermost have intentionally raised themselves, or that they desire to maintain themselves, by oppression of their fellow-men. Only as the natural result of a rapid industrial development has arisen the present condition of inequality, in which the difference of rewards in the form of wealth seems out of all proportion to

the difference in merit. Yet it is true that those who count themselves the Christian and the enlightened part of the community are, for the most part, in the upper half; and, under these circumstances, it is no cause for wonder if the under half sometimes think that Christianity applied from above downwards might bring about a more equitable division of the products of man's labor, at least might restore that fast-vanishing equality of opportunity which has been the life, and is still the boast, of our American civilization. Nor is it strange if the working classes sometimes suspect that their employers' Bibles open more readily to the text, "To him that hath shall be given," than to its complement, "To whom much is given, of him shall much be required."

It is, perhaps, true that there are some, especially of that class whose wealth has come to them through no effort of their own, who think their public obligations fulfilled in furnishing to the busy, worrying throng an object-lesson in the art of enjoying life. Yet there are comparatively few in our land who ignore entirely the responsibilities of wealth. The trouble is rather that so many will give money but will not give time and thought. For, in spite of all our benevolence, the conditions that call for it remain unchanged, and, though it may not be right to say that the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer, it is at least true that control of the means of production is becoming more and more concentrated, and the proportion of those dependent on others for the opportunity to earn a living is ever increasing; while the numbers of the very rich and the numbers of those who can never raise themselves from poverty are increasing too. It is well to stop and try to realize the enormous change that has taken place from individuality to combination in industry. In the early part of this century probably a decided majority were their own employers, so that their success was directly proportioned to their energy of mind and body. All were able at least to exercise some choice as to the calling they would follow, and employer and employed were in personal relations to each other. The conditions essential for the justification of the *laissez-faire* theory of political economy were present: freedom to move from place to place, and from industry to industry, wherever the best chance offered. That fair field for individual merit to prove itself and win its due reward has been our pride so long that it is hard to believe it gone. But it is gone, and we now see not scores or at most hundreds, but thousands, even tens of thousands, all under

one employer; and that employer, as a rule, an impersonal, and therefore almost of necessity a soulless corporation.

This is the situation, and I contend that we do not begin to realize its meaning and its demands. We declare that our generous gifts, our multitude of charitable societies, prove our philanthropy. The other half points to the ever-growing inequality of condition, the ever-increasing calls for that generosity, as proof of its insufficiency. The reason is that Christian principles do not enter into our industrial life. It would be interesting to know whether this indisposition to Christianize economic institutions can arise in any measure from our theory of the absolute separation of church and state. It is probably rather the result of democratic belief in human equality. This theory in its entirety is perfect. It means, not — as some have chosen to assume for the purpose of ridiculing it — that all men born into the world have equal powers, but that all have a right to an equal chance to make the most of such powers as they have. The trouble is that, while the equal right remains, the equal chance has been vanishing, and now for the greater portion remains in theory alone. We are still blinding ourselves to the change, and insisting that the social system best suited to a condition when equality of opportunity for all men was the rule is best now that equality is no more.

In our dislike to face the situation, we try to answer the indictment against us by finding flaws in its details. Some one declaims against the massing of great fortunes, and we proceed to show the vast good accomplished by many rich men in acquiring their fortunes, no less than in expending them. That is all true enough, and it is very foolish to inveigh indiscriminately against money-getting, but we ourselves overlook the distinction between those who devote their abilities to increasing the general wealth and those whose whole effort is expended in gathering unto themselves what has already been produced by others: between the railway manager, who receives a few thousands for services which benefit millions, and the speculator, who makes his millions by the ruin of thousands of small investors. If the ignorant include all the wealthy in the latter class, are they so much to blame as we, if we include all in the former?

But, in fact, there is little bitterness on the part of the working-classes even toward the laziest of those who live in luxury. Future generations will look back with wonder at the forbearance shown by the toilers of this century toward the idle holders of

vested rights in the proceeds of others' labor. All they ask of the Christian community is appreciation of their ideas and co-operation in their efforts. To that they are entitled, and that they do not have.

It is this lack of sympathy on our part that is exasperating. When we are discussing strikes and labor-unions we seem to forget that the men involved have human feelings like our own. The majority of us make no distinction between socialists, communists, and anarchists, and class all labor organizations alike together as bodies of misguided, and hence dangerous, men, whose leaders are invariably selfish, and whose objects, if not wicked, are at least impracticable. If the workingmen ask for an eight-hour day, or for Sunday rest, we reply that they do not go to church on Sunday when they have it free, and we gravely discuss whether extra hours of leisure would not be worse than wasted in the saloons. Now I submit that an industrious, hard-working man has good right to be incensed, when told that we are really very sorry, but it is necessary that he should toil until he is too tired to do anything but go to bed, for fear he may get into mischief. Similarly, nearly all our talk about the "masses," the working-classes, and their aims and rights, is ignorant and condescending. About strikes, in particular, we lay down the law, and make sweeping misstatements with the utmost complacency. The baseless assertion that "in nine cases out of ten strikes are a failure" seems to be an especial favorite with the religious press.

Our criticisms of organized labor and its methods of self-protection are sincere in their intention, but they have a very hypocritical appearance. Our economists teach that executive ability is rare, and must be highly paid. They tell workingmen that their failure to appreciate this principle is one of their chief faults. But when these workingmen give to the heads of their orders, on whose judgment and tact the welfare of thousands or tens of thousands may depend, salaries proportionate to the abilities their posts demand, we forget our precepts and seek, by pointing to these high salaries, to excite discontent and discord among those who pay them. Likewise do economists declare that on forethought, on the willingness to undergo present loss for a future gain, depends industrial expansion, and that these qualities are characteristic of a high state of enlightenment. No less do our ministers preach self-sacrifice as the essence of Christianity. But when laboring-men put these theories in practice, when they unitedly endure the suffering of a strike for the sake of ultimate

gain to themselves and others, when they contribute generously to sustain brother workers in their struggles for what they believe to be their rights, then we change our tone, declare that coöperation is slavery; that forethought and mutual assistance are the height of folly, and beg our deluded brothers to accept the gospel of selfishness and improvidence, each acting for himself alone, and for the present only. We aver that our advice is good, but what does it mean? That they cease to coöperate one with another to raise wages, and begin instead to compete one against another to lower wages. We say our advice is disinterested; but who pay the wages, high or low? We pay them, every one, that is, whose income is derived, in whole or in part, from invested capital. Can we wonder, then, that the unconscious selfishness of such advice is more patent to those to whom it is given than is its real, but sadly unthinking, benevolence? Finally, what right have we to expect absolute soundness of judgment and wisdom of plan from those whose advantages have been less than ours, when we ourselves do not even try to solve the social problem, save in the same old way, which is more and more inadequate?

It is not so much want of effort on our part to help them, as our failure to sympathize with and assist their own efforts for relief, that constitutes the grievance of the working-classes. What they want is not charity, but justice; not condescension, but coöperation. Attempts, however well meant, to bridge the chasm between the two classes, between those who have and those who have not capital, must be futile; for the latter class feel that the chasm is one that ought not to exist at all. It must be filled, not bridged. Thus the effort to mitigate discontent arising from economic conditions by bringing rich and poor together in "society" does not touch the root of the difficulty. "Society" relations are a personal matter for individual selection, and hence must always be self-adjusting. Again, there is the very irony of heartlessness in our telling the poor that the remedy for their troubles lies in personal Christianity. Christianity is, no doubt, a personal matter, but its spirit ought not on that account to be excluded from other relations of life. It will be much easier than it is now to establish Christian friendliness among all men, and to open the way for unrestrained social intercourse, when one half ceases to feel that the other half is enjoying an advantage in all the material means of happiness as the result of the absence of Christian principles in our economic organization.

For is it not evident that our economic system is diametrically

opposed to Christian teaching? Christianity is the religion of peace, but industrial classes are avowedly in a state of warfare. As Christians, we look at our fellow-men to see what we can do for them; as members of the industrial world, to see what we can get out of them. Christianity means coöperation and the uplifting of the lowliest; business means competition and the survival of the strongest. If, then, there is to be a firm basis for a better social order, individual Christianity must not forever be engaged in a struggle to counteract the results of public selfishness.

Do I mean to say that Christian philanthropy is a failure? Certainly not; only that the time has come earnestly to consider whether its field ought not to be extended so as to cover the cause of the evils it is already doing so much to alleviate. Charity, whether public or private, mainly deals with results, to mitigate effects; public action must be applied to the industrial system itself, in order to prevent a continuation of their causes. Our philanthropy must concern itself not only with private helpfulness, but with public reform and economic reorganization. The very simplest recognition of this idea we have seen in the substitution of personal investigation and encouragement to self-help in place of indiscriminate out-door relief to mendicants. Again, the object of religion, as the theologians, even of the old school, now put it, is to save from sin, not from the consequences of sin. "General" Booth, although first of all a religious leader, goes one step further, realizing that to be accessible to religious influences men must first be lifted out of a state of hopeless material misery. But even "General" Booth's plan is not fundamental. It proposes to make new opportunity for those whom the competitive system is continually crowding down, but the system itself it does not touch.

What, then, is to be done? To carry out literally the doctrine that "mine is thine" would be no less disastrous than to apply the opposite theory, unfairly attributed to the socialists, that "thine is mine." If the rich were to sell all that they have and give to the poor, the whole world would soon be brought to destitution. But there is a wide difference between dissipating productive capital and devoting its income to public purposes, or transferring its ownership to those who use it. It is not self-evident that dire results would ensue if a greater share of the increment of capital, or even the whole increment, were to go to those who produce it.

It is to promote a distribution, more equitable than at pres-

ent, of the products of man's labor that the reformers present their divers schemes. Communism and socialism in their various forms, nationalism, the single tax, coöperation, and profit-sharing, even free trade and protection respectively, are urged by their several advocates as the indispensable means. It is not my intention to add one more to this list, nor even to weigh down any of the plans already proposed by my special indorsement. I merely contend that, in view of the industrial revolution wrought by science and invention during the past century, the burden of proof rests on those who maintain that the old ways are sufficient under the new conditions, no less than on those who demand a change. The presumption is that an industrial evolution so great as that which men still living have seen, with its complete change in the relations of employer and employed, should be accompanied by a corresponding evolution in the functions of the state and in its relation to the conduct of industry. Therefore, proposed reforms are not to be lightly disposed of by saying that they are wholly unprecedented. The development of steam and electricity are also wholly unprecedented. Moreover, some of these plans of reform have excellent precedents, as we should see, if we would but rid ourselves of our provincialism and look around a little.

The several governments, both state and municipal, in Europe perform for the public benefit many services by which in our land of liberty private monopolies are enriched. Such public service is neither paternalism on the one hand, nor socialism on the other. It is simply business, and practical Christianity as well; for it gives the masses the profits of those monopolistic privileges which their presence alone makes valuable; gives a large body of workingmen security of employment and just reward; and, so far as it extends, puts an end to the opportunity of individuals to acquire wealth by oppression of employees and extortion from the public. In our country we never venture beyond the most moderate regulation, but even in this there is much opportunity for good.

At this very moment call is made for practical legislation that, though demanded by justice to all, would be an especial blessing to the poor. In his oath of office the chief justice of the United States promises to do "equal justice to the poor and to the rich." Yet, in fact, equal justice can be no longer done, for, with the supreme court three years behindhand with its docket, the poor have not the means to carry through their suits, and the rich take deliberate advantage of them in the knowledge that their cases will never be brought to trial. No less important is the institution of

a court of claims, where that old delinquent, the United States government, may find it consistent with its sovereign dignity to make more speedy settlement with its citizen creditors. If Christian people would but take an aggressive interest in these matters, they could easily compel the necessary legislation, and thus fulfill in no inconsiderable degree the oft-repeated injunction of the ancient prophets: "Seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."

But there is a subject that calls still more urgently for national legislation. Twenty thousand railway-men maimed and three thousand killed every year, constitute a standing reproach to the Christian community. We have no record of the number of miracles of healing wrought by the founder of the religion we profess, but it may, I think, be said without fear of exaggeration that, though the days of miracles are passed, it is in the power of the Christian people of this land to compel protective legislation, which in a very few years would save more men from needless maiming or death than all the cripples Palestine could possibly have furnished nineteen hundred years ago. Yet many a pious stockholder offers, and sincerely, too, his daily prayer to God to protect the fatherless and the widow, but never thinks of taking ten minutes to write to his congressman, his newspaper, or his railway president in behalf of legislation by which so many of the husbands and fathers might be spared.

In state legislation, also, without taking a very long stride toward socialism, worthy Christian work may be done in promoting something of strength and beauty in beings whom it now seems bitter sarcasm to describe as temples of the Holy Spirit. Not of stunted, overworked children in store and factory was it said that "of such is the kingdom of heaven," and of such ought not to be kingdoms of earth. Yet those who seek to save these children, and to give them a well-developed mental and physical life, are allowed to carry on a very unequal contest against money-seeking parents and employers. Again, the call for technical education deserves a response. There is too much truth at present in the charge that our schools teach discontent with the conditions of life, without providing a remedy. The reformatory ought not to be the only place where a boy can learn a trade. Is it possible that our neglect to provide such opportunities for the masses can arise from apprehension that if by the means by which they should be "leveled up" we on our part might at the same time be "leveled down" a little?

In all this there is hardly the shadow of socialism, and there is much possibility of good. But now suppose we shake off with a mighty effort our prejudice against that alarming spectre just enough to look without terror at the proposition that the national government own the railways. The proposal is a serious one, which deserves and demands the earnest consideration of all good citizens. For it involves vast consequences and possible dangers, while it is being urged with a growing persistence that will not be silenced except by reforms which daily experience seems to be proving impossible. In favor of the plan there are, moreover, at least six strong arguments to be met. From the nationalization of the railway system there would be: (1.) A gain to justice in preventing local and personal discrimination in rates. (2.) There would be a gain to justice in preventing excessive charges for the payment of interest on fictitious values. (3.) There would be a gain to economy in preventing the waste attending competition and parallel building. (4.) There would be a gain to humanity in doing away with the present inevitable antagonism between the employing corporations and their employees, securing for the latter fair treatment by a government in which they have a voice. (5.) There would be a gain (may we not again say?) to humanity in providing for the multitude a safe investment in the government bonds issued in payment for the railways, in place of the risk and frequent ruin attending the possession of railway securities at present. (6.) There would be a gain to morality in removing so largely from the business world the temptation to speculate, and to seek wealth by luck or shrewdness instead of by doing a share of the world's work. It is no less true now than when it was first written, that "an inheritance may be gotten hastily in the beginning, but the end thereof shall not be blessed."

Perhaps municipal administration offers the best field for the combination of business with philanthropy. This touches the citizens, especially the poorer classes, more nearly than we often realize. Clean, well-lighted streets, cheap light in the homes, cheap and rapid transit, frequent open breathing-spaces, restrictions on overcrowding, free libraries and evening schools, all go to make those conditions of existence in which the city's toilers have time and strength to think of the higher things in life. Providing them through a well-conducted municipal administration is a very practical form of charity, and it saves in the end more than it costs. What it requires is that each citizen give, not silver

and gold, which he may not have, but himself ; some small share of his time, thought, and business capacity to the welfare of the community at large.

Such an extension of the functions of government, especially of local governments, to the performance of all public service, and, if this prove successful, to the ownership of all monopolies, affords the most promising outlook for giving the different classes of society a common interest, and thus bringing them together in co-operation. If the body of the people would only regard the state, not as something extraneous to themselves, but as an organization of which they are, each one, a part, and which may be used for the good of all, there might be fostered in them a sense of responsibility and a public spirit which would be a valuable educational force. Attempts to bring the different industrial classes together in "society" are generally sorry failures, welcome to neither party, while to give the employees of railway or factory a direct share in the business management would be impracticable. It ought, however, to be possible to awaken in all classes the same interest in municipal administration that is shown by the voters of the best-governed English cities, or that prevailed throughout New England when the town meeting was in its glory. Then general discussion of public policy in the management of the common business might confer on the masses not only decided material benefits, but intellectual and social benefits as well.

It is replied that nothing of this is possible, because our governments are corrupt, or, at least, unbusinesslike. It is the old story ; the hypocrisy of charging bad government to the ignorant, degraded masses. The blame is ours, and the whole blame. Whether is worse, for the ignorant to be misled, or for the wise to refuse to lead, or even to act? We are the government. To say that we can do nothing because of corruption is no more than to say that we will do nothing because we choose to be corrupt. In matters so important Christians must not be unbusinesslike ; the more intelligent have no right to ignore their responsibility for the welfare of those around them. It is their duty to study the aims of the lower classes ; not to thwart their efforts, but to direct them ; not to acquiesce reluctantly in their successes, but to lead the way. First of all, by maintaining pure and efficient government, they should prepare for whatever changes in social organization may be found best or inevitable. It will not do to say we have no time for this. Does the clergyman, urging personal religion on a workingman, accept the excuse that he has no

time? No more right has the clergyman to plead that excuse when urged in turn by the workingman to the examination of social questions. Suppose every one were to give an hour a day to the subject, or even an hour a week. That certainly is little enough, but it is more than many now give, and, if well spent, it would mean a great deal.

In the present situation of unrest every plan of reform which has for its object elevation of the less prosperous classes deserves honest attention; not with the object of proving it bad, but in the hope that it may be found to contain some good. Anybody can find faults of detail, but it is constructive, not destructive criticism that is wanted. As Bacon advises, "Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, . . . but to weigh and consider." The question for thoughtful readers of "Looking Backward" ought not to be, whether it would not be impossible to attain the high uniform level of comfort with the low uniform requirement of labor there depicted; but whether the book does not contain suggestions which, if followed, would make possible a higher average degree of comfort, combined with a more equitable apportionment of labor and its rewards, than at present exists; not whether all men would do their best if the rewards of all were to be equal, but whether more men than at present would not be stimulated to their best endeavor, if their rewards were always proportioned to the value of their performance; whether it really would be more destructive of a man's independence to be an employee of the state in which he is a voter with an equal and common interest with all others, than to be the employee of a corporation in which he has no voice, and with whose managers he is often on hostile terms; finally, whether opportunity for developing talent and advancing in rank might not be extended to larger numbers with less favoritism under government management of large industries, than under their present corporate control.

But there are some who, while admitting that reforms under government direction might better the condition of the working-classes, still declare that the object sought is purely material, and that, accordingly, those who advocate it are setting up a false and unworthy standard as the highest ideal of social progress. "Character is the main thing," they say, "and of that you take no account. Character determines condition." This is true, but only partly true; for it is equally certain that condition determines character. The actual truth of the matter is about this: that

for those who have some chance in life character determines condition, but for those who have no fair chance condition determines character. The work for Christianity in public affairs is to create and make permanent those favorable general conditions under which each man's character shall determine his individual condition. This is not materialism. It is rather preparing good ground for religion; and it is impossible to escape the thought that religious teachers would do well if they gave more attention to preparing such good ground for their gospel seed, and less to scattering it on stony and thorny soil. For it will be admitted that those who live in a fair degree of comfort secured by their own continuous effort furnish the best types of character, and are the main strength of both church and state. Accordingly, while nationalism as portrayed by Bellamy, if viewed as an end in itself, may be merely vanity and vexation of spirit, yet, modified to come within the limits of possibility and viewed as a means of attaining the conditions of life most favorable to intellectual, moral, and spiritual development, it may be found worthy Christian support.

A more serious danger is that of interfering with individuality. "Beware," says the economist, "how you touch the sacred competitive system. It is essential to progress that each one be stimulated by competition to his own utmost endeavor." And the preacher adds that the individual responsibility of each one for what he becomes is a cardinal doctrine of Christianity. Yet there is no more mischievous misconception than this, that the individuality taught by the Christian religion is the individuality of the competitive system. We must remember that there are two different forms of competition. First, there is the competition of rivals, each striving to win success by excelling others. It is this that has been the soul of progress and that develops individual capacity, but it is this that great business combinations are destroying. Secondly, there is the competition of employers for laborers and of laborers for employment, each bent on giving as little, and getting as much, as possible. However it be with the first form, such competition as the latter is un-Christian and unjust. It does not stimulate, but rather discourages enterprise; for it introduces hostility where coöperation ought to prevail, and it is continually degenerating into the strike, where the competition is simply to see which party can do the other the most harm. Again, by the minute subdivision of labor, increasing numbers are becoming mere machines, to whom any change in employment, or even advance to a higher stage in their chosen calling, is im-

possible. Thus, in fact, our industrial system in its present stage is no less destructive of individuality in its effects than it is antagonistic to Christianity in its methods. We are coming to admit that the former of these evils, the destruction of the laborer's independence, is inevitable. We must adapt ourselves to it. But the absence of Christianity in our industrial relations is not a necessary evil. On the contrary, it is only by introducing the Christian idea of coöperation, wherever combination has prepared the way, that we can hope to restore the individual to an equal, if not to a perfectly independent place in the state.

For it cannot be too often repeated that the object and effect of genuine reform in industrial affairs must be not to create dependence, but to furnish opportunity. To provide opportunity is less socialistic, less dangerous to individual energy, than is charitable restitution to those who have never had opportunity. It is an excellent thing to provide a man a good tenement, but it is a better thing to enable him to provide it for himself. Paternalism is one thing; coöperation is another. Under paternalism the state does for the citizen what he ought to do for himself; under coöperation the citizens unite to do for themselves, through the state, what they cannot do for themselves alone.

How far it may be wise to go in this direction must always be an open question, to be decided by experience and circumstances, but it is as needless as it is customary to confound all the successive stages of state socialism. First, there is that very moderate form which has no quarrel with competition, but only with monopoly. Its principle, most simply stated, is that every natural monopoly of a public character shall be operated by the people for their own benefit; or, somewhat extended, that in every industry also where competition has been supplanted by combination, the people shall take control. This does not destroy the opportunity for individual initiative, for it is already destroyed; nor does it interfere with competition, for that does not exist. What it does accomplish is to make the citizen a stockholder in organizations which formerly held him at their mercy.

The next stage of socialism would have the government conduct all industries, even those in which, as in farming, monopoly seems impossible. Yet even this socialism adopts the maxim of Laveleye: "To each worker his produce, his entire produce, and nothing but his produce." This is not to be identified with the communism of Edward Bellamy, which, instead of equitable division of the produce, makes equal division among all. Only the

two latter forms of socialism remove any existing opportunity for individual initiative, and only the last removes incentive to individual exertion. The lines of division are so distinct that there is no excuse for ignoring them. One step in no wise involves the next, save only as its success may inspire confidence and encourage advance. The proposition that cities own the gas-pipes under their streets is not to be condemned because we do not fancy Bellamy's notion of an "elephant" dining-hall, or because we question the ability of the national administration to carry on retail trade.

I urge here no particular plan of reform; but I believe that reforms must come, and that in favor of some of those now brought forward there are arguments which appeal strongly and reasonably to all who desire the uplifting of their fellow-men. I have ventured to question, also, whether we can profitably preach the first great commandment to the poor, until we succeed better in practicing the second toward them; and I ask whether our methods of Christian activity ought not naturally to expand with the political and industrial growth of the times, so that we may maintain through public action, by the coöperation of all in the industrial world, those conditions of life which we are continually but ineffectually striving to restore by private philanthropy. The answer to the question how Christianity shall be applied is that we, the "classes," must apply it first; and that we must apply it in our public life and our economic system, until the distinction between classes and masses ceases to exist, or at least becomes again, as earlier in our history, a distinction, not of opportunity, but of worth alone. We must rid ourselves of the comfortable belief that the working-classes are always in the wrong, that our duty accordingly is to suppress their efforts, and that we can educate them back to accept contentedly those old theories of sociology which are daily proving their insufficiency to meet the conditions of modern life. The aspirations of the masses are right. They have, moreover, a power which the classes cannot break, but which they can, if they will, direct.

It is true that "the people must be righteous before the state can be righteous;" that, as Hegel says, "the state is the realization of the moral idea of the people." All I ask is that we express to the full our moral life in the state and in our social relations; that we be as good in public as in private; that we cease to call our neighbor a brother in the church and to treat him as a machine in the factory; and that we concern ourselves as much for

the general welfare as for our private interests. Then, though we cannot look to the state to solve our problems for us, we may solve many of our problems for ourselves by means of the state. The enlightenment of the nineteenth century must not confess itself helpless in face of the social question it has itself created. That question is, indeed, a perplexing one, but it can be solved if those who profess to be guided by Christian principles will throw the whole force of their mind and character into the application of those principles to public affairs. It is not necessary that some shall forever be trampled to the bottom in the struggle for existence. The energy which is expending in forcing others down might be used instead to lift them up. Mutual aid is a higher law than the survival of the strongest. Or is it, in truth, too much to hope for a Christianity so thorough-going that its principles shall permeate our public life and our industrial relations, and, in place of the antagonism of class to class, render possible the coöperation of all?

Charles Worcester Clark.

RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

THE religious people in this nation are (with certain exceptions) staunch supporters of our public schools. These exceptions are a considerable number of the adherents of the Catholic Church, and a few Protestants who are dissatisfied with the exclusion of the Bible from them. Yet nearly all of these friends of the public schools are opposed to having religious instruction given in them. This is not because they doubt the desirableness of such instruction for the young, but because they think they see insuperable objections to allowing schools supported by the state to give this instruction. Most of them have come to this opinion reluctantly, and it is a matter of principle and not of preference. They think that religious instruction must be given elsewhere, and that it is better to run the risk that it will not be given at all than to introduce it into the public school.

This class is so large and influential (for it includes far more than the adherents of Christian churches) that it may be held responsible for the policy of the public schools in this particular.

This paper addresses this large and intelligent class of American.

can citizens, and begs a rehearing of the question: "Shall the public school give any kind of religious instruction?"

We need, to begin with, a clear conception of what the public school is for, — the end in view which justifies and requires its maintenance by the state. One of our best educators has given this brief and excellent statement of the true end of the public school: "To train up the children of the country to be good citizens of the state and good members of society." The state, then, maintains schools for the same reason that it maintains an army or a navy, because they are essential to its safety and prosperity. The state *must* have good citizens. The right to exist involves the right to do whatever is necessary to continued existence, and on the ground that the proper training of the children of the country is necessary to the safety and well-being of the state, it rests its authority to tax the people to maintain public schools.

If it be asked whether the state may not safely trust that the patriotism of its citizens, and the regard of parents for their children, and the interest in education felt by religious denominations, will insure for the young the training requisite for good citizenship, the people would answer that far too many parents have too little patriotism or intelligence or sympathy with our American institutions to be so trusted; that they think only of getting their children to self-support by the shortest road, and that each religious sect would naturally educate with special reference to propagating its own faith, and with no direct reference to the wants of the state, and thus the state would be left dependent, for its very existence, upon those over whom it was exercising no control. Should the state enact laws with severe penalties requiring each parent to educate his children, not to say that in many cases this would be requiring an impossible thing, it is manifest that the state could not in this way be sure that the education the child would receive would be such as to fit him for the responsibilities of citizenship. The simple and just way is for the state to establish its own schools, arrange the courses of study with exclusive reference to the great end it has in view, and tax all the citizens for their support on the same principle that it taxes them for the maintenance of any other of its arms of defense, because all alike are benefited thereby. In this opinion, at least, the people are well-nigh unanimous. They believe that the dangers that beset free government are so great that we can intrust the training of our future citizens to no mere voluntary and irresponsible agency.

These dangers are greatly enhanced by the bad quality of so

much of the emigration which has been for some years pouring into our country; and the task committed to the public school of training the numerous offspring of these foreign-born parents to be good citizens is greatly increased in difficulty by the fact that they can be retained in school, in the vast majority of cases, so short a time. The poverty of parents, and their haste to get their children to earning their own living, and the reluctance of the children to submit to the restraints of school keep multitudes of children from ever reaching the high school, very many below even the grammar grade. What the public school is to do for such, it must do at a very early age; a bent, at least, must be given in the right direction, — some good seed must be sown at a very early age.

This, at least, is already apparent, that the importance and difficulty of the work belonging properly to the public school forbid the putting of any burden upon it other than the work of training its pupils to be good citizens of the state, and require that it be as thoroughly equipped as possible for this specific work. The state has no right, and cannot afford, to regard the demands of individuals or parties or sects. It is true that the training that qualifies for citizenship will be helpful towards getting a living, and may go far towards making good Christians, but not for either of these ends does the state tax its citizens for the support of its schools. And as it has no right to shape its courses of instruction with a view to helping in these directions, so it has no right to swerve from the line of its true end for the sake of avoiding such results.

The training which is to fit the child for citizenship must recognize in the child intellect, sensibilities, and will; that is, the training must be both intellectual and moral. The training of the intellect is more than the storing of the mind with knowledge, though this is not to be undervalued. It is more important that he be taught how to get knowledge for himself. Falsehood and error are not knowledge, and as to reach right results one must pursue right methods, the child must be trained in right methods of gaining knowledge. Thus, he may be taught the supreme value of truth on all subjects, and this will be a beginning of moral training.

There can be no difference of opinion as to the importance of moral instruction for the future citizens of a free country. The notion that general intelligence and mental culture are all that is needed to insure the stability and perpetuity of our free govern-

ment has long since been abandoned by thinking people. The dangerous classes to-day are not the illiterate. There may be a great amount of brutalism in our country, — not all of it imported, — but it is not so dangerous to free government as the educated rascality that is corrupting our politics and our social life and demoralizing our business. The educated but conscienceless class are armed with the most fatal weapons, and are skilled in their use. The necessity for a large moral element in the training that children receive in the public school is universally recognized, but it is just those who emphasize moral training who as emphatically object to [the] introduction of religious instruction into the public schools. They would inculcate morality, but draw the line of exclusion at religion.

Here, then, we are brought face to face with the question, Can morality be inculcated if religion be excluded? The question is a practical one. Granted that a distinct line can be drawn between the principles of morality and the doctrines of religion, and between duties to men and duties to God, the practical question still remains, whether the former can be inculcated if divorced from the latter. There may be no conflict between science and religion, but a clearer line can be drawn between them than between morals and religion; and yet a teacher of science will find it impossible to avoid religious questions if he is to do thorough work. Questions respecting the origin of matter, of the order manifest in the universe, and of life in its various forms, intrude themselves. These belong to the domain of religion; and the bright, inquisitive child will have answers, if not the true, then the false. The very silence of the teacher is misleading and dangerous. The truth is, the domains of science and religion are not separated from each other by hard and fast geographical boundaries; they not only overlap one another, they are complements of each other. God has joined them together, and man violates divine as well as natural law when he puts them asunder.

Let us come closer to this question of moral as related to religious instruction. Grant that we have a perfect code of morals carefully taught and strictly enforced in the school. Let the pupils be taught that it is wrong to steal and to lie and to disobey parents. Let every act of disobedience to these rules be met by suitable penalties, so far as the authority of the school can be made to reach. Let the atmosphere of the school be made as hostile to these vices and as friendly to the corresponding virtues as the teaching and practice of the instructors can make it. How

shall this excellent instruction be made effective outside the schoolroom, and on into life when schooldays are over? We are specially concerned for the boy who comes from a home (?) where he is taught by parental authority and example to lie and to steal, and where to refuse to do these things is to disobey his parents. What we want to know is how the dormant conscience is to be roused to action, and these moral precepts made to take fast hold of it. What help can the public school afford the boys (who are a mighty host) whose home surroundings are all hostile to virtue to enable them to resist the influence of their environment, so that they shall grow up good citizens? Shall they be told, and find it true in the schoolroom, that it is profitable to do right; that truthfulness and honesty and industry bring rewards, and falsehood and cheating and indolence bring penalties? But what if they find this order reversed everywhere outside the schoolroom? If they accept the general rule that upon the whole "honesty is the best policy," how much will this avail in the hour of temptation? The vicious are expert in devices, and confident of their ability to avoid the consequences of wrong-doing. The more the intellect is sharpened by education the greater their skill, and the stronger their confidence in it. Honesty, from mere policy, is no match for the blandishments of seductive temptation.

Such morality is rootless. It has no source of life. The coming citizen needs to be taught that there is an almighty and righteous Ruler of men who will render to every man according to his deeds; that under the government of such a ruler it is inconceivable that wrong-doing should bring good to the wrong-doer.

Or shall the child's love of approbation be appealed to? Let him be taught to prize the approval of his teachers and of those to whom he looks up as wise and honorable. And why should he not be taught also to covet the approval of a righteous God who approves only that which is right and good? Or if the child be taught to cultivate respect for himself, to form such a character as will command his own approval, why should he not also be taught to set before himself the highest standard of character, and strive to attain to it, even though the only perfect model the world has ever seen is, by unanimous consent, the Lord Jesus Christ?

It may be that our free institutions are strong enough to endure the strain caused by the vices and crimes of the illiterate and sensual masses, found chiefly in our great cities, but if those who have enjoyed the training furnished by our public schools think lightly of moral integrity, use crafty artifices in business and poli-

tics, "contaminate their fingers with base bribes," so that votes are bought and sold in the open market by educated citizens; and law-makers sell their official influence for office or money, and law-executors become partners with law-breakers, we may well tremble for our institutions and our country. And what shall save the coming citizens of the republic — now receiving their training in our public schools — from such corruption, if in their education all instruction respecting an almighty, omniscient, and righteous Ruler of the world be excluded?

Our business and our politics manifestly need nothing so much as a large infusion of faith in righteousness in the hearts of the people. But on what can faith in righteousness rest if there be no assured belief in a righteous God? What is righteousness but a name or a sentiment if there be not a Supreme Power that rules righteously?

On a question so vital, we shall do well to listen to what some of our wisest and best patriots and educators have said touching it. Washington, in his farewell address, said: "Let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." Daniel Webster, in his speech on the Girard Will case, said: "In what age, by what sect, where, when, by whom, has religious truth been excluded from the education of youth? Never. Everywhere and at all times it has been regarded as essential. It is the essence, the vitality of useful instruction." Principal Fairbairn says: "Human society reposes on religion. The nation that loses faith in God loses not only its most precious jewel, but its most unifying and conservative force." The late Dr. Tayler Lewis said: "The inseparability of morals and religion has been held by the best thinkers of all ages. What can be more decidedly irreligious than to instill into a child's mind the idea that there can be a true morality that has no relation to a divine law or a divine being regarded as the fountain of righteousness?" Dr. G. Stanley Hall says: "The slow realization that God's laws are not like those of parents and teachers, evadable, suspendable, and their infraction perhaps pardoned; but changeless, pitiless, and their penalties sure as the laws of nature, is a most important factor in moral education." Professor Laurie, of the University of Edinburgh, says: "Comparatively little value is to be attached to moral instruction, save in so far as it is

directed and inspired by religion. It is this union of the moral and the spiritual that produces what may be denoted by the one name, —the ethical life. Our aim in the school, therefore, is an ethical aim, and all we do is of true value only in so far as it contributes to this — the final cause of all our teaching."

The entire secularization of instruction in the public school by the exclusion of religion and the Bible cannot fail to lower and degrade the tone and spirit of the school. Professor Laurie (just referred to) says: "The eminent men who have left their mark on the education of the past have owed their influence mainly to some profound religious or moral impulse. Nor can any teacher or director of education be held to occupy a place that fits him, if he finds himself discharging the functions of an instructor of youth, or a superintendent of schools, unsupported and undirected and unconsolated in his daily task by a moral or religious purpose. Such a man has missed his vocation." A true teacher will inspire enthusiasm in his pupils. This he cannot do unless he feels an enthusiasm kindling his own soul. Men who have chosen teaching as their lifework because of their deep interest in youth are, for the most part, men of strong religious convictions, and will not allow themselves to be handicapped in their work by limitations in just that direction in which their chief interest lies. The scientist to whom his favorite science is constantly revealing an ever-present and ever-working Creator will not consent to hide from his pupils the discovery which is to him of supreme interest. The biologist who finds the source of all life in a Creator will not be forbidden to teach his pupils the truth as he sees it. The teacher of history who traces in the course of human events a guiding hand ruling in righteousness will not be content to give to his pupils the mere husk of facts, and withhold the kernel of vital truth which the husk incloses.

A true teacher's inspiration is the thought that he is moulding character, and inspiring high and noble purposes in youthful minds placed under him to be trained for the responsibilities of citizenship. The exclusion of religious teaching from our public schools cannot but result in driving from them the most enthusiastic and inspiring teachers. If God and his righteous government over men be ignored in our schools, the best class of teachers will retire from them, and few be left, except mere mercenaries who make teaching a trade. It is the *teacher* that educates, not school-houses or books, or mechanical methods, however perfect, and he only is fit to train immortal minds who is inspired with a high

purpose. Professor Laurie well says: "Of this we may be assured, that it is impossible to maintain moral instruction at a high level, or to give it its true meaning in relation to the life and destiny of a human being, if it be not fused into one whole with the emotion and passion which can be drawn from the religious life alone. Nay, without this spiritual element it may be shown that there is no true discipline, in any adequate sense of that important word." It will be a dark day for our public schools and for the state when teachers, whose inspiration in their work is drawn from their faith in God and religious truth, shall leave our schools, and their places be filled by those who are without such faith, or who are willing to hold their faith in abeyance for the sake of their positions.

The religious people of this nation who believe in our public schools believe that republican government rests on the virtue and intelligence of the people, and that the public school is necessary to train the generation about to come upon the stage in virtue and intelligence, and that only the virtue that is rooted in intelligent religious conviction will withstand the inevitable assaults of temptation, and that, therefore, the future citizen must receive somewhere early in life some kind and measure of religious instruction, and that the best inspiration for the work of teaching springs out of religious faith.

But is the public school the proper agency for giving this instruction? It certainly seems so. Science reveals a Creator, and history makes it certain that He is a righteous Ruler; and our best literature — prose and poetry — is permeated with religious thought, and even the dictionary contains a vast amount of religious teaching. Truths learned in their natural relations will hold their place best in the mind. The laws of psychology would be violated by ruling out religious instruction from its natural place. Then, it is manifest that the reasons already given why parents cannot be trusted to give their children the training the state would require apply with peculiar force in the direction of religious instruction. Those who give no thought to what their children need to make them good citizens are just those who cannot be trusted with their moral and religious training. Has the state no duty to the multitude of children, largely of foreign birth, all of whose surroundings are irreligious and demoralizing? Is it safe to trust to voluntary agencies to counteract the influence of these surroundings, while refusing to administer the antidote in the public school? Again, is there any sufficient reason why,

if the state take upon itself to educate the youth of the country for citizenship, it should omit an essential part of its task? A bridge is worthless that reaches only part way across the stream.

To all this it is replied that the religious training of the child belongs exclusively to the parent. If by this it is meant that it is the duty of each parent to give his child proper religious instruction, it is true. But does the state rest its own security upon the assumption that every parent will do his duty? Does it not behoove the state to guard against the possibility that multitudes of parents will utterly neglect it? Or is it meant that the *right* to give religious instruction belongs exclusively to the parent, so that no one else — individual, or church, or state — may interfere, at least without the parent's consent? This may be emphatically denied. Whatever the state needs to do for its own safety it has a right to do irrespective of any one's consent. This right the state is continually asserting, as when it taxes the Quaker for the support of the army. So far as the well-being of the state requires it, the authority of the state is higher than that of the parent over the child, and the right of the parent must give way to that of the state. This, being admitted, sets aside the objection, so often urged, that it is unjust to tax a parent for instruction which he does not wish his child to receive. The parent is *not* taxed for the instruction which his child receives, but for the protection which the state affords both himself and his child, — the school being as necessary for this protection as the army. To allow every parent, who can set up the plea of conscientious objections, to rule out of the public school whatever he does not want his child to learn would be manifest folly. Thousands of adopted citizens, born and reared under the institutions of the Old World, have no sympathy with our republican principles, but it is just the business of the public school to inculcate these principles, regardless of all such parents.

We come now to consider the stock argument against religious instruction in the public school, which may be fairly stated thus: "All religious teaching by the state is a support of religion by the state, and involves the principle of a union of church and state." If this proposition be true it closes the discussion, for the American people are unalterably opposed to the union of church and state. But is it true? Does what has been advocated in this paper involve the principle of union of church and state? It will be fair to allow an opponent of such teaching to state his case in his own words. The late Rev. Dr. S. T. Spear, one of

the early and most earnest advocates of the exclusion of the Bible from the public school, said: "If the state, considered as a political body, exercising the civil power, expressing its will through law, and enforcing that law by penalty, be a proper agency for the teaching and propagation of religion, then there can be no good objection to the employment of the Bible for this purpose in the public school. Indeed, the state, provided it regard the book as teaching the true religion, ought, upon this supposition, to use the Bible, and to adopt the necessary measures in the selection of teachers and in the entire arrangement of the system, to have the doctrines and precepts of the Bible, *as the state understands them* (italics his), thoroughly and effectively taught in every school which it creates and governs, and for whose support taxes the people." This, he says, involves us in state religion. Undoubtedly it does. But who desires the state to become an "agency for the teaching and propagation of religion?" Certainly no Protestant. The difference between "teaching and propagating a religion," "by law and penalty," and making use of certain religious truths — the common property of all mankind — in training its future citizens is radical. The youth of the nation need these elementary truths to fit them for citizenship as much as our soldiers need arms. The state buys the best arms to be found in the markets of the world for its soldiers: is there any reason why it should not be equally free to enter the markets of the world for the truth it needs to arm its future citizens?

Dr. Spear goes on to say that "if the Bible be admitted into the public school, it must be accepted on the authority of its source," and that school-boards must pronounce upon the correctness of the translation admitted, which goes to show that by an "agency for the teaching and propagation of religion," Dr. Spear means an agency for making orthodox Christians of the children, rather than an agency for making them good citizens. Now, however necessary a belief in the divine authorship of the Bible be to citizenship in the kingdom of heaven, few indeed think it indispensable to American citizenship. He emphasizes the fact that the state is "a political body exercising civil power, expressing its will through law, and enforcing law by penalty" as if it would use law and penalty to compel belief of its religious teachings. Now, when the state enforces the teaching of the public school in mathematics or political economy by penalties, it will be soon enough to fear that it will abuse its power in the direc-

tion of religious instruction. Not till the state inflicts a penalty on the pupil for refusing to believe that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is there any danger that the state will enforce its religious teachings by penalties.

The answer to be given to the question, often asked with an air of triumph, "What religion?" is, None. But if the question be, "*What religious truths?*" the answer is, "Such as the state judges to be useful and necessary to make good citizens." And if it be said that the people of the state are not agreed as to what truths are thus necessary, it may be answered that they are no more agreed on questions of science or history or political economy. And if it be objected that these questions do not come within the domain of conscience, the reply is that they often do. In a late number of a popular journal, two articles stand side by side, with these titles, "The Protection Idea Unchristian," and "Protection a National Duty." Each writer appeals to the consciences of his readers. In all such cases the individual conscience must give way to the united convictions of the people.

For the purpose for which the state needs the Bible in the public school, the question of its source no more needs to be discussed in the school than that of the authorship of "The Tempest." "The Tempest" is what it is, whether Shakespeare or Bacon wrote it. Let the Bible hold its place in the public school on its inherent character as a book suitable for training the future citizens of a free nation. Its friends certainly ought not to fear that it would not endure such a test. Professor Huxley is no "Bibliolater," but he has lately said: "Twenty-two years ago I pleaded for the use of the Bible as an instrument of popular education; and I venture to repeat what I then said: Consider the great fact that for three centuries this book has been woven into the life of all that is noblest and best in English history, and that it forbids the veriest hind, that never left his village, to be ignorant of the existence of other countries and other civilizations of the great past, stretching back to the furthest limits of the oldest nations in the world. By the study of what other book could children be so much humanized, and made to feel that each figure in that vast historical procession fills, like themselves, but a momentary space in the interval between the eternities, and earns the blessings or the curses of all time, according to its effort to do good and hate evil." "Down to modern times no state has had a constitution in which the interests of the people are so largely taken into the account, in which the duties, so much

more than the privileges, of rulers are insisted upon, as that drawn up for Israel in Deuteronomy and Leviticus ; nowhere is the fundamental truth that the welfare of the state, in the long run, depends on the righteousness of the citizen so strongly laid down." Certainly a book whose histories teach such truths as these, whether the history be inspired or not, is worthy of a place in the public schools of a republic.

The question, "What religion?" assumes that each sect desires to have *its* religion taught in the public school. This is an unfair assumption. It would be more just to say that no sect desires the state to assume any part of *its* work, but only that the state do the work that belongs to itself. And yet, at bottom, the opposition to religious teaching in the public school arises chiefly from each man's fear that if any religious teaching be allowed, religious error (or what he regards as error) may enter at the open door. The Protestant says, "If Protestants introduce instruction agreeable to themselves, when they have the power, Catholics will do likewise, when they get the power, and so the only safe policy is to exclude all kinds of religious teaching." It must be admitted that men intrusted with power may abuse it. A school-board may introduce sectarian teaching, under the pretext that it is adapted to make good citizens, but the possibility of such abuse does not invalidate the principle that the state has a right to give such instruction as will insure good subjects. My servant may mix poison with my food. I can escape the danger by abstaining from food, but this would be only choosing starvation in preference to death by poison. As between the risk of being poisoned and the certainty of starvation, I choose the former, so between the danger of sectarianism on the one hand and atheism on the other, the former is to be preferred. The one reply to be given to all demands from sects or parties is : "The public school teaches, not in the interest of any sect or party, but solely in the interest of the state, that it may have good citizens, and for this end it will avail itself of whatever will best serve its end, whether or not it be found in the creed of any sect, — in Bible, or Koran, or Veda." Sectarian teaching is to be kept out of our schools, not by excluding from them everything that any sect teaches, but by strict adherence to the principle of teaching that and only that which makes for good citizenship. If the religious sects were the right hand of the body politic, and the public school were the left hand, the left hand should not know what the right hand was doing. General Grant's idea, "Neither sectarian religion

nor atheism in our public schools," will be realized, and the independence of the public school maintained, by a firm adherence to the principle that the public school belongs to the state for the training of its future citizens.

No school-board is competent to draw the line between religious and non-religious instruction, but any ordinarily intelligent and patriotic board can tell what instruction the child needs to fit him for the responsibilities of citizenship. The danger that our schools will come under sectarian influence is not so imminent as that they will become practically atheistic, and the former calamity, should it occur, would not be so disastrous as the latter.

The state recognizes and protects the right of each sect to teach such doctrines as it deems essential to its own existence and growth. Has the state itself less liberty than it guarantees to the humblest sect? Shall the state permit any party or sect to deny its right to teach its future citizens anything whatever that it deems essential to its own safety or welfare? To do so would be something more humiliating and dangerous than a union of church and state. It would be the subjection of the state to a sect; and when a state allows any sect to prescribe what shall be the training of its future citizens, it commits the destiny of the state to that sect. The right to forbid or exclude what the state deems profitable cannot be distinguished, in principle, from the right to require, and thus we shall have, if not the unlawful wedlock of church and state, the helpless bondage of the state to the church.

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BROWNING'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

PHILOSOPHY and art are supposed by some people to be at variance; and they are certainly different in aim, method, and result. For the aim of philosophy is truth, the aim of art is beauty. The method of philosophy is critical reflection, proceeding from the known to the unknown by logical processes. The method of art is creation, or representation, transforming the ideal into the real, and the real into the ideal, through the fusing power of the imagination. The result of philosophy is a system that appeals to the intellect, and that explains or tries to explain phenomena. The result of art is a creation or "concrete repre-

sentation, which, uniting matter and spirit, substance and form, real and ideal, into a complete organic whole, addresses itself at once to the senses, the intellect, and the heart."

But deeper than all these divisions is the union of philosophy and art. While it is true that neither philosophy nor art is at its best until it is free, and while each is supreme in its own realm, both emanate from a common source, and each lends to the other something of itself. Both are deeply concerned with ideas. The sense impressions of philosopher and artist alike are reinforced and transformed by the critical energy of mind. The artistic impulse would be without significance or strength were it not nourished by meditation; thought makes of the mind of the artist a magnet, drawing to itself images and ideas, and thus enabling him to create out of the garnered wealth of his own soul and the universe. "Let no one hope without deep thought," said Plato, "to fashion everlasting material into eternal form;" and a modern writer with more fullness of truth has said: "More than the painter is required for the creation of great painting, and more than the poet for the exhibition of immortal verse. Painters are but the hands, and poets but the voices, whereby peoples express their accumulated thoughts and permanent emotions. Behind these crowd the generations of the myth-makers, and around them floats the vital atmosphere of enthusiasms on which their own souls and the souls of their brethren have been nourished."¹

On the other hand, philosophy could ill afford to dispense with "the idealized and monumental utterances" of art, — its witness to the unity of man and the world, and its penetrating glances into the facts and principles of the spiritual universe. The result of philosophic work can never become generally current, or "dear and genuine inmates of the household of man," so long as they are insulated by the intellect, or dwarfed by dogmatic statement, but these results must be vitalized by the emotions and the imagination, and this is the peculiar work of art. Mr. Browning at the end of the "Ring and the Book" states the philosophic content of that great and long poem in a very few words. He then asks, "Why take the artistic way to prove so much? Because it is the glory and good of art, that art remains the one way possible of speaking truth, to mouths like mine at least. How look a brother in the face and say, 'thy right is wrong, eyes hast thou yet blind, thine ears are stuffed and stopped, despite their length: and, oh, the foolishness thou countest faith!' Say this as silverly as tongue

¹ Symonds.

can troll: the anger of the man may be endured; the shrug, the disappointed eyes of him are not so bad to bear: but here's the plague, that all this trouble comes of telling truth, which truth, by when it reaches him, looks false, seems to be just the thing it would supplant, nor recognizable by whom it left: while falsehood would have done the work of truth. But Art, — wherein man nowise speaks to men, only to mankind, — Art may tell a truth obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought, nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word. So you may paint your picture, twice show truth, beyond mere imagery on the wall, — so, note by note, bring music from your mind deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived, — so write a book shall mean beyond the facts, suffice the eye and save the soul beside."

The greatest poets and artists have chosen this "more excellent way" of presenting truth, and are significant alike for the truthfulness of their ideas and the beauty of their artistic forms. "Ten silent centuries," it is said, found a voice in Dante, and "the truths to which he gave immortal expression had been slowly crystallizing in the consciousness of the Christian world." Now Dante was a student of scholasticism and a lecturer upon it as well. The passage through Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, as described in his "Divine Comedy," is the thread for the exposition of his doctrines. It would be difficult to find in this poem a truth that cannot be found in the writings of Albert or Thomas Aquinas. But the poem is much more than a system of philosophy or of theology; it is a vision, at once terrible and inspiring, not of the mediæval world alone, but of the world of humanity, and the essential conditions of the soul in any country, in any age, on such a pilgrimage. Scholasticism may have furnished the warp for Dante's sublime weaving, but the pattern, the texture, the figures, the perennial significance, all that appeals to the imagination and stirs the soul, is due to the genius of the poet.

What Dante did, — transfigured scholasticism for the "poor laity of love" to read, — a score of painters and sculptors sought to do in the first great period of Italian art, the period covered by Browning in his poem, "Old Pictures in Florence." More orthodox than Dante, dominated more by the church, and guilty, many of them, of picturesque infidelity, their work has not been so world-wide in its influence, or so significant to the modern mind. But in those days, when so few could read and there was so little for them to read, painting was in Italy the most potent means for the education of the people.

Hence, every great conception of the Middle Ages, dogmatic theology and pagan philosophy, Christian and pagan virtues, moral and political precepts, Biblical stories and monkish legends, saints and ecclesiasts, the bliss of the blessed and the misery of the damned, whatever was thought needful for the religious and civil life of man, was painted on the walls of churches and palaces.

Let us now consider the relation of Browning's art to the philosophy of his age. "The stream of tendency" in the nineteenth century is not, like that of the age of scholasticism, pervaded by a movement that carries all activities with it; it has many currents, and the main current is not always the same. There must be much interaction in a century so complex as ours; hence, the philosophic relation of such a complex poet as Browning can be determined only approximately. With the philosophic movement of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, Browning has little in common. It is too narrow, too mechanical, too materialistic, too destructive of the soul's freedom, to nurture a great poet. Mill himself fled for relief from his own philosophy to the poetry of Wordsworth; Herbert Spencer's suggestive phrase, "transfigured realism," is a confession of the need he feels for a more spiritual view of things. But the mind cannot be transfigured by a mere physical complement with vague suggestions of an Unknowable Force behind it. As a recent writer justly says: "Herbert Spencer leaves matter and mind, nature and thought, over against each other without vital relation, without explanation, and without a clew to that Unknowable Something in which they somehow combine, and which somehow animates and explains them both." Or as Browning himself puts it in the person of the prophet John in "A Death in the Desert": —

"For I say, this is death and the sole death,
When a man's loss comes to him from his gain,
Darkness from light, from knowledge ignorance,
And lack of love from love made manifest;
A lamp's death when, replete with oil, it chokes;
A stomach's when, surcharged with food, it starves.
With ignorance was surety of a cure.
When man, appalled at nature, questioned first,
'What if there lurk a might behind this might?'
He needed satisfaction God could give,
And did give, as ye have the written word:
But when he finds might still redouble might,
Yet asks, 'Since all is might, what use of will?'
— Will, the one source of might, — he being man

With a man's will and a man's might, to teach
 In little how the two combine in large, —
 That man has turned round on himself and stands,
 Which in the course of nature is, to die.

“ And when man questioned, ‘ What if there be love
 Behind the will and might, as real as they ? ’ —
 He needed satisfaction God could give,
 And did give, as ye have the written word :
 But when, beholding that love everywhere,
 He reasons, ‘ Since such love is everywhere,
 And since ourselves can love and would be loved,
 We ourselves make the love, and Christ was not,’ —
 How shall ye help this man who knows himself,
 That he must love and would be loved again,
 Yet, owning his own love that proveth Christ,
 Rejecteth Christ through very need of Him ?
 The lamp o’erswims with oil, the stomach flags
 Loaded with nurture, and that man’s soul dies.”

By far the broadest movement in the nineteenth century thought, the movement that has overspread and modified all others, is the scientific. By the scientific, I mean, a certain way of looking at things, certain methods of investigation and thought, rather than any specific system or theories ; and, as such, it has been all pervasive ; every kind of intellectual activity, even the poetic, has been influenced by it.

Browning has the scientific habit of mind, he has the critical scrutiny that examines from different points of view, sifts, and endeavors to approach more and more to the conception that represents the maximum of truth. Browning has also the enlightened curiosity for facts that distinguishes science, — the sympathy for old religions and civilizations, the hospitality to new ideas and theories.

Science has been “ a precious visitant,” indeed, to Browning, because she has “ furnished clear guidance, a support

“ Not treacherous to the mind’s excursive power.”

In addition to the point of view of scientific realism, Browning has that of idealism, and employed his genius as an artist to give expression to the results of both. “ He knows,” says a recent writer, “ the ‘ infinite significances ’ that facts have for thought, and how this significance comes of the mind’s own laws and depths. He is, in a word, an idealist in the last resort. Behind the energetic realism and strong grip on facts is a ‘ visionary power,’ and sense of ideas — convictions and passions that claim and affirm a world more real because ideal. He has the poet’s ulterior, intellectual perception, the artist’s sense of the reality of

the ideal, the thinker's conviction of its spirituality. Aware of both sides of experience, and keenly aware of its real side, he yet seeks on its ideal side the clew to experience and to the unknowable elements of man's own nature. Of all worlds, to him the most real is the world of man's thought and passion.

"The beliefs and emotions, the characters and actions of men, the expression of man through religion and art, the revelation of man in literature and history — here, indeed, is a realm of facts of most curious and profound interest, facts requiring and rewarding interpretation more than any other facts, and throwing more light than the whole body of physical knowledge on all that is of most value for us to know. . . . In an age of science mainly physical, he has maintained and illustrated the supreme interest and most real significance of man, not only to himself and with reference to every 'use' of life, but with reference to knowledge too. To this ground he has kept; from this standpoint and with this outlook all his work has been made."¹

Browning's affinity for idealism has already been indicated. He is identified with a movement of human thought that is as old as Plato. His idealism, however, is not that of Plato, but that which owed its most modern impulse to Kant and his successors, and has been accelerated by the poetry of Schiller and Goethe, Shelley and Wordsworth. These philosophers have made the most successful attempts to reconcile what has been called "the three great terms of thought, world, self, and God," while the poets have sought to embody them in artistic forms. Neither has succeeded perfectly; indeed, the perfect reconciliation of matter, thought, and spirit will be the final achievement of philosophy, as their perfect realization will be the crowning glory of art and religion. In "Paracelsus," in his sublime vision of a true evolution, Browning has foreseen this reconciliation: —

"Thus God dwells in all,
From life's minute beginnings, up at last
To man — the consummation of this scheme
Of being, the completion of this sphere
Of life : whose attributes had here and there
Been scattered o'er the visible world before,
Asking to be combined, dim fragments meant
To be united in some wondrous whole,
Imperfect qualities throughout creation,
Suggesting some one creature yet to make,
Some point where all these scattered rays should meet
Convergent in the faculties of man."

¹ Henry Jones : *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher.*

"Progress is

The law of life : man is not Man as yet.

Nor shall I deem his general object served,

While only here and there . . . a towering mind

O'erlooks its prostrate fellows ; when the host

Is out at once to the despair of night ;

When all mankind alike is perfected,

Equal in full-blown powers — then, not till then,

I say, begins man's general infancy."

Here are the steps of this reconciliation : God in nature working toward man, God in man working toward a complete humanity, and this complete humanity is "stung with hunger" for the divine fullness. Thus "nature," as one says, "is on its way back to God, gathering treasure as it goes."

Browning, thus interpreting God, man, and nature from an idealistic point of view, naturally discovered in art a deep significance. Like Kant and his successors, he connected art very closely with character. To Schiller, the beautiful was an intimation of the true and the good ; art was a means to these. More exactly than any one before him, Schiller estimated the importance of the artistic feeling for the development of humanity. Hegel connects the three general forms of art, the symbolic, the classic, and the romantic, with the three essential stages through which the spirit of man must pass in its development. And Browning's art-poems are studies of character in certain forms and periods of artistic activity.

An art-critic, intent only upon literal accuracy, would not accept the judgments expressed in those poems without many qualifications. He would cite, for example, the frescoes of Andrea del Sarto in the entrance court of Santa Annunziata in Florence, — their great dignity, their fresh passion and imagination, as evidence that Andrea was more than the clever realist Browning has described. Sandro, better known as Botticelli, is classified by Browning in his "Old Pictures in Florence" with Giotto, Taddeo Gaddi, and Cimabue, but Botticelli was a pupil of Fra Lippo Lippi, who ushered in the next period of Italian art. Many such criticisms might be made, but they do not invalidate the truth of Browning's art-poems. His principle of classification transcends such minor distinctions, and is concerned with the exemplification in art of certain types of character. Andrea del Sarto, it is true, occasionally rises to a great dignity of expression, but the general level of his art, as of his life, was low, stereotyped, and sordid. Botticelli, though a pupil of Lippi, had a strong individuality, and

belonged in spirit to the school of Giotto. Few painters have made every part of their work so tributary to an idea, or striven more earnestly after ideal beauty.

In the poem, "Old Pictures in Florence," Browning shows that romantic art in its crude form is superior to Greek art in its perfection, simply because it manifests a higher ideal of the human soul. He is not unmindful of the glory of the Grecian character and art. The very atmosphere in which the Greeks lived was pellucid, and their thought was like it. They had, too, an intense love of sensuous beauty, a love that a clear, translucent sky, blue crystalline seas, and each old poetic mountain "inspiration breathing around," so nurtured that it became their master passion. Naturally their thoughts became transfigured into images; the more vivid the conception, the more sensuous it seemed; indeed, thought and image became one. The spirit of man for a time saw its ideal realized in the grand and beautiful forms of the Grecian divinities.

But no sensuous representation, however excellent, could long seem an adequate expression to the developing soul of man. Spirit alone can satisfy spirit, and only in its own realm, the inner realm of the soul, can it find its true reality. In the decadence of Grecian art, in proportion as there was a surrender to outer vision and as bodily charm was sought as an end, the human spirit turned its gaze inward and communed with its own loftier ideals. Philosophy dissolved the splendid Grecian mythology into a single, infinite, invisible divinity. Idea and sensuous image were separated. Then Christianity came, insisting upon the Divine Spirit as the absolute ideal, and glorifying the soul at the expense of the body, if need be. Christian virtues had no necessary connection with bodily symmetry and grace. A Greek faun must be graceful, a Greek god must be vigorous, but a Christian saint without any physical charm might be enshrined with glory. The Greek had no appreciation for such beauty as St. Bernard saw in his hymn to the Crucified One:—

"All the strength and bloom are faded,
Who hath thus Thy state degraded?
Death upon Thy form is written;
See the wan, worn limbs, the smitten
Breast upon the cruel tree.

"Thus despised and decorated,
Thus in dying desolated,
Slain for me, of sinners vilest,
Loving Lord, on me Thou smilest:
Shine, bright face, and strengthen me."

But it was just such spiritual beauty as this that was the strength of the soul in this stage of its development, and it was the mission of romantic art to reveal this beauty.

Now let us turn to Browning's poem and observe how he distinguishes between these two stages, between classic and romantic art : —

"When Greek Art ran and reached the goal,
Thus much had the world to boast in fructu —
The Truth of Man, as by God first spoken,
Which the actual generations garble,
Was re-uttered, and Soul (which Limbs betoken)
And Limbs (Soul informs) made new in marble.

"So, you saw yourself as you wished you were,
As you might have been, as you cannot be ;
Earth here, rebuked by Olympus there :
And grew content in your poor degree
With your little power, by those statues' godhead,
And your little scope, by their eyes' full sway,
And your little grace, by their grace embodied,
And your little date, by their forms that stay."

"Growth came when, looking your last on them all,
You turned your eyes inwardly one fine day
And cried with a start, — What if we so small
Be greater and grander the while than they ?
Are they perfect of lineament, perfect of stature ?
In both, of such lower types are we
Precisely because of our wider nature ;
For time, theirs — ours, for eternity.

"To-day's brief passion limits their range ;
It seethes with the morrow for us and more.
They are perfect — how else ? they shall never change :
We are faulty — why not ? we have time in store.
The Artificer's hand is not arrested
With us ; we are rough-hewn, nowise polished :
They stand for our copy, and, once invested
With all they can teach, we shall see them abolished.

"T is a life-long toil till our lump be leaven —
The better. What's come to perfection perishes.
Things learned on earth, we shall practice in heaven :
Works done least rapidly, Art most cherishes."

"On which I conclude, that the early painters,
To cries of 'Greek Art and what more wish you ?' —
Replied, 'To become now self-acquainters,
And paint man, man, whatever the issue !
Make new hopes shine through the flesh they fray,
New fears aggrandize the rags and tatters :
To bring the invisible full into play !
Let the visible go to the dogs — what matters ?'"

The degeneracy of art has always been characterized by a turning away from the invisible and a bowing down to the visible. The limitation and condemnation of all such art may be found in the poem of "Andrea del Sarto." Andrea speaks of his easy mastery of his art:—

"I can do with my pencil what I know,
What I see, what at bottom of my heart
I wish for, if I ever wish so deep —
Do easily, too — when I say, perfectly,
I do not boast, perhaps : yourself are judge,
Who listened to the Legate's talk last week ;
And just as much they used to say in France.
At any rate 't is easy, all of it !
No sketches first, no studies, that 's long past :
I do what many dream of all their lives,
— Dream ? strive to do, and agonize to do,
And fail in doing. I could count twenty such
On twice your fingers, and not leave this town,
Who strive — you don't know how the others strive
To paint a little thing like that you smeared
Carelessly passing with your robes afloat, —
Yet do much less, so much less, Someone says,
(I know his name, no matter) — so much less."

But his ideal is lower than that of others who are not so skillful, and he feels that he falls below them : —

"Well, less is more, Lucrezia : I am judged.
There burns a truer light of God in them,
In their vexed beating stuffed and stopped-up brain,
Heart, or whate'er else, than goes on to prompt
This low-pulsed forthright craftsman's hand of mine.

Yonder 's a work now, of that famous youth
The Urbinate who died five years ago.
(T is copied, George Vasari sent it me.)
Well, I can fancy how he did it all,
Pouring his soul, with kings and popes to see,
Reaching, that heaven might so replenish him,
Above and through his art — for it gives way ;
That arm is wrongly put — and there again —
A fault to pardon in the drawing's lines,
Its body, so to speak : its soul is right,
He means right — that, a child may understand.
Still, what an arm ! and I could alter it :
But all the play, the insight and the stretch —
Out of me, out of me !"

In suggestive contrast to Andrea del Sarto stifling the promptings "God and the glory, never care for gain," and squandering

his talents upon self and popularity, is Pictor Ignotus, who chose to worship his lofty but narrow ideal in poverty and obscurity, rather than lavish his genius on the vain world. "Nor will I say," Pictor Ignotus confesses, —

"I have not dreamed (how well!)
Of going — I, in each new picture, — forth,
As, making new hearts beat and bosoms swell,
To Pope or Kaiser, East, West, South, or North,
Bound for the calmly satisfied great State,
Or glad aspiring little burgh, it went,
Flowers cast upon the car which bore the freight,
Through old streets named afresh from the event,
Till it reached home, where learned age should greet
My face, and youth, the star not yet distinct
Above his hair, lie learning at my feet! —
Oh, thus to live, I and my picture, linked
With love about, and praise, till life should end,
And then not go to heaven, but linger here,
Here on my earth, earth's every man my friend, —
The thought grew frightful, 't was so wildly dear!
But a voice changed it."

The voice of his soul proclaiming a lofty, austere ideal, that had nothing in common with the popular fancy: —

"Wherefore I chose my portion. If at whiles
My heart sinks, as monotonous I paint
Those endless cloisters and eternal aisles
With the same series, Virgin, Babe, and Saint,
With the same cold calm beautiful regard, —
At least no merchant traffics in my heart;
The sanctuary's gloom at least shall ward
Vain tongues from where my pictures stand apart:
Only prayer breaks the silence of the shrine
While, blackening in the daily candle-smoke,
They moulder on the damp wall's travertine,
'Mid echoes the light footstep never woke.
So, die my pictures! surely, gently die!
O youth, men praise so, — holds their praise its worth?
Blown harshly, keeps the tramp its golden cry?
Tastes sweet the water with such specks of earth?"

In Fra Lippo Lippi's earnest pleading there is revealed another important element in Browning's philosophy of art.

Lippi, a waif, full of sensibility, his soul and sense sharpened by "the hunger pinch" to the keenest scrutiny of the world about him, is taken, at eight years of age, to a convent, where he shows such a decided propensity for painting that the Prior, despairing

of doing anything else with this erratic little genius, bade him daub away : —

“ My head being crammed, the walls a blank,
 Never was such prompt disembodying,
 First, every sort of monk, the black and white,
 I drew them, fat and lean : then, folk at church,
 From good old gossips waiting to confess
 Their cribs of barrel-droppings, candle-ends, —
 To the breathless fellow at the altar-foot,
 Fresh from his murder, safe and sitting there
 With the little children round him in a row
 Of admiration, half for his beard and half
 For that white anger of his victim's son
 Shaking a fist at him with one fierce arm,
 Signing himself with the other because of Christ
 (Whose sad face on the cross sees only this
 After the passion of a thousand years)
 Till some poor girl, her apron o'er her head,
 (Which the intense eyes looked through) came at eve
 On tiptoe, said a word, dropped in a loaf,
 Her pair of earrings and a bunch of flowers
 (The brute took growling), prayed, and so was gone.
 I painted all, then cried, ‘ ’Tis ask and have ;
 Choose, for more's ready ! ’ — laid the ladder flat,
 And showed my covered bit of cloister-wall.
 The monks closed in a circle and praised loud
 Till checked, taught what to see and not to see,
 Being simple bodies, — ‘ That's the very man !
 Look at the boy who stoops to pat the dog !
 That woman's like the Prior's niece who comes
 To care about his asthma : it's the life ! ’
 But there my triumph's straw-fire flared and funk'd ;
 Their betters took their turn to see and say :
 The Prior and the learned pulled a face
 And stopped all that in no time. ‘ How ? what's here ?
 Quite from the mark of painting, bless us all !
 Faces, arms, legs, and bodies like the true
 As much as pea and pea ! it's devil's game !
 Your business is not to catch men with show,
 With homage to the perishable clay,
 But lift them over it, ignore it all,
 Make them forget there's such a thing as flesh.
 Your business is to paint the souls of men —
 Man's soul, and it's a fire, smoke . . . no, it's not . . .
 It's vapor done up like a new-born babe —
 (In that shape when you die it leaves your mouth)
 It's . . . well, what matters talking, it's the soul !
 Give us no more of body than shows soul ! ”

The standard of art that the Prior held up was too narrow for the broadening spirit of human development. The aim of the artist had been the mere intelligible expression of the theme, generally a theological one, which he was commissioned to treat. In his treatment he suppressed, so far as possible, his own individuality, and made his figures look as unworldly as possible. And so long as the ruling style of painting was allegorical, so long as symbols were much in vogue and theological fidelity was more highly esteemed in the painter than picturesque fidelity, no disunion was felt between theme, artist, and form; these three were one.

But when the Renaissance with its rich and varied culture, with its revelation of a new value in man and the world, began to stir the soul of man, a significant change began. Pagan tradition teaching the value of this present world contended with monastic "other-worldliness" for the possession of the soul of man, beauty strove for supremacy with dogma, Art, conscious of her increasing power by reason of her improved technique, tried to serve two masters. She received her commissions from the church, professed fealty, but mingled pagan and Christian ideas in a way sweetly reasonable to herself, if to no one else, and bodied them forth in a manner which showed that her heart was with beauty rather than with dogma. That is a very suggestive question the Prior asks Fra Lippo Lippi:—

"Here's Giotto, with his Saint a-praising God,
That sets us praising, — why not stop with him?"

Giotto had taken a long step in advance of the Prior's ideal. Giotto had little of the superstitious enthusiasm of his time, but much of the new love of nature. His themes, it is true, are much like those of his predecessors, but his style is not so formal and servile; he employs natural incidents and forms; his composition has a depth and richness that is almost modern. Compared with Don Lorenzo Monaco or even with Fra Angelico, "that late blooming flower of an almost by-gone time amid the pulsations of a new life," Giotto was a realist. Accurately stated, Giotto was an idealist, with decided touches of realistic treatment: only such a painter could have given the great impulse Giotto did to the sculpture of the Renaissance. Indeed, the other old masters whom Browning praises for their lofty ideal, Cimabue, Taddeo Gaddi, Sandro, the sculptor Nicolo the Pisan, and others, — these artists, sensing the Renaissance love of beauty that was dawning upon the world, humanized this ideal and gave it sensuous charm.

In the next great period of Italian art, the period ushered in by Fra Lippo Lippi, the artist was less fettered, he asserted his individuality more, and sought more earnestly for beauty in his forms. Luca Signorelli, for example, in his picture, *The Madonna and Child*, has painted in the background, instead of the customary shepherds, four nude figures, modeled in strong light and shade. This painting symbolizes the character of that period; it shows how the Renaissance, though in outward conformity to the church, was luring art to the worship of beauty. What Signorelli painted Fra Lippo Lippi voiced in his answer to the Prior's dictum, "Paint no more of body than shows soul." He argues: —

"Why can't a painter lift each foot in turn,
Left foot and right foot, go a double step,
Make his flesh liker and his soul more like,
Both in their order? Take the prettiest face,
The Prior's niece . . . patron-saint—is it so pretty
You can't discover if it means hope, fear,
Sorrow or joy? won't beauty go with these?
Suppose I've made her eyes all right and blue,
Can't I take breath and try to add life's flash,
And then add soul and heighten them threefold?
Or say there's beauty with no soul at all—
(I never saw it—put the case the same—)
If you get simple beauty and naught else,
You get about the best thing God invents:
That's somewhat: and you'll find the soul you have missed,
Within yourself, when you return him thanks.

.

"You be judge.

You speak no Latin more than I, belike;
However, you're my man, you've seen the world
—The beauty and the wonder and the power,
The shapes of things, their colors, lights, and shades,
Changes, surprises,—and God made it all.
—For what? Do you feel thankful, ay or no,
For this fair town's face, yonder river's line,
The mountain round it and the sky above,
Much more the figures of man, woman, child,
These are the frame to? What's it all about?
To be passed over, despised? or dwelt upon,
Wondered at? oh, this last of course!—you say.
But why not do as well as say,—paint these
Just as they are, careless what comes of it?
God's works—paint any one, and count it crime
To let a truth slip.

.

"This world's no blot for us,
Nor blank; it means intensely, and means good:
To find its meaning is my meat and drink."

The gist of Lippi's speech is well expressed in Mrs. Browning's "Aurora Leigh," "Paint a body well, you paint a soul by implication, like the grand first Master."

Browning's distinction of objective and subjective poet in his "Essay on Shelley" throws so much light not only upon Lippi's speech but upon his philosophy of art, that it may well conclude this paper.

"The objective poet," says Browning, "is one whose endeavor has been to reproduce things external (whether the phenomena of the scenic universe, or the manifested action of the human heart and brain) with an immediate reference, in every case, to the common eye and apprehension of his fellow-men, assumed capable of receiving and profiting by this reproduction. It has been obtained through the poet's double faculty of seeing external objects more clearly, widely, and deeply, than is possible to the average mind, at the same time that he is so acquainted and in sympathy with its narrow comprehension as to be careful to supply it with no other materials than it can combine into an intelligible whole." This is precisely the endeavor and method of Fra Lippo Lippi. His saints are of our common humanity; his angels are "like great, high-spirited boys." His figures are drawn with such human feeling and grouped with such dramatic vividness that they easily charm the observer.

On the other hand, "the subjective poet is impelled to embody the thing he perceives, not as much with reference to the many below, as to the One above him, the supreme Intelligence who apprehends all things in their absolute truth, — an ultimate view ever aspired to, if but partially attained by the poet's own soul. Not what man sees, but what God sees — the Ideas of Plato, seeds of creation lying burningly on the Divine Hand — it is towards these that he struggles. Not with the combination of humanity in action, but with the primal elements of humanity he has to do; and he digs where he stands, preferring to seek them in his own soul, as the nearest reflex of that absolute Mind according to the intuitions of which he desires to perceive and speak."

This characterization is just as true of the subjective painter, — it contains the essential principle of Fra Angelico's art and, in general, that of the Old Masters of Florence whom Browning praises.

The subjective and the objective poet may be combined in one person; I believe that they were in Robert Browning; similarly the subjective and the objective artist were one in Raphael. And I come to the conclusion of this paper with the strong desire that Browning had written one more art poem, exemplifying how the idealism of the Old Painters of Florence and the realism of Andrea del Sarto, each alike one-sided and struggling for supremacy in Fra Lippo Lippi, became one in Raphael, a full-orbed artist, making the ideal appear more real and the real more ideal.

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HOW FAR IS A PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT IS CALLED THE TENDENCY OF HIS TEACHING?

THIS question is placed at the head of the paper, not because of confidence in an absolutely correct response, but for the purpose of leading thought in that direction. The attempt, therefore, will take the form of a study. A complete definition of terms and relations, could such be drawn, may be likened to a circle. The endeavor shall be to place a few segments of the circle, and so approximately determine, from the arcs given, the sweep of the circuit.

The question under discussion is an important one for several reasons, a few of which will be noticed.

It nestles at the heart of many of the most interesting historic problems. No man is a wise student of former days unless he goes to his research with a mind awakened to the pertinency of the question, with a mind furnished and disciplined somewhat by an attempt to solve it. The time of annalists is gone by. In the rearing of literary, historic structures, sap is taking the place of cement. As to the great fact of the flow of thought and the flow of life in thought, Plato says in *Theætetus*: "Summon all philosophers, one after another, with the exception of Parmenides: summon the great masters of either kind of poetry; and they will agree with you in this: all things are becoming, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming." However vaguely and vainly these ancient thinkers may have speculated in this line, tending now to spiritual and now to material pantheism, still there is seen to be a recognition of the great law of life: Things are in flux. When we take our stand

with Plato both the present and the past have for us a glorious depth. We are able to handle somewhat sympathetically the philosophical ideas of that day. Add the positive, responsible force of the individual will, as enunciated in the gospel and as emphasized in modern times, a force sometimes lost sight of but never destroyed, and we are prepared to deal with history in its length and breadth and, as never before, in its depth. It is this view of thought that has introduced the style of adding an historical portico to the edifice of any department of knowledge. We feel the need of getting into the flow of thought, and flowing with it, in imagination, down to the given section which is the special study of interest at the time. We say there were reformers before the Reformation. We have introduced the study of the history of doctrines into our theological seminaries. Bernard proves to our minds that there is progress of doctrine in the New Testament; and the call now is for a Biblical theology.

Again, all epoch-making heroes, like Luther in religion, Descartes in philosophy, Montesquieu in history, Adam Smith in political economy are "big with the future, because loaded with the past." The most original men are great readers as well as great thinkers. "Originality and true progress," says Shedd, "are impossible without history." Consider, also, the interminable line of charges of plagiarism. Begin with Poe's savage attack upon Longfellow, and you may go back along the entire line of brilliant names in literature, omitting scarcely one. Pascal once wrote these lines with his puncturing pen: "Certain authors speaking of their works, say, my book, my commentary, my history; it were better to say, our book, our commentary, our history, for generally there is more in it belonging to others than to themselves." I have found this to be true; read a certain book, and you think it original, unique; read a little further, and you decide that it belongs to a small group; read still further, and you conclude that it has an unbroken line of genealogy. Thus, whether we deal with the past in a special biographic manner or in a comprehensive, philosophic way, we see the importance of the question, for it must come into consideration before any proper historic estimates can be placed upon characters, schools, institutions, epochs.

Again, this question deserves to come into special prominence in what are called transition periods; for, with the race, as with the individual, these seasons are specially critical: critical in this particular, the influence of life on life. New view-points are

taken. Scenes are shifting. Thought is intense. Souls are susceptible. While the new is only partially known it is captivating. Therefore there is needed the balancing effect of this question as to responsibility. What seems play of the mind for the time may turn out to be durable work for eternity. That we have entered upon such a period there can be no doubt. Science has been broadening and deepening the stream of thought. A re-discovery of the East has also added breadths before unrealized. Thus unexpected tributaries flow in from hitherto dark continents, and not only swell the volume, but compel comparisons which, in turn, call for a redistribution of judgments. We are assured that "all European history, for instance, is being rewritten and reinterpreted under the new ethnological truths of the present generation." And we find the question of the revelation, inspiration, and evidence of the Bible discussed with a freshness of method and power, as in the treatise of John Robson, who speaks in the preface as follows: "This work is strictly a biblical study; but the point of view is one which, though familiar to myself, is not so familiar to most biblical students in this country who have not been brought practically into contact with other faiths." It was because he was struck with the similarity of many of the Brahmanical arguments to those of the Christians in upholding the inspiration of their sacred books that he entered upon the investigation.

Further, if history teaches anything plainly, it teaches this: that great material advances are sure to be followed by a deep revolutionary stirring of the intellectual life. The clustering inventions and discoveries of the latter part of the fifteenth century were precursors of such a grand quickening as we find in the Humanistic movement and the Reformation. The commercial prosperity of the Italian cities, fostered by the Crusades, prepared the way for the dawn of art and literature. What, then, must we say is in store for us? For to what half century can we point that will furnish a parallel to the last half century in the strides taken along the line of material advancement in scientific, inventive, mechanical, industrial activity? Here are gathering in our Republic, wide as the continent, a marvelous wealth of historic forces, new in their variety, new in their political relationships. Here a problem is to be worked out in the free atmosphere of a government, by and for the people, by means of factors contributed from all parts of the world, and at a time when the world has learned to be more wisely retrospective.

There can be but one conviction, that we are already living in the dawn of a new age. The Empire of Rome broke up into feudal territories preparatory to the political distribution of modern Europe. Though a political millennium is not yet, there is certainly thought to be an advance. Is he altogether a visionary who sees a somewhat similar movement initiated by Luther in the ecclesiastical world? Before his day, the church was one vast, despotic empire. Have we not been living for many generations in the midst of a feudalism of church creeds and church politics? Do we see in the Evangelical Alliance, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Societies of Moral Reform, and the Benefit Associations [an embodied rebuke to the churches, — a rebuke, however arrogant? Are they, in the providence of God, to act wholly as pulverizing agencies, or in part as ushering to the church of the future? Is the ethical drift of to-day a false current, or is it to render a corrective service, as was done in the twelfth century when the revival of Roman law not only aroused antagonism to the political claims of the papacy, but fostered an ethical opposition to the theoretical subtleties of the schoolmen? Whatever view may be taken, all open-eyed men will consent to the appropriateness of the words: —

"We are living, we are dwelling, in a grand and awful time,
In an age on ages telling to be living is sublime."

To the preacher and pastor this question is certainly vital and practical. "Every scribe," said Christ, "who hath been made a disciple to the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a householder, which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old." In fidelity to this idea, the preacher may find men gathering about him, as they gathered about Paul, saying, "Thou bringest strange things to our ears; we would know, therefore, what these things mean." Paul, indeed, was an apostle, and the subject-matter was new; but he who nailed the ninety-five theses to the church door of Wittenberg was not an apostle, except as all preachers are apostles sent of God to unfold and defend the truth: the subject-matter was not new; but it had been left in the treasure-house so long that men said of him when he brought it out, as they said of the apostle, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods." Ever since the crystallization of the proverb, "Like priest like people;" ever since the charge was made against Socrates that his teaching corrupted the youth of Athens, this question has deserved a foremost place: How far is a person responsible for what is called the tendency of his teaching?

A tendency implies force, continuity, change. This is true alike in the realm of matter and the realm of spirit. The great Teacher likened the kingdom of heaven to a planted seed. Different terms may be used in the two realms; but the one all-embracing fact, dominating more and more the man who is a keen and wide observer, is this: the forces of the past project themselves by various laws of continuity into the future, and become different in the future in so far as passage through the present may affect them. In the material world the present allows of new combinations, and so nature spontaneously pushes itself through form after form. Each of the revolving seasons gives a new atmosphere to the network of twigs, a new temperature to the soil in which the roots are buried, and so fosters, retards, graduates, the microscopic building processes of the oak. The oak life, planted years ago in the acorn, works in the present together with the sunshine, the cloud, the wind, the drouth, the fog, the dew.

In the intellectual realm, likewise, the present moment allows of new combinations, and so thought pushes itself into ever varying form. Thought has its complex environment as well as the oak. There are intellectual seasons and climates. Historic epochs which were first the bursting buds of new life, afterward become the diverging points of an amplified growth. The buds lengthen into branches. Culminating points become radiating centres. The influences at work in each momentary stage of the progress are readily acknowledged as numerous, varied, and in no small degree subtle. There are not only "persistent and gigantic pressures" from the race behind, from the age without, but there are manifold local and personal considerations which exercise a moulding power. In the midst of this interplay of forces, there is one which I am to seize upon and hold, as distinctly as possible, before the mind while I discuss the question proposed; and that force is the will of a teacher.

There is no responsibility where there is no power of will. Will is a person acting, or, as Kant says, "Man's will is his proper self." The will of a teacher is a person in intellectual activity bringing himself to bear as a modifying power upon another person in intellectual activity.

This, then, is a statement of the problem. A man is different to-day from what he was yesterday. How far is his teacher of yesterday responsible for the change manifest to-day? And by responsible is meant answerable to God. How far is he justly

held accountable? It is not so simple a question as it at first appears. If it is an inquiry calling for a grapple with a real ethical problem, it covers more ground than the words actually cover. When thus put, it takes for granted that the tendency of a man's teaching is gauged and tested by conditions in his pupil, hearer, or reader. If a teacher were the only means of communication between the thought in the past and the pupil in the present; if the pupil received into his life only such thought as the teacher elected, and received it passively, as a cistern, connected by pipe, receives water from a reservoir, then the teacher would be responsible for whatever tendency was transmitted to the pupil. The fact is quite otherwise. No one man or set of men has a monopoly of the transfer of thought from generation to generation.

The intellectual life of the past, full to overflowing, seizes upon every avenue through which to convey itself into the future,—book, painting, statue, monument, statute-law, precedent, custom, organized societies and forms of endeavor. A teacher finds himself, therefore, in the midst of a countless multitude of communicating agencies. He lifts himself in the midst of this world-wide, ceaseless flow. He stands between the thought of the past and the pupil. He focalizes a different aggregate of thought in his personality, and so brings to bear a unique influence; but, while he is teaching, the pupil is seeing, reading, thinking, remembering, yes, breathing, with intellectual lungs, the subtle influences afloat in the air.

We are therefore to bear in mind that teaching and learning are correlative activities; and hence, that which may be called the tendency of the former may owe its quality and force to this reciprocal union of the two.

Let us, then, analyze this term, "tendency," and ascertain what its elements are.

It may be said in general that a tendency is shown sometimes in intensifying or carrying to an extreme; sometimes in deadening or inducing indifference; and sometimes in bringing about a reaction. These different conditions are never continuously distinct. They are ever shading off into each other. Celsus once caught a glimpse of this fact and affirmed that "all things are subject to the law of periodicity." We are all well aware of the ease with which a good thing may merge into a bad thing. We err in the direction in which we excel. Generosity becomes prodigality; prudence, miserliness. A comprehensive view tends to

compromise, and, in turn, brings about skepticism. Extreme Calvinism leads to theoretical fatalism and practical antinomianism, and so gives an occasion for a Channing, and he will be followed by a Parker and a Frothingham. Romanists claim that the natural outcome of Protestantism is Rationalism; with them the Liberalists agree.

The question is thus seen to be very complex. Let us, then, detach a few of the elements for separate consideration.

1. A tendency is imparted by adding to the sum of thought. A teacher who increases the stock of a pupil's knowledge adds to the furnishing of his mind, gives it new as well as multiplied equipment for thinking and planning. Scientific contributions (I speak now of facts and laws, not theories) we all acknowledge exert a modifying influence upon our thinking in every department of life. Geology threw light upon Genesis. Archæological discoveries in Egypt and Assyria are now doing the same. The advance in physics is stirring life with revolutionary influences that girdle the globe. Max Müller unlocks the religious and philosophical treasure-house of the East, and brings to our minds that which leaves us by no means where it found us. New data call for fresh judgments. It is rare that absolutely original contributions are made to the world's sum of thought; but it is one of the rudimentary parts of teaching to communicate that which before was unknown to the pupil. This, then, is the first way in which a teacher transmits tendency to a pupil. He adds knowledge of facts and laws; supplies the raw material which of itself invites mental activity, necessarily unlike, in some respects, any that has preceded it.

2. A tendency is imparted by the method adopted in presenting thought.

Every teacher has a system, however meagre or ill constructed. It may be compact at the base, and lift itself into splendid architectural harmony, or it may more nearly resemble a rambling Dutch house. The mind instinctively calls for a unification of its knowledge. Even though a teacher may strive to be a colorless medium through which knowledge is conveyed, there can be no avoiding the necessity of doing what is done under the lead of an intelligent will. That will has a choice, and will show it in its grouping. Everything cannot be made known to-day. Which, then, from what is known, shall be selected, and how shall facts and laws be arranged for presentation? "A method always involves a principle." In proportion as a teacher is consistent will he

approximate the standing of a philosopher. Philosophy makes the grand, intellectual difference between men. The Platonic—that is, the Ideal, the Synthetic—philosophy and the Aristotelian—that is, the Logical, the Analytical—philosophy are as distinctly traced in the men whose minds they sway as are the colors of the rainbow.

The arch was a method, and led to a wonderful expansion of architecture. The Infinitesimal Calculus, a like expansive force in mathematics, resulted from a methodical joining of algebra and arithmetic. Bossuet and Voltaire were antipodes, because the one, in his historical survey, took for a standpoint the Divine will in Providence, and the other ignored all but secondary causes.

Thus we see how method in the selection and combination of the elements of knowledge brings to bear in each case a distinctive influence.

Every preacher has a more or less clearly defined philosophical view of religious knowledge, which manifests itself in his method of interpretation, application, and defense of Scripture truth.

3. A tendency is imparted by the emphasis given to certain thoughts.

Emphasis might properly be regarded as belonging to a method; but I have in mind a distinction which makes method characterize a class, while emphasis distinguishes individuals. Within the same philosophical and theological schools there are men laying emphasis upon different parts of the systems of thought. This fact arises partly from individual dissimilarity and partly from the condition of those whom they serve. Every man has his favorite words as well as ideas. They are continually recurring in the whole circle of his life work. In the Introduction to his works, Channing says: "Some topics will be found to recur often, perhaps the reader may think too often; but it is in this way that a writer manifests his individuality, and he can in no other way do justice to his mind." "To learn what a man is, it is not enough to dissect his mind and see separately the thoughts and feelings which successively possess him. The question is, what thoughts and feelings predominate, stand out most distinctly, and give hue and impulse to the common actions of his mind."

It is said of such persons as Raphael, Herder, De Stäel, Locke, Grotius, and Jonathan Edwards, that in their earliest works was deposited the germ of all opinions afterward developed. They again and again, though in a more elaborate way, revert to these dear topics.

4. A tendency is imparted by exercising repressive power over the minds of learners. The tendency shows itself in unrest at the time, and especially in a reactionary form afterward. The Roman Catholic Church furnishes a long series of illustrations of this attempt at making men think obediently to the behests of its will. Sometimes an individual, who has a bold, confident, self-assertive way, and who is impatient at the least dissent from his views, can, by his intellectual ascendancy, repress free expression of thought, and arbitrarily have things in his own way. The reactionary religious movement in Franklin, after the death of Dr. Emmons, may serve to show that another series of illustrations may be found running through Protestant Christendom.

5. A tendency may also be imparted by stirring the mind of the learner, and infusing into it a certain spirit of the teacher. This will apply especially when the power of personal presence is added to the thought objectively considered. There are certain authors who seem to have the power of breathing a personal magnetism into their thought, and giving it an atmosphere of influence independent of the subject-matter. The added thought, the grouping, the emphasis, may not be remembered; but the effect of the intellectual vigor, the moral earnestness, the great manner of the thinking, the man in the teacher, may awaken the mind, charge it with a spirit, set it into activity, the results of which may be even more marked than would be the result if the same system were adopted and the identical emphasis be reproduced. Socrates, in the "Apology," says: "If I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, I am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the god; and the state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy, and requires to be stirred into life." A teacher, by his spirit of search, by his attitude of independence, by his horror of shams, by his insistence on having rational grounds for action, may do more for a learner than in any other way. Goethe said he was indebted, at the first, to a reading of the "Vicar of Wakefield." Kant attributes to Hume his own "awakening from dogmatic slumbers." He was awakened by him, but did not follow him. Lessing said of Leibnitz: "It is for this I value him" — that is, for his great manner of thinking, and not for this or that opinion which he seemed to hold or really held. So Jonathan Edwards was indebted to Locke.

Our most influential teachers have brought to bear upon us this kind of influence. A summer storm may clear the air for our better breathing, and this it will do without expecting that we shall try to reverberate its thunder-peal.

I have thus noticed five parts of the contents of the tendency in question, such as are distinctly seen to originate in the teacher: namely, the adding, the grouping, the emphasizing, the repressing, the awakening of thought. The former three refer to the objective body of thought given; the latter two refer to the thought of the pupil as specially due to the personal element in the teacher.

But, with these given, it cannot be decided and defined in any general and conclusive way how far the teacher is answerable for the tendency of the pupil's thinking. As man always works under conditions, so do historic forces and personal influences. Every question, in practical life, is concrete, not abstract. As in the time of Jeremiah, "The children gather wood, and the fathers kindle the fire, and the women knead the dough to make cakes to the queen of heaven," so always questions in practical life are mixed questions. The personal influence of Luther cannot be understood unless it is regarded in this light. The Turks on the south, eager for conquest; Francis I. on the west, watching with envy the Emperor Charles; the maturing determination of the German princes to put a stop to the financial draining of their provinces; the preparatory literary work of Erasmus and those associated with him, all these cluster about the Reformer and his work, as conditions of his influence. The age is the coefficient of the man. This is a representative case.

A decision as to the responsibility of personal influence is a moral judgment. A moral judgment is always the application of a general principle to a particular case. The particular case must be supplied by experience; that, as Bacon says, furnishes the substance of the middle proposition. The syllogism, therefore, will not be complete; in other words, the responsibility of the teacher cannot be determined until we add the supplementary parts of the contents of the tendency. It has already been shown that teaching and learning are correlative activities, and that which may be called a tendency of the former may owe its force and quality to the reciprocal union of the two.

Let us now consider a few particular cases. If the conclusions reached seem to be more frequently negative than positive, let it be borne in mind that "no definition can be made, that is, no thought can become definite, except by limitation and negation." *Omnis determinatio est negatio.*

My attention was first called to this question some years ago, when I found, to my astonishment, paragraph after paragraph, amounting in all to pages, transferred bodily from Mansel's

"Limits of Religious Thought" into the "First Principles" of Herbert Spencer. I afterwards found that Mansel was a disciple of Sir William Hamilton, who derived his "Philosophy of the Conditioned" from the devout Pascal. How far is Pascal responsible for the agnostic system of philosophy? This, again, is a representative case. Descartes is followed by Malebranche and Spinoza, the one a theist, the other a pantheist. Locke is followed by Berkeley and Hume, the one an idealist, the other a deist. Where shall the lines be drawn?

Every full man is a microcosm. Every full man's teaching is microcosmic. Therefore, it is possible to attach thought at some point in an author's line of reasoning, and branch out into a side issue, independent of the intent of the author, and he will not be responsible.

In man's thinking there are what may be called centrifugal and centripetal forces at work. A given system may revolve about the axis of truth; but, if a man simply catch the centrifugal tendency at a given point, and does not hold it in balance by the centripetal, he will go off on a tangent, and he may say he got his impetus from that system, and others may point to the first man as responsible for the tendency in the second. He is not. It is his supreme duty to swing in the orbit of truth. All the scientific vagaries start out from some fact or law of nature, as all heresies find a place of joining with Biblical teaching. The fact of nature and the truth of Scripture are wrested from their place in the body to which they originally belong. They are not scientifically placed in the body of teaching subsequently developed. Paul was not responsible for the misunderstanding and perversion of the Thessalonians as to the coming of the Lord. He chides and corrects them in his second epistle. Because Fénelon and Cowper lean toward pantheistic speech, in reference to finding God in nature, they are not to be held responsible for the pantheism which may be held by any of their readers. The same may be said of Wordsworth, even though he did write "Intimations of Immortality." There is a Christian pantheistic and a Christian dualistic element in the Bible itself. Life is ensphered in mystery. The Bible is a book of life; and human language is, at any time, an imperfect expression of experience in the reaching forth of the mind, in the inflow of germinal suggestions, subtle inklings, and momentary flashes of revelation with which the most fertile thinkers are favored. A word is the incarnation of a thought, and such incarnation always

necessitates a certain emptying of the glory it had in its heavenly home. A thinker may be said, in a sense, to become poor as teacher that he may make others rich.

Through imperfection of language, therefore, the learner may be led to ascribe the tendency of his thought to an author who has no sympathy whatever with what is called the maturer, or amplified manifestation of his own ideas. How many renowned historic controversies have been wranglings over words and names. What a world-wide difference of thought was affirmed as lodging in the expression, *Credo ut intelligam*. To the Romanist, it meant, "I receive my creed on authority, that I may afterward develop its logical meaning and results." To the Protestant, "I feel that I may know; knowledge comes through an experience, at the heart of which is faith." The New Testament terms "redemption" and "ransom" were regarded in former ages as lying at the basis of that theory of the Atonement which made Satan the receiver of the ransom.

On the other hand, when an author intentionally uses, as Shedd says, "an inexact phraseology, because of the facility with which it can be twisted and tortured" into a variety of meanings, he becomes responsible. Melancthon exposed himself to this charge when, in later life, he is found at times seeking, we are told, "not really to minimize differences, but to veil them under an intentional obscurity of expression." All such practice is akin, in moral quality, to that spoken of by Lowell:—

"And, still lip-loyal to what once was truth,
Smuggle new meanings under ancient names."

Again, a tendency may be due to the narrow view of the learner. Inferences from too few data have been the bane of the philosophical and theological as well as the social world. It is the old, old story of the "ever-widening, spiral ergo, out of the narrow aperture of a single text." How many expressions of Scripture, bold, metaphorical, convey their proper meaning only as a wide, comprehensive view is taken. Many statements, such as the hating of father and mother, the plucking out of the eye, the giving of the cloak to one who has stolen a coat, have at times been carried out literally by narrow-minded fanatics. And what is true of separate sentences is also true of reaches of reasoning. In Christ's talk with Peter, the rock has been made the basis of the Papal edifice, although first the edifice was an air-castle, and had the foundation afterward thrust under it. It was not breadth of view, in that case, but a view narrowed by the overcrowding

presence of worldly ambition. A narrow-minded man, or a man whose vision is narrow through a concentration of interest, may work out from a particular portion of teaching, and, not seeing that portion in relation to the whole, may misunderstand it, and yet think that in that teaching he finds his warrant.

The most diverse systems, like those of Pascal and Spencer, of Archbishop Butler and J. Stuart Mill, may have parts that coincide. That does not make them alike in character and influence any more than a brief coincidence of paths proves that two travelers are going on the same journey. Every philosopher is building a Rome, and every province, whether subjugated and incorporated in the empire, or simply raided upon, contributes to its architectural adornment. The living Cæsars, and not the buried kings by the side of the Nile, are responsible for the presence of Egyptian trophies. Quotation marks do not make a writer irresponsible.

Not only the narrow view of the learner, but the necessarily partial view of the teacher, must be taken into account. The greatest and the best know only in part. When there is, therefore, a progressive discovery and appropriation of truth universal, the authors of the past, who served their day, are not to be taken advantage of by subsequent authors to furnish a kind of shelter in their hostile work. It is said that a parable must not be made to go on all fours: let it be added, and certainly not push with a brute's lack of wisdom through all the ages. There is a continuity of responsibility. One cannot think on all sides for all that come after him. If there is such a thing as the solidarity of the race, why is there not a race responsibility? Men are to regard themselves as belonging to a vast, organic body of thinking activity. And the men of one generation are to look upon past theories as a man of to-day looks upon his knowledge and attainments of yesterday. It is incumbent on him to correct the past in the light of the present. Every system is to be looked upon as contribution and not a finality.

The narrow view of the Old Testament worthies does not make them responsible for the perverse narrowness of the Jews in Christ's day. If a surveyor gives sufficiently accurate measurement for a given terrestrial object, his lines are not to be called in question because they do not furnish a good base for calculating eclipses.

On the other hand, while a man is not to be held responsible for what are really the defects of his age, neither is he to be fully

credited with ideas which, merely hinted at in his works, afterwards unfold into revolutionary sentiments. What Jehu Baker says of Montesquieu is true of others, that, in common with all great thinkers of the world, he has been supplemented by much which, although included within the range of his method, did not come within the scope of his conscious and definite recognition.

As authors are not always to be held responsible for the appearance and influence of their opinions in subsequent works of others, neither are certain men to be classed with other men of their own day, because they seem to think in the same line or in the same atmosphere. "Great epochs wake the mind in all directions." Luther was held responsible for the fanatical Munzer. A Scriptural, spiritual protest was classed with a blind and frenzied iconoclasm. The Anabaptists were continually made to bear a bitter burden of charges. Because Chivalry, Romance, Literature were in sympathy with the peasant Waldenses, in their opposition to the Romish hierarchy, that does not prove that the one was responsible for the character of the other. Men, in different localities, breathe the same general spirit of the age. Let it be the spirit of political freedom, intellectual independence. In the one it will lead to manly, noble assertion of inalienable rights; in another it may lead to reckless, revolutionary attempts, regardless of means or consequences. In the one case we have the American Revolution, in the other the French Revolution.

Again, a man is not responsible for the effect which the introduction of truth may have upon men trenched in error. Sometimes morally good men hold doctrinal positions so confidently that to dislodge them may and does, in extreme cases, wreck them religiously. A few years since it was stated throughout this section of the country, that if Christ did not come at a certain, specified time, then the Bible was not to be relied upon. Advancing time was the teacher of such men; and some fell, as a consequence, into disbelief. The man who has the truth is to be as relentless as time. There is occasionally in these days the same feeling which existed in the time of Cicero, that we had better favor a little superstition and error, even if knowing ones smile when face meets face, than to tell the whole truth, for fear that when the prop of error is removed, moral catastrophe will ensue. A kindred idea is not unfrequently advanced that the system of the Roman priesthood is to be favored, at least in certain quarters, because of its police control over otherwise troublesome masses. Europe was indebted for its first lunatic asylums to the Mohammedan

error that the insane are God-intoxicated persons. Shall the good, coming out of the error, make us hesitate about substituting the truth for the error? Shall we fear to run the risk of taking out the old foundations, and putting in a new and truthfully solid one?

Shall we push aside and try to keep back the study of comparative religion because it discloses similar ethical elements to the Christian religion, and thus disproves what many good Christian men have taught? Shall we teach an over-scriptural rigid observance of the Sabbath, for fear that if we teach our convictions, they will be the occasion of an inexpedient liberty? Shall we talk as though there were no canonical difficulties? Shall we be in sympathy, of any shade, with the sentiment opposed to the new version, because of erroneous views of people about the text of scripture? Look at it as we may, time, also, in this case will yet be teacher. All topics are now coming to the notice of the rising generation, through school and press. And young men, who finally discover that their religious teachers have been ignorant, or too timid for true prophets, will in that proportion lose their respect. A reactionary tendency can work in the Protestant as well as the Roman section of Christendom.

Is a man who holds the truth responsible for another man who takes from him the truth and carries it to an extreme? Certainly not. Let a certain truth be represented by a straight line. Deviation to either right or left is error; for example, at the farthest remove on the left is the Roman institutional extreme; on the right, excessive Protestant individualism. He who insists upon a return to the straight line, the gospel idea of church life, who helps get the church in motion toward it, is not responsible for the action of those who keep up the momentum, cross the line, and go as far astray on the other side. In one way of looking at it, the tendency is from one extreme to another; but there is no logical nor spiritual necessity for such a course as that of Orestes A. Brownson, so frequently cited as a warning example.

It may be suggested, Are we not taught a principle in the language of Paul where he says, "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no more meat"? There is a principle here; but, surely, it cannot reach so far as to make it a matter of no concern whether truth or error be countenanced. Man has a large variety of *physical* food to choose from; he may well practice self-denial for the sake of another. But what shall the soul feed on, if not on truth? Can we say, If truth make my brother to offend, I will no

more speak truth? Did not Paul chide Peter for sacrificing the truth through fear of offending those of the circumcision? The Apostle to the Gentiles became all things to all men; but that practice was always consistent with another, that of commending himself, as a truth lover and herald, to every man's conscience. Shall we hold back the truth because some will pervert it to their harm? God does not. Christ did not. The times of ignorance which God winked at are passed away. These are the last days, the days of the full coming of the kingdom. After that faith has come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster, for we are all the children of God. We are to say without fear of consequences to any whose religion may cling to a modern Gerizim, Neither in this mountain are you to worship; God is a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth. Truth is the sphere within which the Christian is to live, teach, work, grow.

Lessing and De Staël were nearer right than many otherwise safer leaders when they said: "Truth is never harmful." We are to go out as far as we find the truth under our feet. Truth and error lie very close to each other. There is no intermediate territory. These facts involve dangers. But what are some of the axiomatic deliverances of scripture and of the soul in its highest hour? Face a fact; frankly speak, honestly act in view of it. Love the truth. Seek the truth; work for it; dig for it as for hid treasure. Buy it and sell it not. Bind it to your heart. Forsake father, mother, houses, lands; become a martyr rather than give it up. Follow it as far as it leads. A large, deep, whole view, the view of Pascal's great man, calls for advance to limits. Dare to go the length of your convictions. "Stand in the ways and see and ask for the old paths, where is the good way and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls." The old paths are the paths of truth. Truth is the intellectual, spiritual expression of God. Nothing is old but that; error is an innovation. Man made in the image of his God must live in truth, find there alone his rest. He who says peace, peace to any man in error cannot be called a herald of the Most High, a publisher of glad tidings.

We are to be positive where we can, and the case, in practical life, is rare where we cannot be positively constructive; but if we know error to be error, we are to call it so. Negative, preparatory work has its place. That must be admitted by any student of history. Says Caird, "Progress is not simply toward better answers to the question asked, but quite as much toward the deepening and enlarging of the question." If a building is about to

fall, it is my duty to inform the occupants, even though I may not be able to build them another house. In the Providence of God, a second house will more likely be built if the occupants are outside rather than underneath the ruins of the first one.

If it is a man's right to seek truth for himself, it is his duty to give it to others, for rights and duties are moral equivalents. Moreover, a man possessed with an idea is instinctively a missionary. It is the alpha of the gospel; every Christian a missionary; let him that heareth say, "Come." Hearing and saying are yoke-fellows.

The question under discussion is, indeed, complex, and involves many difficulties. The endeavor has been to treat it in a large, philosophical way. No lower idea of responsibility than answerableness to God has been thought of.

The question may be asked, Is no distinction to be made between moral and logical responsibility? In reply let it be stated: Truth is God's thought. We think truth when we think God's thought. To think as God thinks is to think logically, that is, to think "according to the necessary laws which underlie and govern the three processes: conception, judgment, syllogism." All truth is therefore logical; and responsibility to God, in speaking the truth, is both logical and moral. There is, however, a distinction to be made in passing from pure to applied logic, from theoretical to practical life,—that is, in evolving truth into a system, and adapting it to a particular case in hand. Let the idea be illustrated by the use of a circle. Let the centre, "C," represent a germinal truth. Let the circumference bound a system of thought evolved from "C." Let a certain point "I" in the circumference represent an individual to whom the truth "C" is to be adapted. Every radius of that circle must be logical, including the radius "C, I." A teacher must be logical if he describes the circle, that is, if he evolves a system; he may not, however, be under moral obligation to evolve a system; but if an individual, "I," is in need of the truth "C" applied, he is under moral obligation to apply it, and, in making the application, he is under obligation to be logical. So the radius "C, I" is really the coincidence of two lines, in the drawing of which he is both morally and logically responsible. "I" is the occasion of his moral responsibility. "C" contains within itself a germinal logical structure which necessitates logical responsibility. "I" is never in need of error, any more than a system is in need of a fallacy, therefore no teacher is to declare, wink at, or excuse error. "I" may not

be in condition to appreciate truth in its fullness, but that does not make truth harmful and error helpful. Man always needs truth, and a teacher's moral responsibility is involved in the selection of the proper portion, not that which the pupil would like to receive, but that which he needs whether he will receive it or not. God once gave such instruction to Ezekiel, and added, "And they, whether they will hear or whether they will forbear, yet shall know that there hath been a prophet among them."

In conclusion, he who teaches error, who puts a half truth for a truth, who makes that which is partial a finality, is responsible, in part, for a wrong tendency manifest in a pupil, no matter though his influence go farther than he intended. If he have a beautiful moral character, that does not shield him, but gives an added degree of responsibility, for it gives his error currency where it otherwise could not go. The piety of Fichte does not counteract the tendency of his philosophical system which is based on the denial of a personal God. "Hegel, as a man," says Professor Flint, "may be orthodox; but Hegelianism is polydox, an ambiguous shelter of Atheism, Pantheism, as well as Theism." And still, it can be just as truly said by Alexander Grant: "To borrow philosophy from Hegel's 'Philosophy of History' is like borrowing poetry from Shakespeare, a debt that is almost inevitable." He who reads Shedd's "Philosophical and Historical Essays" sees this statement elaborately illustrated. God, in an elective way, made use of Egyptian, Greek, and Roman influence in furthering his gospel plan. So may we. What we need is to keep the eye clear, the mind alert and hospitable, the heart filled with the Spirit of God.

Listen to these antiphonal strains of spiritual music. From Plato: "Truth is the beginning of every good to the gods and of every good to man; and he who would be blessed and happy should be, from the first, a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man; — for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood." From Bacon: "Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and turn upon the poles of truth."

Rev. B. A. Greene.

LYNN, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.

VII. THE SATISFACTION OF HUMANITY IN JESUS CHRIST.

If we put beside the life of Paul the life of any one of his great contemporaries in the pagan world we note a striking difference in our estimate of them. We naturally think of his contemporaries simply in their own personality; we cannot think of Paul without thinking more of Christ. The life of Seneca, for example, cannot be referred in any considerable degree to another person, only to the general civilization of which he was a part. The life of Paul is distinctly referable to Jesus Christ. No philosopher, or moralist, or religious devotee of Paul's time could have said, after the analogy of his memorable utterance, "That life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in (One) who loved me and gave himself up for me." There was no sense in which it was true that the life of such a man was shared with or possessed by the life of another. But within Christianity the utterance of Paul became the familiar language of the growing fellowship, and at length one of the commonplaces of human experience. A constantly increasing proportion of the human race acknowledges, gratefully and joyfully, the fact that its life is not altogether its own, but that, like Paul's, it is distinctly referable in its new spiritual capacity to the indwelling life of Christ.

Jesus Christ has not imposed or enforced his life upon men. This fact is quite as significant as the fact of his possession of humanity. He has possessed no heart which He did not first satisfy. He continues to possess only because He satisfies. Satisfaction is the secret, as it is the measure, of the power of Jesus over the human heart. He renders satisfaction at points in respect to which it is otherwise impossible to obtain it, and that which He renders is absolute and complete.

Manifestly such a fact must have a bearing upon our conception of the person of Christ. We must interpret Christ in part through that humanity of which He is so great a present factor, and in which He lives according to the conscious experience of so large a portion of the race. It would be as unscientific as it would be unnatural to ignore the fact in our interpretation of his person. We will try to apprehend with some definiteness the satisfaction of humanity in Jesus Christ, before we attempt to apply the fact to the present discussion of his divinity.

Jesus Christ has satisfied humanity in its desire to know God. Through Him, and through Him alone, we know that we know God. The certainty of our knowledge in things spiritual, as in things natural, is always worth more to us than the completeness of that knowledge. There is a sense in which the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is not complete, but we feel that it is sure, which is but saying that it is morally com-

plete. Other disclosures concerning God await our entrance upon the larger realities of our being, when once we take our place more intelligently in the universe, but of what God is to us here and now and of what He must always be to us morally, we can no longer have a doubt. The revelation of God in Christ matches the whole ethical nature of man.

One evidence of this assertion, and at times a very impressive evidence, is the fact that the Christian revelation of God has put down that protesting element in human nature which always attends the false conception of God. The God whom we know through Jesus Christ commends himself to bad men as well as to good men. No man is able, under that revelation, to rise up in his sin and wickedness, and say in any kind of self-justification, or with any consent whatever of his moral nature, I protest against God. God rules in the revelation of Jesus Christ with an absolute supremacy, because He rules there not by the authority of might, but by the authority of a merciful righteousness.

Another evidence, not as impressive but specially appreciable by our time, is the fact that the revelation of God in Christ is rectifying all other and minor beliefs, and bringing them into harmony with this which is central and supreme: revising those which went before, and revising with no less freedom those which have followed after. Perhaps no age of the church has been made more conscious of this rectifying power of the Christian revelation of God than our own age, certainly not because we are further in spirit from that revelation, but because, we think it may be fairly said, we are more sensitive to it. It is the Christian conception of God, which is taking high precedence in all the religious thought of our time, which is informing its religious consciousness, which is reconstructing our systems of belief, which is compelling a larger and more Christian interpretation of the doctrine of sacred Scripture. No one can altogether escape the power of this conception, not even those who persistently refuse its application to mooted points of Christian doctrine. It has at least brought about this singular result in the case of those who are unwilling to thoroughly Christianize theology, that it has forced them for the most part to take refuge in the vagueness of extra-Christian conjectures or beliefs.

But the certainty that we know God through Christ has its more directly spiritual uses. It is the chief stimulus to faith. The desire to know God is not purely an intellectual desire. It is more than "the passionate curiosity which we feel before the mystery of the universe." It has in it the longing for companionship, the craving for communion. It belongs to the demand of the spiritual nature for life, for life in continuance and in fullness. So the soul instinctively turns to God, "Whom to know is life eternal." It is knowledge in this sense which gives the communicating impulse to the thought of God. Whoever knows Him in the way of fellowship must strive to bring others into that relationship to Him. The intellectual knowledge of God may be held as a personal possession, but the spiritual

knowledge of Him, the knowledge which admits the daily intercourse, the freedom of communion, the walk with God, has in it the "woe is me if I preach not the gospel." It is this communicating impulse which runs with such gladness and urgency through the first Epistle of John. The whole epistle is conceived in the spirit of the opening words. "That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled concerning the word of life, (and the life was manifested, and we have seen and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father and was manifested unto us :) that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us ; yea, and our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ ; and these things we write that your joy may be fulfilled." Such is the satisfaction which Jesus Christ has brought into the world, and made possible to all men, and profoundly real to many, through his revelation of God.

But there is another form of satisfaction which He has rendered which is even deeper and more intense than this. Jesus Christ has satisfied humanity in the relief which He has brought to it under the consciousness of sin. There is really no experience which can compare in intensity with the experience of sin. The reality of sin is not to be confused with the experience of it. The reality is universal, the experience is unequal. Some know what sin is by its bitter fruits in their own souls and bodies, or in the souls and bodies of those yet dearer to them than their own ; others know what sin is only in principle, through the selfishness which has some lodgment in every heart. Now as the experience of sin is unequal, so the satisfaction which Christ brings to sinning men is unequal. And no one may argue from any knowledge which he may have of sin, short of the experience of it, how great that satisfaction is which Christ can render. For he who would satisfy humanity under the consciousness of sin must be able to meet it in its lowest conditions and in its extreme possibilities. But the fact which bears its constant witness to the power of Christ is, that when the lowest conditions are reached, and the most extreme possibilities are realized, then the satisfaction is most complete. The saying of Paul is verified a thousand times with every day, "Where sin abounded grace did abound more exceedingly."

It is not to our present purpose to say how this result is brought about. If it were, it might not be possible. No theory is as wide as the fact. No philosophy of the atonement can altogether explain the process by which the sacrifice of Christ finds its sure result in purity and inward peace at the heart of a penitent and believing sinner. All that we can do is to watch the phenomena which attend the method of Jesus. We know that his approach to sin is through his own sinlessness. We can see that his purity wins its way where anything short of that would falter and fail. We know something of the power of his passion for sinners, how irresistible at times it is, working against the love of sin by "the

expulsive power of a new affection." And we know that the method of Jesus is always sacrificial, in its deepest sense vicariously sacrificial, life for life, the cross the standard and the measure of the satisfaction which He imparts to a sinner. So much of the process we can see — and then the result.

There are two ways in which we can measure the impression which Christ has made upon the world as to his power over sin in the human heart. One is that which we have just been considering, in the case of those consciously delivered [by Him from its bondage, and consciously changed in the disposition and temper of their minds. The other appears as the painful opposite to this experience, in that false sense of security which the marvelous power of Christ has begotten in many minds, against which Christianity is obliged to put forth its constant and most serious warnings. The power of Christ seems so great and is so accessible, that many presume upon it. Their presumption is their acknowledgment of it. The false sense of security, which is the counterfeit of the true satisfaction of the soul in the actual relief from sin, is one proof of the genuineness of that satisfaction. If the saving power of Jesus Christ was not so evident, if it was not so constantly evidenced, some men at least would not dare to sin.

These are the two great matters of spiritual concern about which the heart of man demands satisfaction, — the sure knowledge of God, the conscious relief from sin. Jesus Christ has given at these points a satisfaction which is true and full.

But here comes in a new fact, which is of the greater significance, because it is not precisely like those upon which we have been dwelling. As long as the human heart was unsatisfied, uncertain about God, unrelieved of the sense of sin, what could it do but expend all its energies in trying to gain some kind of satisfaction? What could the man do, who would know God, but "feel after Him, if haply he might find Him"? What could the man do, oppressed with the sin of sin, but strive by penance and sacrifice to purge the guilt of his soul? As long as these great necessitous desires were unsatisfied, all other spiritual desires were held back and repressed, until at times it seemed as if they had no existence, as if the individual man cared only for a personal and selfish salvation. But when Christ satisfied these imperious desires, then all other spiritual desires were set free and sprang forth into newness of life. Nothing is more inspiring than to note the growth of those new desires which Christ called forth, and of which he took the leadership. Christianity meant at once, in idea, not simply the knowledge of God and the relief from the sense of sin, but a new society, new laws and customs, a new literature and life, another and a better world. The meaning of the new liberty was exemplified in Paul. Here was a man of essential greatness of nature, but dwarfed in his powers, and in danger of perishing in his narrowness. Christ met him and set him free, and instantly the freed and enlarged powers of his nature went out to the saving of the world. It was the

manifest intent of Christ that it should always be thus with his followers. He never intended that freedom should be an end in itself. He never intended that any soul should rest in the satisfaction which He had brought to it. The Christian was to be a new man, conscious of new and larger desires, and set to new and larger tasks.

Jesus Christ thus declares himself in respect to man by the twofold sign of power, — able to satisfy his deepest longings, and able also to lead forth into wide activity those latent desires of his spiritual nature which He has set at liberty. And it is evident that humanity responds to the spiritual leadership of Christ, as it acknowledges the satisfaction which it has found in Him. One by one the great leaders of humanity have been taken up in the progress of the race, and absorbed in the volume of its better life. Jesus Christ has not been taken up and absorbed. His leadership is the constant and undiminished factor in human progress. The race gains upon itself, but it makes no gain upon Him. It has been sententiously said, that "Christianity is always the best thing in the world." That may mean much or little. Christ does not share the varying fortune of Christianity. He is, as we know, "the same yesterday and to-day," and as we believe, "yea, and forever."

We have thus far been considering a most singular and unique fact, which is inseparably connected in all its parts with a person. Here is one through whom men know God, and know that they know Him; through whom they are relieved of the burden of sin, and to whom they turn in the gratitude of their deliverance; and through whom they are able to rise in their freed powers into the new joy of sonship and go about the Father's business on earth. The fact is the most unique as it is the most glorious in human experience, and offers itself as an essential aid in our attempt to interpret the person of Jesus Christ. Happily for our generation, the chief approach to his person is not by the way of controversial or even speculative interest, but rather by the way of interpretation. His personality comes before us not as a metaphysical problem to be solved, but as an acknowledged reality to be apprehended and interpreted. The question which one serious-minded man puts to another is not, How do you explain Christ? but, How do you understand Him? What does He mean to you? How do you place Him in your own life and in the life of the world? The interpretation of a person, not the solution of a problem, represents the present attitude of the religious mind toward Christ, and determines the method of our approach to his personality.

The fact before us, which must be considered as one of the sources of interpretation, necessitates some conclusion in regard to the person of Christ. To begin with the revelation which we have of God through Him — that revelation is so peculiar that it implies a peculiar relation on his part to God. Christ's revelation of God was that of a new relationship in the divine nature, namely, fatherhood. What guarantees to us that relationship? How do we know that it is anything more than an idea, an analogy taken up out of earthly relations and carried back into the

nature of God? To our mind, the guarantee of the absolute and essential fatherhood of God is the absolute and essential sonship of Jesus Christ. In this way the assurance is given not in word but in fact. When we say that men are the sons of God, we proclaim a comforting truth, but we do not thereby gain a better knowledge of what God is. We do not reach through the assumption of this relationship a sure and satisfying knowledge of God. To get a true idea of fatherhood we must have a true idea of sonship. That idea completely and perfectly realized, we know at once that there must be a corresponding idea of a complete and perfect fatherhood. The order of thought in the statement of John seems to us natural and rational: "The only begotten which is in the bosom of the Father he hath declared Him;" a statement which accords exactly with the utterance of Christ: "No man knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal Him." The revealer of God the Father is naturally God the Son. The revelation must hold the quality and substance of the life revealed. The Nicene Creed was not written in the language of the nineteenth century, but we believe that it still utters a reasonable faith: "Very God of God, very Light of very Light." When a spiritual relationship has been established and has become familiar, we are apt to think that it is self-evident or easily discoverable. This thought finds constant exemplification in the conception of the divine fatherhood. We cannot think of God apart from it. But until the sonship of Christ made it evident, the world had never caught sight of it in any clear or sufficient sense. Earthly relations did not establish it, however much they may now seem to us to suggest it. And we are not at all sure that the conception would abide as a fixed reality if its original support should be withdrawn. Take away the fact of the absolute and essential sonship of Christ, and though we may not deny that fatherhood is inherent in the divine nature, yet we do not know how we can justify the belief to our certain consciousness. The sonship of Christ is the pledge of the fatherhood of God. It is difficult to see how we can accept the relationship, and refuse the guarantee which Christ offers in himself. Fatherhood and sonship have their abiding reality in the spiritual world because of the eternal correspondence revealed in the Father and the Son.

Passing now to the relation of Jesus Christ to the sin of the world, we find much in this relation which points to the same general estimate of his person. The method of Jesus, as we have seen, was sacrificial, ethical indeed, but not to the exclusion or subordination of the sacrificial. But when we begin to study the method of Jesus, we are startled to find that he reversed the whole course and current of sacrifice. The great volume of sacrifice had been pouring through innumerable channels from the heart of man into the heart of God. Christ met and overwhelmed the sacrifices of men with the sacrifice of God. It was the inflowing tide of the ocean staying and returning the waters which were seeking its bosom. The act of Jesus was an act of sublime daring. We instinctively ask,

Who is it that dares to make this reversal? Who is it that bids men cease their propitiatory rites? Who is it that puts out the fires on sacrificial altars, and stanches the blood of sacrificial victims? Who is it that carries out the change in and through his own person, and offers himself "the lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world"?

If the change wrought out through the method of Jesus had been from the sacrificial to the ethical, it would not have been so astounding. If he had abolished not only the system, but the principle of sacrifice, we might say that his act represented a new stage in the divine administration of the world. But no, the principle was not abolished, it was rather acknowledged, accepted, and obeyed. It was ratified in suffering and death.

That the method of Jesus was sacrificial seems to us to be beyond dispute, the only question about it being this, Was it simply a part of the pain and suffering under which the whole creation groaneth and travaileth, or was it more distinctly God's part in the work of redemption? And this is really asking in respect to Jesus, Was his sacrifice voluntary or involuntary? What did He mean when He said of his life, "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father"? Here again it seems to us natural and rational to interpret the sacrifice of Christ through his relation to the nature of God, and that in that relation lies the security of the Christian conception of sacrifice. Nothing less than the absolute assurance that the act of Jesus Christ in reversing the course of sacrifice was a divine act can avail to prevent a return of the race to the old course. No ethical provision can satisfy men in their sins. The correlative of sin is sacrifice. It is the sacrificial element which makes the ethics of Jesus permanent and universal. Confucius may have anticipated some of the sayings of Jesus, but the words of Jesus have gone abroad in their saving power into all the earth. "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them," is another saying when interpreted in the light of the cross. The sacrifice of Jesus has transfigured all human duty. "The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge that one died for all, therefore all died; and he died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again."

The conclusion which we reach concerning the person of Christ, through the study of his sacrificial method, is sustained by the further inquiry into the ground of the assurance we have in his unailing development of the race. Without doubt the trend of modern thought and faith is toward the more perfect identification of Christ with humanity. We cannot overestimate the advantage to Christianity of this tendency. The world must know and feel the "humanity" of Jesus. But it makes the greatest difference in result whether the ground of the common humanity is in Him or in us. To borrow the expressive language of Paul, was He "created" in us? or are we "created" in Him? Grant the right of the

affirmation that "there is no difference in kind between the divine and the human;" allow the interchange of terms, so that one may speak of "the humanity of God and the divinity of man;" appropriate the motive which lies in these attempts to bring God and man together and thus to explain the personality of Jesus Christ, it is still a matter of infinite concern to us whether his home is in the higher or lower regions of divinity. After all, very little is gained by the transfer of terms. Humanity is in no way satisfied with its degree of divinity. We are still as anxious as ever to rise above ourselves. And in this anxiety we want to know concerning our great helper whether He has in himself anything more than the possible increase of a common humanity. What is his power to lift, and how long may it last? Shall we ever reach his level, attain to his measure, become as divine as He, or does He have part in the absolute and infinite? This question may seem remote in result, but it is everything in principle. The immanence of Christ has its present meaning and value because of his transcendence. "Our fortunes — shall I say it? — we borrow the words of Dr. Dale in his "Lectures on the Ephesians," — "were identified with the fortunes of Christ. In the divine thought and purpose we were inseparable from Him. Had we been true and loyal to the divine idea, the energy of Christ's righteousness would have drawn us upward to height after height of goodness and joy, until we ascended from this earthly life to the larger powers and loftier services and richer delights of other and diviner worlds; and still, through one golden age of intellectual and ethical and spiritual growth after another, we should have continued to rise towards Christ's transcendent and infinite perfection. But we sinned; and as the union between Christ and us could not be broken without the final and irrevocable defeat of the divine purpose, as separation from Christ meant for us eternal death, Christ was drawn down from the serene heavens to the shame and sorrow of the confused and troubled life of our race, to pain, to temptation, to anguish, to the cross and to the grave, and so the mystery of his atonement for our sin was consummated." Such an identification of the race with Jesus Christ not only declares the meaning of the Incarnation and the Atonement, but sets forth the ground of that hope for the race, which is cherished by the Christian heart, that humanity will yet find its full perfection in the human — because the divine — Christ.

In concluding this discussion of the satisfaction of humanity in Jesus Christ, the question reverts for the moment to his own consciousness in respect to himself and his work. Did He anticipate such a result? Was He conscious of that within himself which must have its correspondence in the return of the human heart to Him in confidence and trust? The answer to this question is found in the recorded meditation of Jesus, among the most unquestioned of his words, in which, as He contemplates his union with the Father, He contemplates also the meaning of it to the wearied and troubled soul of man. The spirit of prayer passes into that of invitation as He communes with his own heart, and He anticipates in

his own soul the utterance of that compassion which was to break from his lips.

"At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.

"All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him.

"Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light."

AN EXAMINATION OF THE CLAIM THAT A MAJORITY OF THE
AMERICAN BOARD SHOULD CONTROL THE FOREIGN WORK
OF THE CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES.

A BARE majority of the Prudential Committee defeated the appointment of Mr. Covell to missionary service under the American Board. This majority claims that its policy, in this and in other cases more or less similar, is sanctioned by the Board, — that is, by a majority of the Board, — and that it is therefore itself beyond criticism.

We will not now raise the question whether or not, or to what extent, the Board has given such approval, nor inquire what responsibility rests upon the Committee for the action under which it shields itself. We desire rather to go back of all such reasoning and consider the principle on which it rests. If the alleged action of the Board is *extra vires*, if it is a violation of rights and an undue exercise of power, it is no defense of the Committee in any other respect than a purely formal and official one. And it cannot be pleaded even to this degree for the Board itself, nor indeed for any officer of the Board, who, as a corporate member, aided in bringing it to pass. Even if the act of a corporation, though wrong, may to some extent cover the responsibility of an agent, when the agent is himself a member of the corporation, and an active participator in the action which is set up in his defense, he cannot escape personal responsibility for the wrong which is done. We press, moreover, a discussion in the form which is now raised because it is time that the Board itself should more directly consider than it yet has done its responsibility for the present situation. If, even by acquiescence and silence, it is a party to a violation of the rights of any of its constituents, and is encouraging a policy essentially arbitrary and tyrannical, it ought as soon as practicable to remedy the evil and do what is just and right. And we take up the question, not only because we have a firm faith that sooner or later, by its discussion, the Board will discover the right path, but because we believe that there is an increasing proportion of its mem-

bers who desire that its action should be more directly and fully shaped by sound principles of administration, and less by official influence and temporary expedients.

Among these principles we note the following: —

1. *The Board is the agent for foreign missions of the Congregational churches of the United States.* It is this *de facto*, and also by its own consent and profession. That it receives gifts from other sources does not qualify this statement. Neither do the circumstances and conditions under which it arose, and the methods by which it at first secured contributions to its treasury. These have long since passed away, and the Board has wisely adjusted itself to its environment.

2. *As related to these churches the Board rests on a Fellowship of churches.*

One of the two cardinal principles and distinctive characteristics of the Congregational churches of America is that they are a Communion of churches. Their fellowship is not something incidental and dispensable, but a permanent note or attribute. It is declared in the Congregational platforms of polity to be a moral obligation. It is essential and structural. No church is recognized as a Congregational church apart from it. No pastor or missionary is ordained otherwise than in conformity to it. If the Board dealt solely with the local societies, one by one and individually, it would still be dealing with bodies which exist under this law of their institution and nature. If it dealt merely with their members, one by one and individually, the same truth would hold good. There is no member of one of these churches who is not incorporated into this communion of all the churches, and brought under its obligations and invested with all the rights which thereby accrue. But we need not dwell upon this aspect of the case. The Board deals directly with Congregational churches as such, and avails itself of their organic structure in many ways. It puts itself into immediate connection with the forms and agencies of their fellowship, and makes these tributary to its work. Its candidates for appointment ordinarily are approved by Associations and ordained by Councils. Its representatives are received by the county, state, and national bodies. Its secretaries are appointed to districts comprising groups of these churches, and communicate with them through all available organic forms by which their intelligent and benevolent support can be secured. The entire organism of these churches is an instrumentality used by the Board to the greatest degree it can be employed. The Board is now asking from these churches an annual gift of one million of dollars, and the far more precious offering of not a few of their choicest and most consecrated lives.

3. *This entire fellowship of churches has a right to participate in the foreign missionary work, as conducted by the Board, to its full extent. And the only measures of this extent are opportunity and support.*

The Board, through its organs, has not been slow nor slack in acquainting the churches, to which it constantly and rightly appeals for missionaries and funds, with the obligations which rest upon them. Where there are duties there are rights. If it is the duty of the churches, constituted and working in fellowship, to use the resources and powers inherent in this fellowship and acquired by means of it, for the advancement of the Kingdom of God, then they have a right to such use, and a right commensurate with the obligation. Any restriction imposed upon the right which is not at the same time and to the same degree a limitation of the obligation is arbitrary and unjustifiable.

Let us apply now these familiar and indisputable principles to the situation which we have briefly described in our opening paragraph. We repeat the salient facts. A majority of an executive committee sets up doctrinal tests of appointment to the missionary service of the Congregational churches which are not recognized by these churches. So far it has been practically supported in this policy by the body which appoints this committee. We waive for the present discussion any qualifications of this last statement which the exact and whole truth may require. This electing body gives this support by the voice of a majority of its members. The claim is then set up that the majority of the Board must rule, and that the minority have no grievance. Their rights are fully recognized when they are granted the ordinary opportunities and privileges of minorities in deliberative assemblies or under a constitutional government.

The principles we have stated show the fallacy of this contention. It overlooks entirely the relation of the Board to the Communion of churches whose agent it is in their foreign work. So far as the Board is a self-governing body the principle of government by majority applies to it. Within this limit a minority has simply the rights which are professedly conceded. But the Board, *as related to the churches*, is not a deliberative assembly which is constituted to declare their mind or will. It is not a representative body for legislative purposes; nor a constitutional convention appointed to frame or set in operation a plan of government. Its majority is not the result of a majority vote of the churches; it has been created very differently. Its minority does not spring from a party in the churches. The Board is the agent for foreign missions of the Congregational body, the whole fellowship of churches. It is so professedly, and no less by long-established custom and mutual agreements and pledges in the coöperation of many years of missionary history. If the body for which it acts accepts certain articles of faith as incumbent on its ministry of the Word, the Board cannot rightfully, while acting as the agent of this body, send out as missionaries men who reject these doctrines. On the other hand, if the churches treat certain tenets or beliefs as matters of opinion, with reference to which within their communion there is individual liberty, the Board, as representing these

churches, cannot rightfully refuse the same liberty to its missionaries and to candidates for appointment. That a majority of its members think such opinions ought to exclude from service, and a minority think otherwise, is something irrelevant; and if the opinion of the former is expressed in action and enforced in practice, this is something purely autocratic and oppressive. Its majority and minority, as we have said, have their rights within the limits of its own corporate function, but they cease to have any significance when we pass beyond this sphere. The churches stand before it not as parties, represented within it, but as a fellowship having its own conditions and tests of membership and service. The Board, as related to them, is a larger prudential or executive committee. It may decide by a majority vote what it will do with what is confided to its discretionary use by the churches, but it cannot rightfully by a majority vote, nor by a unanimous one, dispose of what is not thus committed to it. The churches have not intrusted to it, for instance, the institution of doctrinal tests for missionaries or missionary candidates, nor the power to exclude, for theological reasons, from their service in the conduct of missions, whether by counsel or active participation, any persons whom they fellowship. The Board is not the communion of the churches either literally or representatively. If it adopts rules which practically exclude from the foreign work of the churches a portion of its constituency which has a right through membership in them to be admitted to such work, this is not exercising the legitimate right of a majority, it is not a management of its own affairs by the admitted methods of corporate action, it is a failure to keep its promise and fulfill its pledges, it is a violation of the confidence it has invited and accepted, it is a cutting itself off from the churches and a refusal to serve them save upon its own terms, it is a rupture of the bond which binds them to it, and it is more than this, — it is a withholding from them of what belongs to them through the increment, by many years of accumulation, of the means and facilities for augmenting the effectiveness of their foreign service. It is preposterous to call this a government by majority, or a proper use of the principle of decision and direction by the voice of the majority. Here is a great body of churches, a definite religious communion, easily ascertainable in its Christian belief, spirit, and purpose, consecrated to the work of advancing the Kingdom of God at home and abroad. It is self-governing; it determines by its own methods what is necessary to its communion; it puts this fellowship at the service of the Board, as the Board pledges itself to be its agent; and at last it finds that a majority of the Board does not recognize it in its integrity and rights, excludes it from the full use of the fruits of its own sacrifice and toil, and sets up in justification that it is a majority. A majority of what? As respects the churches, by any just analogies or upon any sound principles of reasoning, is this anything other than an intolerable usurpation of authority and power?

We imagine that there would be but one answer to this question, were it not for the influence of doctrinal prepossessions. The Board is looked upon by its managers or their supporters as a citadel of orthodoxy. Some of these men, at least, are alarmed at the flowing tide; here, they hope, its proud waves will be stayed. Congregationalism is not, in their view, a sufficient defense against new opinions. Its councils cannot be trusted. The Board must stand in the old ways, and having done all must at least stand.

We would respectfully ask such persons seriously to consider whether they are truly serving their cause in this way. Are they not rather in danger of making the end justify the means, of doing evil that good may come? Can they hope to maintain orthodoxy by injustice, Christianity by denying their neighbor's rights? Has orthodoxy ever flourished when divorced from justice, or whenever it has come into conflict with principles of rectitude and honor? Can the Board consent to be the agent of the Congregational churches for foreign missions, and at the same time honorably treat their organism with distrust? Can it accept their money and reject their councils, invite their members to participation in foreign work and then discriminate between these members, use the agencies of fellowship and then ignore what is essential and vital in this fellowship? The moral influence of the Board is to be thrown, it is hoped, against the "New Theology." In the long run is not moral influence measured by its morality? What is the morality — we use the term in its highest sense — of assuming before the churches to represent them in preaching the gospel and of then excluding their authorized preachers from missionary service, of asking their gifts to send out evangelists and teachers, and then refusing men whom they have trained for this purpose, of asking their support in doing their work, and then making the work something other than theirs?

What is the moral influence of the votes of the present majority of the Board in commending their opinions to acceptance, or in discrediting those which they would resist? We would not underestimate it. It has some force. But it is seriously weighted. Most of all by the fact that it is widely regarded as a misuse of power, and has a taint at the start. Further, by the fact that it is a made-up majority. This fact became evident at Des Moines. It was advertised at Springfield. Thirdly, by the nature of the questions in dispute, and the shifting and uncertain positions that are taken respecting them. The questions are not regarded by those who are most familiar with them, or at any rate by those who represent the communion of the Congregational churches in councils and associations, conferences and other forms of fellowship, as of a kind to be settled by majority votes, or to be answered in creeds, or to enter into the saving message of a preacher and missionary of the gospel. They are matters of criticism, scholarship, opinion, many of them not ripe for settlement, and none of them of the substance of Christianity. If the

Board were a theological court it could not determine one of them by a vote, or do much to influence their decision. They belong to other jurisdictions. They are to be argued before a very different tribunal. They will be decided, if at all, by other judges. A majority vote upon them by a body constituted as is the Board calls attention to them. Men are surprised at the strength of the minority. There must be something in the new opinions, they say, if so soon they have gained so much headway. We do not doubt that some influence is exerted of a counter sort. But if it were much greater than any one is likely to claim this would not justify the way in which it is gained,—the perversion of the Board to a use foreign to its purpose and disavowed by it, the false relation into which it is brought to the churches, the essential immorality of it. When it is once seen to be also ineffectual, the glamour of it will cease to dazzle and disturb the moral vision. The Board ought not to act as the agent of the churches and at the same time adopt rules which make it the agent of a theological party, ought not to invite a fellowship of churches to work through it and use this fellowship to fill its treasury, and then practically disown this fellowship in its administration of the funds which it has thus procured, and in its selection of missionaries. There is no moral weight in its majority which can offset this immorality. And no alliance of such immorality with orthodoxy can be of service to it.

The policy which is now uppermost is working demoralizingly as respects the organization of foreign work which has been gradually and carefully built up. Scores of men are withholding their gifts to its treasury, or are in an attitude of hesitation, where three or two years ago there was but one. The concessions at New York, the apparent progress at Minneapolis, have yielded no substantial results. It is generally understood that even a man like Mr. Covell cannot now be appointed. There is certainly no encouragement to such men to apply. If he could be, would it not be through a misunderstanding of his position? It unquestionably would, if pure agnosticism respecting future grace is made the basis. The offer of such a basis produces no good effect. It surrenders in the act of proposal the only plausible basis of dogmatism on the subject, namely, apparent scriptural authority, and yet it continues to be dogmatic! It is simply an arbitrary prohibition of thought upon a subject conscientious, intelligent, and humane men can scarcely refrain from considering. The committee has now added a fourth question to its supplementary questions. These questions, *as used*, bring up points outside of the creeds, and set up a theology supplementary to that which the churches deem sufficient. The persistent attempt to enforce this policy is rapidly alienating men from the Board, and already more or less affects contributions. But it is not the amount which will be withheld, or which will be given with a doubtful mind, that is before us now, but the demoralizing principle, to repeat our characterization of it, which the Board

is now setting at work. It says: We will not be governed by the fellowship of the churches in doctrinal matters; we will make our own standards and set up our own tests. The contributor says: If the Board chooses to be independent of the fellowship of the churches in which I stand and which I value, I will be independent of it; if it refuses to appoint, I will refuse to give; if it will not admit the rights of the body of which I am a member, I will not recognize its claim to my support. The contributor in this is simply taking a lesson from the Board and using its principle with perhaps a better justification.

Again, men are looking round for some other organization than the Board through which to work for missions. Some give to the Berkeley Temple Mission. Some give to institutions not under the control of the Board. Some work for foreigners in this country. Some are in perplexity what to do.

The Board is not only stimulating to this by the alienation of feeling it has awakened. It is commending it by its own example. For it is repudiating the organism from which it draws its funds and its men. It thrusts itself before the public as a distinct organization, and while formally retaining its connection with the churches, and practically using them for all it can get on its own terms, it also repudiates them at pleasure.

Its contributors are likely to do the same thing in increasing numbers. They will treat the Board as an organization as that organization treats them. Only they will be faithful to their position as members of the Congregational body. They will seek out such organizations and agencies as are true to the fellowship which they honor. They will square their conduct to their profession. They will be mindful in their giving of the body of which they are members.

Once more, the Board is in danger of breaking up to some extent its own carefully developed organization of missionary work. It is treating the missionaries as though they were its missionaries rather than missionaries sent out by the churches. So long as the Board acts in good faith as the agent of the churches the missionaries have behind them the collective force, the entire fellowship of the Congregational churches. As soon as the Board makes of them its own agents, selects them according to its own standards, picks them out from such portions of its constituency as it favors, it robs them in principle of this support. We believe this to be an infraction of their rights, — their rights as having entered on its service while it was professing to be the agent of the churches. It is, at any rate, an example which cannot fail to have an influence. The Board, instead of acting as the servant of the churches, sets up its own authority. Can it complain if its own servants in turn appeal to the body of which they are members? An agent that ceases to be one cannot consistently object if its own agents, in self-protection, cease to obey its orders, or overstep its rules.

This may become a very practical matter.

We suppose that more dissatisfied contributors to the Board continue their gifts for this reason than for any other, namely, that if they withhold their offerings the missionaries will suffer. There are other strong arguments for giving still through the treasury of the Board, such as the hope of a change of policy, the undesirableness of lowering the standard of benevolence, the importance of maintaining a steady and trustworthy stream of benevolence, the value of a central distributing agency. But the argument that is most concrete and nearest to the thought and heart of givers is the immediate effect of a withdrawal or diversion of funds upon the men in the field and their work.

At the same time, the long-continued resistance in the Board to what seem to many to be the claims of simple justice, — the denial of rights in service, the disappointment in the treatment of what were accepted, perhaps too hastily, as promises of relief, are producing their natural effect. The present attitude of the Committee is not encouraging, but the reverse. The vote of the Board respecting Mr. Noyes is still held in suspense. It is referred to a committee from which the Secretary for Japan is excluded, and of which the Home Secretary is made a member.¹ Meanwhile a secretary of the Board, supposed to be in the confidence of the majority, and really to represent it though claiming only to speak for himself, informs a ministerial association that men of Mr. Noyes's known opinions cannot be appointed. Men are wondering whether their only way of protest is not through the contribution-box. There are yet graver considerations. The delay, even for the short time which we hope will prove necessary to bring about a change, is a more serious evil than is commonly understood. It has meant already the sacrifice of valuable missionaries, the loss of not a few who ought to-day to be in the field. It has chilled enthusiasm to a lamentable degree. The protracted support of a narrow policy in one essential matter, and of the men who insist upon it with unrelenting determination, tends to induce a meagreness of administration in many other matters. The management of the Board in many particulars is suffering severely to-day by a certain smallness of spirit, an absence of appreciation of what is needed, a lack of breadth and vigor. Tolerance of its littleness on doctrinal questions has encouraged a kind of littleness that is felt in other matters. Is there not something painfully like meanness of spirit in the argument: You cannot participate in missions, but we beg you to continue to contribute all the same, otherwise the missionaries will suffer? An eminent professor of ethics has likened this method to that of Indian tribes, who, when attacked, put their women and children in the front. It is not safe for the Board to rely too long upon the generosity of those whose

¹ Since this editorial was prepared communication has been opened by the Committee with the voting members of the Japanese Mission, with which Mr. Noyes has been coöperating.

rights it is denying. Our main point, however, is not yet reached. The Board's own disregard of the orderly and legitimate principles of administration to which its history commits it is conducive to a like disregard by others of rules that in other circumstances are useful and would be deemed binding.

For instance, the time may be near when the argument for withholding gifts may become irresistible to so many donors as to endanger the work now going on.

In such a case the responsible party is not primarily those who do not give, but those who so conduct the affairs of the Board as to preclude their giving. It is not right, however, that the work should suffer. What ought to give way, and we believe would, is not the work of the missionaries, but the regulations of the Committee. The Board is opening the door, by its disregard of its relation to the churches, for a method of relief at the expense of its treasury, its prestige, and its usefulness. It is a door, also, which is likely to be the more used, because its opening would relieve the refusal to contribute to the Board of the one objection which now has most force, namely, the effect on missions.

Perhaps we should be more explicit. By the rules of the Committee all gifts, with unimportant exceptions, must not only go through the treasury of the Board, but into a common fund, from which appropriations are made according to the Committee's judgment of what is suitable to each field. Particularly designated gifts, that is, do not, as a rule, raise the amount appropriated to a particular mission, save as they swell the whole amount available and help it proportionally. In this way the Committee carefully preserves a balance in the appropriations.

Now the policy of the Board, so far as it diminishes contributions by disregarding the rights involved in the fellowship of the churches which support it, cuts off the missionaries from the measure of support which they have a moral right to expect. Suppose that it creates a deficiency which seriously imperils, for instance, the work in some special field. Is it necessary that this work should be paralyzed? The churches do not wish this. The missionaries have gone out expecting to be sustained by them. Yet the course of the Board obstructs the flow of the requisite means. No gift can be bestowed which is not counted to the Board, and used to show how strong is the affection for it, and the support of its policy. Will the work stop for a rule? Why should not the treasurer of a mission, in the case supposed, state to the churches the needs of his field? Why should not other treasurers of particular missions do the same? Why are not donors likely to send their gifts to these treasurers with the stipulation that they are not to be acknowledged as gifts to the Board?

It is easy to show the advantages of the present rule. But how long will a rule stand, if the work is suffering, when the body that prescribes the rule is itself violating the fundamental principle and law of its opera-

tions, namely, that it is not "a theological court," but the agent of the churches? The Board, at least, cannot complain if this supposed way of relief should become a practical suggestion and for the time being open a way to contributors of not giving to the Board, and at the same time of saving missionary work from material injury. What is most important at present to be borne in mind in this connection is, that missionaries are sent out by the Board as the agent of the churches, that they have rights founded in the fellowship of the churches which it is the duty of the Board to respect, that if their work is sacrificed by the Board's imperfect appreciation of these rights they have a recourse to the churches, and that material interests must not be sacrificed to formal rules. This being remembered, contributors will not long be shut up to the dilemma of either leaving the missionaries to suffer or of contributing so as to indorse a policy of which they disapprove. If it should become necessary for the missionaries and the churches to act more or less outside of the intermediary which fails to fulfill its duty as an agent, there would, of course, be danger of disproportion in benefactions, of temporary excess or deficiency at particular localities. But publicity would remedy this, or if necessary a provisional committee might easily be organized that would be effective.

The policy now regnant at the Rooms is essentially arbitrary and tyrannical. It is not conservative but revolutionary, and revolutionary not in the interest of progress and liberty, but of personal domination and prejudice, of theological partisanship, of narrowness and injustice. We want catholicity, a management broad as the fellowship of our churches, capable of meeting the enthusiasm of the generation now entering into active labor for Christ and his kingdom. Giving to the Board is now used as an indorsement of a policy which is the reverse of all this. It is deemed by many to be necessary to continue their gifts, notwithstanding this abuse of them, because of the claims of the work. We admit these claims to the full. The missionaries, as we have said, are missionaries, not of the Board merely, but of the churches. The churches are bound to support them. But if the Board cuts, or seriously disturbs, the connection with the churches on which the life of the missions depends, and this becomes generally understood, the life will be esteemed of more importance than the forms or methods which having once nurtured it are now restricting and oppressing it.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALS.

THE controversy which may fitly be said to be raging in New York between Dr. Parkhurst and Inspector Byrnes is a new and striking turn in an episode of moral reform, which has brought to people's minds serious consideration of problems which they have usually before hurried past, or even retreated from as from lions in the path. Each character in the

present situation offers much that is instructive. Inspector Byrnes stands fairly above being suspected of organized corruption; taking a certain keen professional satisfaction in accomplishing difficult pieces of work in his line, particularly when some skillful criminal is outwitted; having a decent regard for the public weal and for the approval of good citizens; but showing himself decidedly apathetic when some broad advance in the enforcement of law is contemplated. The agent of Dr. Parkhurst's society, granting him the benefit of the doubt in the charge of blackmail which has been laid against him, is not known to have entered upon his work with any large thought regarding it, or with high purpose. Merely his training as a detective had given him a certain skill, and failing of any higher motive, he undertook to exercise this skill for Dr. Parkhurst's society as he might have for any other organization which required spying to be done. That these two men fail in so far to have the spirit of their occupation is not so much to be wondered at when it is considered that amongst men of the highest grade Dr. Parkhurst is to so large a degree the voice of one crying in the wilderness. It is of course to be regretted that Dr. Parkhurst in some of his utterances has parted with moderation; but one who has in any measure faced, as he is facing, the awfulness of the evil of prostitution, and has realized at the same time the shrinking indifference, and even fear, of good people, well knows that one's deeper feelings do not easily express themselves in carefully qualified language. Courageous and determined as Dr. Parkhurst is, there is a sense of the lonely and almost impossible nature of the task he has set himself to. But in the long run even this mighty problem is not insoluble, and we all owe Dr. Parkhurst a debt of gratitude for daring to stand out against the great body of Christian pessimists who continue to say that certain evils always have been and always will be; or, at least, whose silent influence is against rather than for efforts to free humanity from some of the baser and more distorted remnants of the animal inheritance.

And yet, as a matter of to-day, Dr. Parkhurst asks too much of Inspector Byrnes. It may seriously be questioned whether the ideal police official in New York would satisfy Dr. Parkhurst's requirements. To attempt to stamp out prostitution by the heel of the law in New York or in any city with a great apartment-house and tenement-house population is simply to reestablish it amongst the homes of the common people, and vastly to increase its power for demoralization. In smaller cities and towns, particularly where there is an active public conscience, the evil can be practically eliminated by heroic methods maintained with eternal vigilance. But in the great centres of population, the law of absolute prohibition must for the present be held as something to be worked toward rather than to be immediately attained. Let us not attempt the impossible, and so lose also the possible. By gradual attainment of possibilities, even that which was impossible is gained. There are lines of

action by which, through patient action and faith in God and in humanity, the shadow of this curse of the ages can be lifted.

What can the law do? The law can cut off the worst abuses that flourish with the system. It can, with no great difficulty, see that temptation in the way of the suggestive sign or advertisement, or of spoken solicitation, is absolutely banished. With organized help from good citizens, the police officials of large cities will be able, and for the most part willing, to undertake such a crusade. The public appeal of prostitution can be destroyed now. With no great difficulty, the more disorderly and shameless resorts can be closed. Regions which become nests of vice, crime, and degradation, can be broken up, and the denizens of them scattered so as to have less combined power for harm. If this seem a very cautious kind of policy to urge, it may be suggested that it is far better than merely to be furious and do nothing.

But this is only the slightest part of the reasonable remedial programme. Public moral problems are nearly always considered from the restricted point of view of the individual sinner, and of the means for his punishment and possibly for his restoration. Now prostitution is emphatically a social evil; it is no mere figure of speech to call it "the social evil." Influences bear in upon it and out from it on every side of the common life of humanity. Beside its better understood social and ethical bearings and its relation to public physical and mental health, it has distinct economic bearings. It is also a peculiar fact about this evil, obvious enough and yet seldom noticed, that it does not propagate itself. It is in each generation the outcropping of the unethical, unsocial, unphysiological, and uneconomic life of people in general during that and the previous generation. It is a momentous thought that its victims are the product of our home and family life, the women coming from the homes of the poor, the men from the homes of the prosperous.

One is the less radical in plans for the forcible legal extirpation of this great evil, because the root of the evil does not lie where it seems to lie. It is indeed current wisdom on the subject that progress in this matter can come only with the general advance of the race. But we are beginning to have more of the sense of urgency than is indicated in such utterances. However great the task, what shall we do? We must undertake patient, intelligent action in every department of life where the evil has a source toward quenching that source.

On the economic side, we must attack the servant-girl problem and the shop-girl problem, and see whether the larger situation does not demand some material change in the attitude of mistress and master toward the women they employ. The economic freedom of women must somehow be won. They must be trained for honest and effective work, and they must be paid equal wages with men for equal work. The general standard for women's wages must be raised, so that the girl who lives at home without charge shall no longer keep the wages at a point which embarrasses and endangers the girl who has to pay for food and shelter.

There must be a quickening of social life. The homes of the poor must be enriched and the homes of the rich must be simplified. Every sort of healthy and elevating pursuit must be brought into people's lives. Child-life must be fostered and led aright. Good citizens must take counsel together for recreation and for every form of education of mind and hand. Every social institution must broaden and deepen, so as to reach different kinds of people, and to appeal to whatever good thing there may be in them.

It would be darkening counsel to leave the matter there. Good and intelligent people must become better and wiser as to the offense that lingers in and near their own lives. If every Christian home were itself a fountain of purity in this regard, how vastly simpler the problem would be! If there were any lack of exact information upon the subject, the baneful influences that come forth out of the higher social classes would sufficiently indicate utter ignorance of clearly established natural laws and reckless indifference to the higher moral law. The crux of the situation lies with those who think themselves least responsible. We sometimes flatter ourselves that the better portion of humanity has for the most part accomplished its conquest, that it has subdued itself to feelings and motives distinctive of humanity. But when one takes his position amongst the lower ranges of society, and looks up at its inner structure, one begins to learn that there are great forces at work in the higher and better grades, which work not for the building up of society, but for its disintegration. To conquer, subdue, and cast out, these evils, hidden, elusive, often masquerading in holy form, in the lives of those who are well satisfied with their spiritual attainments, is the great task which, in the name of an elevated science and a high morality, Christianity must undertake amongst those who are within its fold. The truth is, as the Rev. Charles Gore recently said, we need a new Christian casuistry which shall apply specifically to the complicated hidden matters of life the laws derived from the most approved ethics gained from our newer and profounder knowledge of society and its intense relations, as well as of the physical and psychical nature of the individual man and woman. When people with the Christian motive in them have begun to be taught by their accredited teachers that there are parts of life often given over freely to instinct and passion, which really belong under the sway of irrefragable laws of nature, as absolute and relentless as the Decalogue; when they begin to yield to these laws, no longer taking the childish attitude that it is the perquisite of God's children to be allowed dispensations; when they finally come to rejoice in these laws of nature which are the laws of God; when they love them, meditating upon them day and night, — then the Christian church and Christian civilization will be able to summon their forces against the seemingly imperious, but indeed cringing, demon of prostitution.

THE CASE OF PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

THE earlier stages of this celebrated case have from time to time been noticed in the "Review."¹ Our readers will remember that the immediate occasion of the attack on Professor Briggs was an address on "The Authority of Holy Scripture," which he delivered, January 20, 1891, on his induction into the newly founded chair of Biblical Theology in Union Seminary.² A great clamor was at once raised in the newspapers and an organized agitation begun; sixty-three of the two hundred and sixteen Presbyteries in the church sent up overtures to the General Assembly which met in Detroit on the 21st of May, praying that body to take some action in the matter. The General Assembly itself, chosen in the heat of this excitement, was strongly reactionary. Professor Green of Princeton Seminary, the foremost Old Testament scholar opposed to Professor Briggs, was made Moderator; President Patton of Princeton College was the Chairman of the Committee on Theological Seminaries and the real leader of the Assembly; the committee was carefully picked — if it had been a political convention we should say *packed* — with the assistance of the Stated Clerk to do what was expected of it.

Under an agreement made in 1870 as part of a general plan for putting all the seminaries of the united church in the same relation to the Assembly, Union Seminary, which till then had been independent of all ecclesiastical control, had conceded to the General Assembly a veto upon the election of professors.³ The Directors of Union Seminary did not regard the transfer of Professor Briggs from the chair of Hebrew to that of Biblical Theology as an appointment under the terms of this agreement, but as an assignment to another and kindred field of instruction. They offered proof from their own records that no election under the requirements of their own charter had been held. President Patton's committee, however, without giving the representatives of the Seminary an opportunity to be heard — disregarding in this, it is said, an express promise of its chairman — construed the transfer as a new appointment, though admitting that a distinction undeniably exists between the election of a person to be a professor and the assignment of one already a professor to the work of a certain department of instruction, "the one act conferring *status*, the other only assigning duties."

¹ See vol. xvi. pp. 511-515; 529-542; 597-600; 623-639.

² *The Authority of Holy Scripture*. An Inaugural Address, by Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D. Second edition, with Preface and Appendix. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891. Cf. *Andover Review*, February, 1891.

³ All appointments of professors are to be reported to the General Assembly, "and no such appointment of professor shall be considered as a complete election if disapproved by a majority vote of the Assembly." This was subsequently defined to mean that the election should be reported to the *next* Assembly, and if not then disapproved should be regarded as a complete election.

It was obviously just and wise that this difference of interpretation should be made a matter of conference between the parties and of consultation with their law advisers before any further action was taken; but Professor Patton urged that not to veto would be to approve Professor Briggs's utterances, and that to defer action till the next Assembly would be to lose the right to veto; and under his adroit management the Assembly first, by a vote of 449 to 60, vetoed the appointment, and then appointed a committee of conference! As must have been foreseen, the Directors of the Seminary, in self-respect and self-defense, could do nothing but adhere to their interpretation of their action and of the agreement of 1870 — which, it must be remembered, originated with them — and disregard the Assembly's veto. The subsequent conferences were necessarily futile; the precipitate action of the Assembly had left nothing to confer about, and, besides, the committee had no powers. Its report to the Assembly of 1892, confessing its failure to persuade the Directors to accept the Assembly's construction of the agreement or to acquiesce in its action, recommended "that the *status quo* be recognized by the Assembly, in the hope that some action may be taken which may lead to a harmonious adjustment of all the matters at issue."¹ At the same time the Directors of the Seminary presented a memorial in which, while affirming the undoubted right of either party to the agreement of 1870 to act alone in abrogating it, they asked the Assembly, for reasons fully set forth, to concur with them in annulling that agreement, and thus restoring the Seminary to its former relations to the General Assembly. Instead of this the Assembly, upon the report of its Standing Committee on Theological Seminaries, "endorsed the interpretation of the compact of 1870 as expressed by the action of the Assembly of 1891," and "declined to be a party to the breaking of the compact with Union Theological Seminary." On the heels of this action, which was couched in studiously offensive phrases, came a declaration "that the Assembly is persuaded that the Church should have direct connection with and control over its theological seminaries," and the appointment of a committee to recommend to the next General Assembly a plan for bringing this about;² Presbyteries are enjoined to see that students under their care are prepared in seminaries and under teachers who are under the oversight and direction of the Assembly, and the Board of Education directed to restrict appropriations for the education of students to those who are pursuing their studies under such institutions or private instructors — a blow aimed directly at Union Seminary. Yet after all this another committee was appointed to arrange for submitting to arbi-

¹ By this ambiguous piece of diplomatic Latin is apparently meant the *existing* state of things; and the recommendation to recognize this would seem to mean that no further action be taken by the Assembly at present.

² Before the reunion Princeton was under the immediate control of the Assembly, and it was in part to relieve it of the manifest inconveniences of this arrangement that Union Seminary proposed the plan of 1870.

tration the difference between the two parties in the interpretation of the agreement! Under these circumstances the Directors of the Seminary had but one thing to do. They were, moreover, advised by eminent counsel that in conceding to the General Assembly a veto upon the election of a professor they went beyond their charter powers, and that the agreement was illegal. They therefore rescinded it, and resumed the independent position which the founders of the Seminary intended it to occupy. This is an outcome in which all friends of the Seminary and of theological learning have reason to rejoice, and we can only hope that the other New School seminaries, Auburn and Lane, will take warning from the avowed purpose to bring them under the direct control of the Assembly and withdraw from the agreements of 1870, 1871. The "direct control" of an ecclesiastical body such as the Assembly now is would be far more mischievous and intolerable than the Old School seminaries found it before 1870.

Before the General Assembly met in Detroit (May 21, 1891) the Presbytery of New York, of which Professor Briggs is a member, had already taken up his inaugural address. On April 13, on the motion of the Rev. Dr. Birch, the address was referred to a committee for consideration, with instructions to report at the meeting in May what action, if any, be appropriate in relation thereto. On May 11 the committee, of which Dr. Birch was chairman, reported, recommending that the Presbytery enter at once upon the judicial investigation of the case. The recommendation was adopted, and a committee consisting of the Rev. G. W. F. Birch, D. D., Rev. Joseph J. Lampe, D. D., Rev. Robert F. Sample, D. D., and Ruling Elders John J. Stevenson and John J. McCook was appointed "to arrange and prepare the necessary proceedings appropriate in the case of Dr. Briggs." This committee, though not expressly so described in the resolution under which they were appointed, acted as a committee of prosecution under Section 11 of the Book of Discipline, and were recognized as such by the Presbytery and subsequently by the General Assembly. This case was therefore actually pending when the Assembly met, and the virtual prejudgment of it by the veto of Professor Briggs's appointment to the chair of Biblical Theology on the ground of his inaugural address was an injustice which neither the careful wording of the veto nor President Patton's ingenious special pleading could disguise.

On October 5, 1891, the committee brought in the original charges.¹ They began with a preamble designed to prejudice the case against the defendant, in which they said that they had not attempted to include in the charges all the doctrinal errors they found in the address, such as Dr. Briggs's teachings respecting miracles, the original condition of man, the nature of sin, race redemption, and his scheme of Biblical Theology in general; but "to avoid an undue extension of the trial and the confusion of thought that might follow an attempt to compass all the errors

¹ Printed in this *Review*, vol. xvi. pp. 529-542 (November, 1891).

contained in said address" they had restricted themselves to a few fundamental points.

Professor Briggs had undoubtedly given a favorable opportunity to those who had long regarded his teaching as unsound. The character and limits of the address precluded the fuller elucidation of his opinions and the careful qualification of his statements. This is especially true of the introduction, on the Sources of Divine Authority and the Barriers of Divine Authority in Holy Scripture, in which he cleared the ground for the positive side of his theme, the Theology of the Bible; and it is noteworthy that the charge of erroneous teaching about the Bible is based exclusively on passages in this introduction. Moreover, Professor Briggs had himself formulated in the sharpest way the points in which he was consciously at variance with a large part of the church, and emphasized the antagonism between his views and the current doctrine of Scripture and the accepted traditions about the origin of the books of the Bible.

The charges which the committee brought in — apart from the railing accusation of their preamble, which they did not offer to prove — were two in number; one covering Professor Briggs's utterances about the Bible, the other his opinions concerning the progressive sanctification of believers after death. They were so unskillfully drawn that those most conversant with the law and the practice of the church courts predicted that Professor Briggs would have no trouble in driving a horse and cart through them. Several of the specifications under the first charge, for example, were in reality fresh charges, and so in conflict with the rule of the Book of Discipline, chapter iii.; others were irrelevant, and if proved would not sustain the charge.

Before the charges were reported to the Presbytery, Professor Briggs, by his answers to a series of categorical questions put to him by the Directors of Union Seminary, had repudiated the most serious of the errors attributed to him, and reaffirmed his acceptance of the statements of the Westminster symbols in regard to the Scriptures. In view of these declarations an attempt was made at the meeting at which the charges were brought in (October 5, 1891) to arrest the judicial proceedings and discharge the committee from further consideration of the case. This motion was lost by a vote of sixty-four to sixty, and Professor Briggs was accordingly cited to appear on the 4th of November.

On November 4, 1891, Professor Briggs filed his objections to the sufficiency of the charges in form and legal effect,¹ in which he showed very conclusively that, tested by the plain provisions of the Book of Discipline and the long-established principles of church law, the charges were fatally defective.² After hearing this argument, the Presbytery, by the decisive vote of ninety-four to thirty-nine — seventy-one ministers

¹ Reprinted in this *Review*, vol. xvi. pp. 623-639 (December, 1891).

² How convincing this demonstration was appears most evidently in the fact that when the committee had the opportunity to try again they completely recast their charges in the light of Professor Briggs's criticisms.

and twenty-three elders voting in the affirmative, twenty-seven ministers and twelve elders in the negative — dismissed the case.¹

It was the right of any persons subject and submitting to the jurisdiction of the Presbytery of New York to carry the case to the Synod of New York by complaint against the decision of the Presbytery dismissing the case, and such a complaint was entered by the Rev. W. G. T. Shedd, D. D., and thirty-three others. It was also the right of Dr. Birch and his associates to prepare new charges and appear with them in Presbytery as individual prosecutors. They preferred, however, to carry the case up immediately to the General Assembly, and by a singular series of accidents they were enabled to do so. Under the Book of Discipline, a prosecution may be initiated either by an individual or by a judicatory. In the latter case the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America is the prosecutor and an original party, and is represented before the judicatory by a committee appointed by it to conduct the prosecution in all its stages in whatever judicatory until the final issue is reached. The status and duties of this committee in the judicatory which appoints it are somewhat like those of a judge advocate, and the whole procedure has more resemblance to that of courts martial than to our common civil courts. The committee of prosecution in the case of Professor Briggs maintained that under the sections of the Book of Discipline above referred to they, representing the Presbyterian Church, were an original party, and this claim was recognized by a ruling of the Moderator of the Presbytery, on November 4, 1891, and, on an appeal from the ruling, was sustained by the Presbytery by a vote of sixty-four to fifty-seven. As an original party, the committee of prosecution claimed the right, under Section 94 of the Book of Discipline (which confers that right on original parties, and on them only), to appeal to a superior judicatory, and did so appeal to the General Assembly.

The procedure in cases initiated by a judicatory was introduced in the

¹ The form of the action is as follows: "*Resolved*, That the Presbytery of New York, having listened to the paper of the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., in the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against him, as to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and legal effect, and without approving of the positions stated in his inaugural address, at the same time desiring earnestly the peace and quiet of the church, and in view of the declarations made by Dr. Briggs touching his loyalty to the Holy Scriptures and the Westminster Standards, and of his disclaimers of interpretations put by some on his words, deems it best to dismiss the case, and hereby does so dismiss it." This resolution was evidently framed to unite in the majority all who were for any reason averse to a heresy trial, and from that point of view nothing need be said about it; but considered as the action of a court, it was a bad piece of work. It gave reasons for dismissing the case which were irrelevant and invalid; and, what was more serious, it did not base the dismissal at all on the legal ground that the charges and specifications were insufficient, but left that question undetermined. This gave the prosecuting committee a handle of which they made effective use in their appeal.

new Book of Discipline adopted in 1884-85, and no cases had arisen under it in which the relation of a committee of prosecution to the body creating it were defined. The members of the committee which framed the new rules are themselves disagreed about the meaning and effect of the sections in question. It seems highly improbable that they intended that a committee appointed by a Presbytery to conduct a case before it should be independent of the Presbytery, so that the latter has no further control over it and cannot discharge it even if the case in which it was appointed is dismissed. Nor does it seem reasonable to suppose that the authors of the Book meant to give to such a committee of prosecution the right to appeal against the decision of the court which created it. Such an appeal is, so far as we know, without any analogy in civil, ecclesiastical, or military law.

Against this very questionable construction of the law, given off-hand by the Moderator and sustained by a narrow majority of the Presbytery in a vote taken without debate as upon a point of order, a complaint was carried to the Synod of New York by Professor Francis Brown, D. D., and others. Before the Synod met, however (October 18, 1892), the General Assembly, by entertaining the appeal of the committee of prosecution, had virtually decided the question, and the Synod took no action upon the complaint.

The General Assembly met in Portland, Oregon, May 19, 1892. Before it the appeal of Dr. Birch and his associates was laid. The grounds of appeal were irregularity in the proceedings of the Presbytery (nine specifications); receiving improper testimony (two specifications); declining to receive important testimony; hastening to a decision before the testimony was fully taken (two specifications); manifestation of prejudice in the conduct of the case (four specifications); mistake or injustice in the decision (seven specifications).¹

The Judicial Committee of the Assembly, Dr. T. Ralston Smith, Chairman, decided *in limine* that the committee of prosecution representing the original party, the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, had a right to take the appeal, and that all the necessary steps had been taken; and recommended that the Assembly entertain the appeal. This the Assembly was not bound to do. In the usual course the appellants should have taken their appeal from the Presbytery to the next superior judicatory, the Synod of New York; and the Assembly might have referred the case to the Synod, as was done in the case of Chavis against the Presbytery of Atlantic in 1884 (Digest, 741). The Moderator of the Assembly, however, ruled that this could not be done;² and that if the Assembly did not entertain the appeal the case

¹ These are the grounds of appeal specified in Section 95 of the Book of Discipline; and, with the exception of two, which were excluded by the nature of the case, are *all* the grounds there specified.

² He afterwards, in the act of taking a vote, corrected his mistake; but in such a way as not to undo its effect.

ended there. The Assembly, then, notwithstanding the able argument of Professor Briggs, decided to entertain the appeal.

It is very evident from the course of discussion on this question that there was much misunderstanding in the minds of members of the Assembly about the effect of entertaining the appeal, many of them thinking that if the appeal were entertained the Assembly would proceed itself to try Professor Briggs; and this confusion about so simple a matter is convincing proof, if any were needed, of the unfitness of such a body of over five hundred members to decide nice questions of law.

The question before the Assembly was now, Shall the appeal be sustained? Professor Briggs defended the action of the Presbytery against the allegations of error in its disposition of the case; but the Assembly sustained all the specifications of error set forth in the appeal. The final vote stood, to sustain the appeal, 307; to sustain in part (which had the same effect), 124; not to sustain, 87. The case was accordingly remanded to the Presbytery of New York for a new trial.¹

On November 9, 1892, the committee of prosecution brought to the Presbytery of New York their amended charges and specifications. In form they are very much superior to the original charges. Instead of two charges they now brought in eight, six of them dealing with the subject of the original first charge, Professor Briggs's utterances about the Scriptures, the remaining two with his theories of the "Middle State," the subject of the old second charge.²

In his response to the amended charges, November 28, 1892, Professor Briggs objected to the radical changes which the prosecution had made in the evidence offered and in the nature of the charges themselves. They were restricted by the Book of Discipline (§ 22) and by the order of the Assembly to amendments which did not change the general nature of the specifications or charges. In total disregard of this rule

¹ The following is the text of the decree: "The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America *vs.* Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D. Appeal from the judgment of the Presbytery of New York, dismissing the case.

"The General Assembly having, on the 28th day of May, 1892, duly sustained all the specifications of error alleged and set forth in the appeal and specifications in this case,

"It is now, May 30, 1892, ordered that the judgment of the Presbytery of New York, entered November 4, 1891, dismissing the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., be, and the same is hereby, reversed. And the case is remanded to the Presbytery of New York for a new trial, with directions to the said Presbytery to proceed to pass upon and determine the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and legal effect, and to permit the Prosecuting Committee to amend the specifications of charges, not changing the general nature of the same, if, in the furtherance of justice, it be necessary to amend, so that the case may be brought to issue and tried on the merits thereof as speedily as may be practicable."

² The amended charges are printed at the end of this article.

the committee had not only reconstructed their former indictment, but introduced two entirely new charges. One of these (Charge IV.) alleges that Dr. Briggs's views of prophecy contravene the doctrines of the truth, omniscience, and unchangeableness of God; the other (Charge VII.) imputes to him inferences from his address concerning the salvation of many who die in their sins, which he had explicitly and publicly repudiated. These two charges the Presbytery properly ordered to be struck out. On another preliminary point of some importance Professor Briggs was sustained by the Presbytery, namely, that quotations from the Bible and the doctrinal standards of the church are to be employed to prove that the doctrines which he is charged with contravening are essential doctrines of Scripture and the standards, and may not be used directly to convict the teachings of Dr. Briggs of error; or, to put it in another way, these proofs belong under the charges, not under the specifications, where the committee had put them. With these amendments, the Presbytery proceeded to trial on the six remaining charges. The evidence introduced was in the nature of the case all documentary, and only a small part of it was read; the interest centred in the arguments.

The case was opened for the prosecution by Dr. Birch, the chairman of the committee. He was followed by Colonel McCook, the real leader of the prosecution, who made by far the ablest argument on that side. This is not surprising, for he is not only an experienced pleader, but a man of altogether different intellectual calibre from his clerical associates, — the surprising thing is that he should be so much more of a theologian than they. We shall hardly go amiss in inferring that he had in these matters the assistance of expert counsel of a much higher order than was to be found in the committee. This is, no doubt, what Professor Briggs means by his allusions to "the theologian who speaks in Colonel McCook." The boldest stroke in Professor Briggs's defense was his application of the higher criticism to Colonel McCook's speech. He showed that arguments originally designed to sustain Charges IV. and VII. had, after those charges were struck out by the Presbytery, been interpolated under Charges III. and VIII., to which they are not strictly relevant; the translocation resulting in just such interruptions of continuity, disturbances of order, abrupt transitions, imperfect joints, as we are accustomed to in the work of the "redactor." A paragraph on page 28, for example, begins with the words, "Here once more," etc., while the antecedents of its "once more" now stand on page 32! Colonel McCook had a rare opportunity to explode the methods of the higher criticism, if Professor Briggs missed it by a hair's breadth in this dissection. That he made no reply may be taken as a verification of the analysis.

Professor Briggs's defense¹ is strong and manly. We feel through-

¹ *The Defence of Professor Briggs before the Presbytery of New York.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

out that he is contending for interests far larger than those immediately at stake in the trial. The issue is not whether he shall be acquitted or convicted; it is whether there is room in the Presbyterian Church in this country for the critical study of the Bible in the spirit of a science which seeks only the truth, and follows the truth fearlessly whithersoever it leads. He recognizes the seriousness of the situation; he sees also its ludicrous side, "that Biblical scholars are defending the translations of which they have no need, and experts in textual criticism are acknowledging that they find no inerrant manuscripts; the higher critics are searching the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures through and through to learn the exact truth and facts about the origin and character of the Bible; while men who can hardly spell out their Hebrew and Greek Bibles, who are as innocent of textual criticism as a child unborn, and who show by their speech and writing that they know not the meaning of the words 'higher criticism,' — that such men are prating about the infallibility of the original autographs and the inviolability of traditional theories." There are a great many men in the Presbyterian Church, as in other churches, who, to apply a saying of Bagehot's, are willing to pay the Bible any tribute except that of studying it.

Before taking up the charges, Professor Briggs discusses briefly but lucidly the question of the Rule of Faith in the Presbyterian Church, the relation of the symbols to the Scriptures, the meaning of the phrase "system of doctrine" in the formula of subscription, and the rights of ministers under the Constitution of the church, — subjects about which there is a great deal of confusion in the mind of the church and the public.

The first two charges have to do with the sources of divine authority. Professor Briggs had said: "There are historically three great fountains of divine authority, — the Bible, the Church, and the Reason" ("Inaugural Address," ed. 2, p. 24). What he meant by this, and what he did not mean, he explained in the appendix to the second edition of the "Address," and at greater length in "The Bible, the Church, and the Reason" (New York, 1892), Lectures 1-3. He had here affirmed with all necessary explicitness and emphasis that he held "to the Protestant position as to their relative place and value, namely, that the Bible is the only infallible rule of faith and practice." But the prosecution have their own logic. A divine authority, they say, must be an infallible authority; an infallible authority must be an infallible rule: therefore, if reason and the church are fountains of divine authority, the Bible cannot be the *only* infallible rule; and they attempt to hold Professor Briggs responsible for the outcome of this series of assertions as if it were a necessary inference from his language! The real offense, however, was not so much what Professor Briggs said about the reason and the church in the abstract, as the fact that he adduced Martineau and Newman as representative Christians who had found the divine authority in which the soul can rest, not in the Bible, but the one in the reason, the other in the church; and that he set these men over against Spurgeon, as "an average modern Evangeli-

cal who . . . assails the Church and the Reason in the interest of the authority of Scripture," expressing the conviction that the opinion of the Christian world would not assign to him a higher place in the kingdom of God than to them. If we were to judge by the part these names play in the arguments of the prosecution we might think that Professor Briggs was on trial for an illustration!¹

The third charge was that Professor Briggs taught "that errors may have existed in the original text of the Holy Scripture as it came from its authors." The original form of this charge was: "Dr. Briggs makes statements in regard to the Holy Scriptures which cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the true and full inspiration of those Scriptures as the Word of God written." This change in the nature of the charge is to be traced to a deliverance of the last General Assembly, which from every point of view may well be regarded as one of the most remarkable in the history of the Presbyterian Church; its nearest parallel is, beyond doubt, the action of the Assembly of 1837 which divided the church.² In this the Assembly declares, "Our church holds that the inspired Word, as it came from God, is without error." Professor Briggs was accordingly put upon trial for contradicting the dogma of "the inerrancy of the original autographs," — to use the jargon which has come into vogue with the dogma.

Professor Briggs rightly says that the deliverance was unconstitutional, for the General Assembly has no power to make or define dogma by deliverance; and that, under the circumstances, it was a flagrant injustice to prejudice in this way a case which it had just remanded for trial in the Presbytery. He has no difficulty in showing that the distinction set up between the original text as it came from its authors and the Hebrew

¹ In the original presentment they actually injected a series of charges against Martineau in one of their specifications; in the new trial they transferred this matter to their speeches.

² This deliverance, which was adopted in response to an overture referring directly to Professor Briggs's address, is as follows: —

"The General Assembly would remind all under its care that it is a fundamental doctrine that the Old and New Testaments are the inspired and infallible Word of God. Our church holds that the inspired Word, as it came from God, is without error. The assertion of the contrary cannot but shake the confidence of the people in the sacred Books. All who enter office in our church solemnly profess to receive them as the only infallible rule of faith and practice. If they change their belief on this point, Christian honor demands that they should withdraw from our ministry. They have no right to use the pulpit or the chair of the professor for the dissemination of their errors until they are dealt with by the slow process of discipline. But if any do so act, their Presbyteries should speedily interpose, and deal with them for violation of their ordination vows. The vow taken at the beginning is obligatory until the party taking it is honorably and properly released. The General Assembly enjoins upon all ministers, elders, and Presbyteries, to be faithful to the duty here imposed."

and Greek texts which we have in our hands is not only wholly unknown to the Bible itself and the Westminster Standards, but in direct conflict with the doctrine of the Confession, which is that "the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek, being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentical," so that when the Assembly declares that "our church holds that the inspired Word as it came from God is without error," if they mean to ascribe to the original manuscripts a character which does not belong to the Bible we have, they say what is not true now and never has been true in the history of the Presbyterian Church. He might have added that this distinction between "autographs" which were free from all error and copies in which many errors exist was invented by the father of modern Old Testament criticism, Richard Simon, as one of the premises of his criticism, and that it was fiercely assailed by orthodox Protestant divines in the beginning of the eighteenth century as a peculiarly dangerous attempt on the part of "the tools of the Papacy" to undermine the authority of the Word of God. The pedigree of dogmas is always interesting; the heretic is seldom many degrees back.

The prosecutors themselves were unable to find anything about the new dogma in the Standards; they could produce nothing more relevant to it than the statements that the Holy Scripture is the Word of God written, immediately inspired, and the rule of faith and practice, all of which Professor Briggs could *ex animo* accept.

The next two charges bear upon the authorship of the Pentateuch and of Isaiah. Professor Briggs said in his address: "It may be regarded as the certain result of the science of the Higher Criticism that Moses did not write the Pentateuch," and "Isaiah did not write half of the book that bears his name." As the Standards contain not a syllable about the authorship of the books of the Bible, — the Westminster divines were much too good Protestants to make canonicity or inspiration depend on authenticity, — the prosecution were here also hard put to it to find wherein Professor Briggs's offense consisted. Last year they said that his critical opinions were in conflict with the Confession of Faith, chapter i., §§ 8, 9; this year they drop section 8, and, putting together clauses from chapter i., §§ 5, 9, charge that his teachings are contrary to the "essential doctrine of the Standards; . . . that the Holy Scripture evidences itself to be the Word of God by the consent of all the parts,¹ and that the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself." Professor Briggs's teaching is also contrary, it is charged, to direct statements of

¹ This "essential doctrine" is discovered by the prosecution in a single clause taken out of a paragraph which teaches that, although the internal evidences abundantly prove the Scriptures to be the Word of God, our conviction of their infallible truth and divine authority rests, not upon this evidence, but upon the work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word, in our hearts, — a doctrine for which Professor Briggs has stoutly contended against the departures of some modern schools of theology.

Holy Scripture.¹ The prosecution thus challenged Professor Briggs on his own ground, and, as was to be anticipated, were badly worsted. Brushing aside their little collection of texts, most of which are palpably irrelevant, he boldly undertook to prove from the Bible itself the truth of the incriminated assertions. He put in the hands of the members of the Presbytery a pamphlet, "Who wrote the Pentateuch? or, The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch," which is a clear and cogent exhibition of the methods and results of criticism. In his defense itself he set forth in a similar manner, though less exhaustively, the proofs that the last twenty-seven chapters of the book of Isaiah are in the main the work of an unknown prophet who lived near the end of the Babylonian exile. The committee were evidently afraid of this aggressive defense, to which they were unable to reply; and Colonel McCook attempted beforehand to destroy its effect. He said in substance, that the prosecution was not called on to prove that Moses wrote the Pentateuch and Isaiah the whole book which is called by his name, or even to refute Professor Briggs's argument to the contrary. If the Bible (that is, certain verses in the Bible) and the Confession of Faith affirm the authenticity of these books, those who hold other views have no right in the church. We do not wish to misjudge Colonel McCook, but it seems to us that he comes perilously near to saying that in a trial for heresy in the Presbyterian Church it makes no difference what is true; the only question is, What is authoritatively declared and prescribed? Professor Briggs, however, was not content with the legal defense that the Bible and the Confession affirm nothing about the authenticity of the Pentateuch and Isaiah that bars the right of criticism; his real defense is the proof that what he had said about the authorship of those books is true. He must have been well aware that such a defense was in the eyes of many an aggravation of his offending — perhaps on the old law maxim, the greater the truth the greater the libel; but his honest and courageous course was fully justified by the result, and gave to his acquittal a significance which it could not otherwise have had.

The last charge deals with Professor Briggs's peculiar views about the "Middle State," especially with the progressive sanctification of believers after death. Professor Briggs had so emphasized the magnitude and significance of this departure from the current theology that his opponents may perhaps be excused for thinking that it must be something very serious — all the more that they could not very well understand what it was. Some detected in it "second probation," to some it seemed a new and more undesirable kind of purgatory. There is undeniably an apparent contradiction between the doctrine of the Standards that at death

¹ It is perhaps worth while to give their references. On the Pentateuch, Ex. xxiv. 4; Num. xxxii. 2; Deut. v. 31; xxxi. 9; Josh. i. 7, 8; 1 Kings ii. 3; 1 Chron. vi. 49; Ezra iii. 2; vi. 18; Neh. i. 7; Luke xxiv. 27, 44; John v. 45-47; Acts vii. 38; xv. 21. On Isaiah, Matt. iv. 14, 15; xii. 17, 18; Luke iii. 4; Acts xxviii. 25, 26; John xii. 38, 41; Rom. x. 16, 20.

believers are made perfect in holiness and do immediately pass into glory, and Professor Briggs's teachings. These paragraphs in the Standards were framed to exclude the Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory, not to teach any special type of eschatology; and as Professor Briggs distinctly rejects the doctrine of purgatory, it would seem difficult under these sections to convict him of essential error.

After Professor Briggs had made his defense (December 13, 14, 15, and 19, 1892), Dr. Lampe closed for the prosecution. His argument is labored and heavy, and, if learning might be inferred from the multitude of quotations, very learned. The learning proves on closer inspection to be largely cram, and not very intelligent cram at that. He made no serious reply to Professor Briggs's argument on critical questions; but, contrary to a distinct understanding, he went outside and introduced new matters. Professor Briggs was therefore permitted to answer him on these points.

The end of this long trial was reached on December 29 and 30, when the Presbytery acquitted Professor Briggs on every charge by majorities ranging from seven to twenty. It is noteworthy that the narrowest majority was on the third charge, the possibility that errors may have existed in the original text of the Scriptures, while it was largest on the fourth and fifth charges, the authorship of the Pentateuch and of the book of Isaiah. It appears from this that there were a good many in the Presbytery, as there are in the Church at large, who are willing to give criticism a free field in the Bible, if only the critics will leave the *doctrine* of Scripture untouched, or rather, if they will accept the compromise doctrine of long-lost errorless manuscripts. The concession is evidently much more significant than the reservation. An analysis of the vote, such as is given in the "New York Evangelist" for December 5, is also very instructive. It shows that the real preponderance in Professor Briggs's favor was overwhelmingly greater than the bare figures show. For example, of the pastors in the Presbytery, thirty-three, representing churches having over eleven thousand members, voted throughout for acquittal; eleven, representing thirteen hundred members, for conviction; while of thirty-one ministers who voted throughout for conviction, fourteen were without charge or retired.

The committee of prosecution have given notice that they will appeal again directly to the General Assembly, which meets in Washington in May. Whether the Assembly will again entertain the appeal is more doubtful. If it should do so, it may either try the appeal itself or by a commission, whose decision, however, upon matters of doctrine would be subject to review by the Assembly. Or the Assembly may refer the case to the Synod where it naturally belongs; in which case it would no doubt come before the Assembly in 1894 on appeal from the Synod. Evidently the end is not yet.

THE AMENDED CHARGES AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

CHARGE I.

THE Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that the Reason is a fountain of divine authority which may and does savingly enlighten men, even such men as reject the Scriptures as the authoritative proclamation of the will of God and reject also the way of salvation through the mediation and sacrifice of the Son of God as revealed therein; which is contrary to the essential doctrine of the Holy Scripture and of the Standards of the said Church, that the Holy Scripture is most necessary, and the rule of faith and practice.

(Specification 1, see "Address," page 24, lines 7-10 and 31-33; page 27, lines 9-21: Appendix, pages 88, 89. Specification 2, see page 28, lines 1-22.)

CHARGE II.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that the Church is a fountain of divine authority which, apart from the Holy Scripture, may and does savingly enlighten men; which is contrary to the essential doctrine of the Holy Scripture and of the Standards of the said Church, that the Holy Scripture is most necessary, and the rule of faith and practice.

(Specification 1, see "Address," page 24, lines 7-10 and 31-33; page 25, lines 1-14 inclusive. Specification 2, see page 28, lines 1-22.)

CHARGE III.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that errors may have existed in the original text of the Holy Scriptures, as it came from its authors, which is contrary to the essential doctrine taught in the Holy Scripture and in the Standards of the said Church, that the Holy Scripture is the Word of God written, immediately inspired, and the rule of faith and practice.

(Specification, see "Address," page 35, line 4—page 36, line 8.)

CHARGE IV.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that many of the Old Testament predictions have been reversed by history, and that the great body of Messianic prediction has not been and cannot be fulfilled, which is contrary to the essential doctrine of Holy Scripture and of the Standards of the said Church that God is true, omniscient and unchangeable.

(Specification, see "Address," page 38, lines 20-30. — This charge was struck out by the Presbytery.)

CHARGE V.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, which is contrary to direct statements of Holy Scripture and to the essential doctrines of the Standards of the said Church, that the Holy Scripture evidences itself to be the Word of God by the consent of all the parts, and that the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself.

(Specification, see "Address," page 33, lines 6-8.)

CHARGE VI.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that Isaiah is not the author of half of the book that bears his name, which is contrary to direct statements of Holy Scripture and to the essential doctrines of the Standards of the said Church, that the Holy Scripture evidences itself to be the Word of God by the consent of all the parts, and that the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself.

(Specification, see "Address," page 33, lines 24, 25.)

CHARGE VII.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that the processes of redemption extend to the world to come in the case of many who die in sin; which is contrary to the essential doctrine of Holy Scripture and the Standards of the said Church, that the processes of redemption are limited to this world.

(Specification, see "Address," page 50, last three lines; page 53, line 3 from below—page 54, line 2; page 55, line 21—page 56, line 8: Appendix, page 104, lines 13-21. — This charge was struck out by the Presbytery.)

CHARGE VIII.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a Minister of the said Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that sanctification is not complete at death, which is contrary to the essential doctrine of Holy Scripture and of the Standards of the said Church, that the souls of believers are at their death at once made perfect in holiness.

(Specification, see "Address," page 53, line 3 from below—page 55, line 2: Appendix, page 107, line 19—page 108, line 17.)

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE SOTERIOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By WILLIAM PORCHER DU BOSE, M. A., S. T. D., Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South. Pp. vi, 391. New York and London : Macmillan & Co. 1892.

This is a fresh, original, striking book. The writer, somewhat in the vein of Bushnell as to style and mode of incisive expression, shows that Christ is our salvation through what He wrought out in himself, that what He became through the struggle, temptation, and conquest of his human life is his power to save us from sin and to make us sons of God. The sinlessness of Christ was not a negative absence of fault but a positive achievement, in which He overcame the world and transformed the human nature He had, with its tendencies to sin, into a perfect human nature free from those tendencies. The reality of Christ's humanity, the stress of his temptation, the fact of his moral conflicts are made impressively vivid. His perfected humanity was his true divinity. They were not two different natures side by side, but were identical. All this is developed by the author with constant regard to the faith of the church in Christ as the Son of the God and as a divine Redeemer, who was himself made perfect in such way as to bring many sons unto perfection.

Particularly, salvation is natural good and so deliverance from natural evil, moral good and so moral freedom, and spiritual good and so actual union with God. The threefold distinction is summed up thus : "Self-realization as it is a realization *of* self is natural good. As it is a realization *by* self it is moral good. But as it is a self-realization in both senses only *in God*, out of whom neither is possible, it is spiritual good. As our good the three are one. But our one good is God, righteousness, and life, which are three." The corresponding terms in the New Testament are reconciliation, or union with God, redemption, or restoration to freedom, resurrection, or renewal and realization of the true self. Jesus Christ is our salvation exemplarily, causally, and really, that is, his own sanctification, redemption, and resurrection become ours through his example, his power, his indwelling. These conceptions of Christ as our reconciliation, our redemption, and our resurrection are developed in separate chapters.

To indicate the view taken of the human nature, the divine sonship, and the sinlessness of Christ, it would be necessary to reproduce at length the reasoning of the writer in the chapters which bear those titles. But in general it is the perfection of human nature gained in the human way of sacrifice and obedience by Christ first for himself and then in us. "We are not to find the divinity of Christ in anything outside of his humanity, but in the divine perfection of his humanity. I do not say that there was not a divinity and a divine personality apart from, and prior to, the humanity, but *to us* this is revealed *only* in the humanity and in the divine perfection of the humanity ; *i. e.*, in the perfect human holi-

ness, righteousness and life of the man, Christ Jesus. . . . That as man He should have possessed a non-human knowledge and power would have made him in those respects not man. The Incarnation is not the Logos playing or acting man, or acting through an outward semblance of manhood, but the Logos as man in all the truth and reality of manhood." The author holds that the sin which belongs to humanity by its nature or inheritance belonged to the humanity of Christ, that thus He took sin, was made in the likeness of the flesh of sin, but that it was not the occasion of sin in Him, since He, by his own personal holiness, never yielded to it; He indeed overcame it so that it ceased to be prompting to sin. That which overcomes us and leads us into actual sin, which, strictly speaking, is the only sin, was crucified by Him in his achievement of a real and positive holiness. Thus He became the power to overcome the sin of nature in humanity by first conquering it in himself. "It gives reality to the thought that God has indeed descended to us to raise us up to Himself, to feel that He has not only taken our nature to unite it to his own, that He has not only entered into our impotency to raise it up to his omnipotency, but that He has taken upon Him *all* that belongs to our fallen nature and condition — yea, even our sin, that He might wash it out in his own blood and cleanse us from it in his own divine purity and holiness. . . . That He who *knew* no sin (*i. e.*, who *personally*, whether as God or man, was incapable of sinning) was made sin for us that we might in Him (*i. e.*, first in his person and secondly in ourselves in union with his person) become the righteousness of God, means, if it means anything, that He became just what we are in the fallen condition of our nature in order that by his destruction of sin in our nature, by his crucifixion, in his own body, of the sinful in our nature, He might be our redemption from the sin of our nature, and our restoration to the freedom and life of God's own holiness and righteousness."

The views of the author concerning nature as distinguished from personality determine his theories of the person of Christ, of his sinlessness, and of the redemption of men. To many who hold that nature exists only in personality the distinction creates more difficulties than it removes. The identification of divinity in Christ with perfect humanity may seem to imperil the divinity. The importance attached to the immaculate conception as the essential condition of understanding the incarnation will hardly be conceded in view of the silence of the Epistles and the Fourth Gospel on that point. Yet the criticisms which might be made at various points are incidental. The writer is possessed of a great idea which he develops with much power, and which is supported by some of the most important passages in the Epistles. Salvation is seen to be a great achievement in the life of the human Christ, and a vital process in those who receive Him. Righteousness is not imputed, but imparted. The incarnation is realized completely in the reconciliation, redemption, and renewal of men.

George Harris.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By NEWMAN SMYTH. Pp. x, 498. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

With this second volume of the International Theological Library the title "Christian Ethics" appears for the first time (so far as I am aware) on the cover of an English book, except in the case of translations from the German. There have been several excellent and even notable works on ethics by American authors, such as the books of Hopkins, Wayland, Hickok, and Porter. But these have been confined to the natural and philosophical grounds of morality, and have not gone beyond the theistic conception of God. During the last few years the science of ethics has received a great amount of attention in England in the advocacy and criticism of the theories of hedonism, utilitarianism, humanitarianism, and idealism, but on purely psychological and philosophical lines, in the works of Spencer, Sidgwick, Mill, Martineau, Green, and others. The need of a thorough-going presentation of Christian ethics which has long been felt is now supplied in Dr. Smyth's admirable work with that title.

He does not follow the German method in the main lines of the discussion, but adopts a method more suitable to the subject. The German theologians include certain topics or doctrines in ethics which we make a part of theology, such as regeneration, sanctification, the kingdom of God, and the church, or the total result of Christianity in its personal and social forms, the division between theology and ethics becoming rather mechanical. In other respects, the dominating principle of Christian morality is not developed, unless in Dorner's "Christian Ethics," and by him not in a consistent and comprehensive manner. The present treatise works on the lines of one central principle, which is clearly characteristic of ethics as distinguished from theology, and also characteristic of Christian ethics as distinguished from philosophical and evolutionary ethics. That principle is the Christian Ideal. Morality is the pursuit of an ideal which is recognized as obligatory. The end to be attained determines all questions of right and wrong. The fundamental inquiry in ethics pertains to the highest good. There is no law of abstract right apart from the good, and the good is some ideal or end in personal and social character which ought to be attained. This distinguishing principle of ethics when carried over into Christian ethics should become the Christian ideal. What is the end in view, the highest good, the ideal of character, according to Christianity? The answer to that question gives the principle upon which Christian ethics as a science and Christian morality as a practice must be based. Theology and ethics deal with the same truths in part. Theology must recognize the end in view, a new personality and a new society which are Christian, otherwise incarnation and redemption are meaningless. But while theology has to do with the revelation in Christ as knowledge of God and of the world, ethics takes this knowledge and applies it to the ideal character which is to be attained.

Adopting the principle which has been stated, Dr. Smyth entitles the first part of his book, which unfolds the theory of the subject, the Christian Ideal, and proceeds in chapters on the Revelation, the Contents, and the Realization of the Christian Ideal, the Forms in which the Christian Ideal is to be realized, the Methods of the Progressive Realization of the Christian Ideal, and the Spheres in which the Christian Ideal is to be realized. The second part is entitled Christian Duties, and includes chapters on the Christian Conscience, Duties towards Self as a Moral End, Duties towards Others as Moral Ends, the Social Problem and Christian Duties, Duties towards God, and the Christian Moral Motive Power; but all the practical questions raised are discussed under constant reference to the Ideal which has been delineated in the first part.

The Christian Ideal is set forth as the kingdom of God, a kingdom constituted of persons in mutual relations, attaining their true worth through the Spirit of God who reveals God. "It is the annunciation of a spiritual power in man working for a good which is here and now to be realized, but which is not to be limited by the conditions of present environment, and which has in itself the potency and the promise of higher spiritual life and perfection. As the sky is to be found at every point when we lift our eyes to the horizon, and the whole earth has its existence in the sky which encompasses it; so when we look to the end of any human effort, and reach in our thought the horizons of all earthly perfection, Christian ethics beholds this good of humanity contained in a larger prospect, and having its place and order as a part of the whole kingdom of heaven. We belong to this kingdom of heaven as men who are immortals. We receive these present beginnings of character and its moral good as the heirs of an eternal inheritance." The ideal is presented as consisting in a perfection like that of the Father in heaven, which is the perfection of love. It is also presented as eternal life, which signifies a personal good, the deliverance from moral evil and death, a renewal through the Spirit of God, the fullness and completeness of personal relationship, a character which realizes holiness, righteousness, benevolence, and love, a present reality and an immediate possession in part, and the conception of blessedness as its element and atmosphere. The Christian ideal is Jesus himself as He was known on earth, and as He has been glorified through the Spirit in the adoration of his church. This ideal is compared with others, as the Oriental, the Æsthetic, the Evolutionary, and the Socialistic, and is seen to be superior in every respect. The realization of the Christian ideal is through faith, the principle of reception and appropriation. The validity of faith and its distinctive Christian use are treated at length, and in a very fruitful manner. One of the best chapters in the book is on love as the form in which the ideal is realized. Love is self-affirmation as well as self-impartation. It is self-finding in another, in which the affirmation or

realization and the impartation of self are coincident. The method of attaining the ideal is partly through conflict, which is most suggestively shown to be a method which may always be employed even apart from sin, partly through coöperation, and partly through the possession and use of the material by the spiritual. The Family, the State, and the Church are the spheres in which the Christian ideal is to be realized. All these work from personal centres in relationship. The relation of State and Church is broadly considered, and their ideal unity indicated.

In the second part there are interesting discussions of many practical questions in Christian morality; personal questions pertaining to conscience, to personal habits and enjoyments, and to the duty of self-development, and social questions pertaining to justice, to truthfulness and permissible deceit, to marriage and divorce, to political obligations, to capital and labor, monopolies, private ownership, and to the moral evil which is at the root of the social problem. Special duties to God in prayer and religious observances, in gratitude and penitence, are appropriately treated.

This notice is intended to give some account of the book, and not to enter into discussion or criticism of the positions taken. The book has wide scope and a strong movement. The subjects are treated with breadth and discrimination. Indirectly, faith is strengthened, as the person, work, and kingdom of Christ are seen to be productive of symmetrical character and righteous society.

George Harris.

APOLOGETICS ; or, Christianity Defensively Stated. By ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. Pp. xvi, 522. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

This is the third volume of the International Theological Library, following Professor Driver's "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament," and Dr. Newman Smyth's "Christian Ethics." The high standard of excellence which was reached in the preceding books is maintained in the present work. The topics fall into three groups : Theories of the Universe, Christian and anti-Christian ; the Historical Preparation for Christianity ; the Christian Origins. In the first part an account is given of Pantheism, Deism, Materialism, Speculative Theism, Agnosticism, and Christian Theism. The various theories are fairly stated, the strength and weakness of erroneous conceptions are pointed out with discrimination, and the theistic position strongly defended. One who wishes to gain correct knowledge of the modern theories which try to account for the universe will here find what is needed. The chapter on Speculative Theism is less satisfactory than the other chapters. The author means by it, Theism as belief in a personal God both transcendent and immanent, but a belief gained without the Christian revela-

tion, on grounds of reason. He chooses as representatives Theodore Parker, W. R. Greg and Frances P. Cobbe, and attempts to show that their theism is sometimes pantheism and sometimes deism. The impression left is that belief in a personal God cannot be reached by the unaided reason. This is too great a concession to the agnostics and materialists, whom the author attempts to confute. It also ignores many weighty names which have established a consistent theism on the laws of nature and on the reason and history of man.

The most interesting and just at present the most valuable part of the book is the second division, which traces the historical preparation for Christianity in the religion of the Old Testament. It is assumed that the critics are right in assigning the law as elaborated in the Pentateuch to the period following the exile, when the ceremonial and moral law was most highly regarded. The religious development of Israel is then described in the stages of Mosaism, Prophetism, and Legalism. The history is seen to be an advance from the morality of the decalogue, through the lofty ideas of God and of his righteous purpose for his people, as given by the prophets, followed by the period of formalism which is known to have characterized the centuries between the exile and the time of Christ. The difficulty of supposing that the entire system of sacrifice and worship was established in the early time of the exodus from Egypt and the settlement of Canaan, and then fell into complete desuetude only to be revived a thousand years later, is removed. The legalism is found to be a decadence which not only observed countless rites, but also multiplied the requirements of ceremonialism and codified them. Dr. Bruce is aware that interest now gathers, not so much about the precise truth among many theories of the authorship and date of the books of the Bible, but about the actual religion of Israel, if the more important agreements of the critics are accepted. He addresses himself therefore to the task of reconstructing the history in correspondence with the probable growth of the literature. He does not ask how much remains of the traditional view, nor how much and how little must be given up. He asks what is gained, what was the actual growth of religious beliefs, and what the reasons of decadence in the night of legalism. In a word, he tells precisely what all intelligent persons wish to know, and tells it in a clear, fresh, and convincing manner. Scarcely any one has so successfully rendered the service of showing what the result of the higher criticism is for the proper understanding of the history and religion of Israel. Those who wish to be informed regarding the effect of modern investigation of the literature of the Old Testament may well be referred to this portion of Dr. Bruce's treatise. They will find that the effect is not destructive but constructive, or rather reconstructive, and that large portions of the Scriptures which had been meaningless or perplexing are regained as reflecting a coherent and significant religious development. The author has not essayed to indicate directly

the extent to which that development is natural, and the extent to which the supernatural and miraculous may be recognized. Evidently, however, prophetism was most closely under spiritual guidance. Moses and the great prophets were in the highest sense inspired men. The late date of most of the psalms suggests that even in the darkness of legalism inspiration was not wanting to produce those sacred lyrics which were the expression of devout feelings for that period, and even for the Christian centuries.

The third part of the work, on the Christian Origins, traverses more familiar ground. The character of Jesus as Messiah and Lord is delineated, the fact of his resurrection maintained against theories of visions, the substantial agreement of Paul's belief with the teachings and character of Jesus indicated, the historicity of the Synoptical Gospels defended, and the Fourth Gospel assigned to the close of the first century. Adverse opinions are fairly stated, and the objections to them are forcibly presented.

The term "apologetics" as applied to such a work is with a wide departure from accustomed use. It would hardly be employed in this case if it had not been handed down from former times. The discussion of Theism belongs either to theology or to the philosophy of religion; the chapters on the Old Testament furnish a sketch of the religion of Israel; the chapters on the Christian Origins present the person and work of Jesus and the characteristics of primitive Christianity. The apologetic character of the work is incidental as Christianity is defended against modern doubt or opposition. In the sense that the best defense of Christianity is itself, in its own reality and power, the book may be considered a treatise on apologetics. The name, however, is of little consequence, except as it is somewhat technical and forbidding. The book is an important aid to faith.

George Harris.

THE APOLOGY OF ARISTIDES on Behalf of the Christians. From a Syriac MS. preserved on Mount Sinai. Edited with an Introduction and Translation by J. RENDEL HARRIS, M. A. With an Appendix, containing the main portion of the original Greek text, by J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, M. A. [Texts and Studies; Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature. Vol. i.; No. 1.] Pp. 118, 30. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1891.

THE NEWLY RECOVERED APOLOGY OF ARISTIDES; its Doctrine and Ethics. With extracts from the translation by Professor J. RENDEL HARRIS. By HELEN B. HARRIS. Pp. viii, 114. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1891.

DIE APOLOGIE DES ARISTIDES. Aus dem Syrischen übersetzt, und mit Beiträgen zur Textvergleichung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Dr. RICHARD RAABE. [Forming part of IX Band, I Heft of von Gebhardt und Harnack's *Texte und Untersuchungen*.] Pp. iv, 97. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1892.

An "Apology" by Aristides, a Christian philosopher of Athens, is said by Eusebius to have been presented to the Emperor Hadrian on the occa-

sion of the latter's first visit to Athens in 124 or 125 A. D., and to have been one of several causes leading to milder treatment of the Christians. This information, copied with embellishments by Jerome and later writers, was all that was known of Aristides until in 1878 the fathers of the Mechitarist Monastery of St. Lazarus at Venice (belonging to that singular Armenian monastic order of the Roman Church, which, using the Armenian language and the Syrian rite, has established itself as far in the West as Paris, and has become distinguished for services to patristic learning) published a considerable fragment in Armenian of what purported to be the "Apology" of Aristides addressed to Hadrian. The genuineness of this was denied, especially by Renan, but was defended by Harnack and other scholars, who, rightly as it now proves, held the suspicious words (such as *θεοτόκος*) to be clearly interpolations. In 1889 Professor J. Rendel Harris made a visit of three weeks to the Convent of St. Catharine on Mount Sinai, and brought away a copy of a Syriac MS., probably of the seventh century, containing the whole of the "Apology." When his edition of the text with translation and introduction was partly through the press, to form the first issue of the Cambridge "Texts and Studies," the editor of the series, Mr. Robinson, accidentally discovered that a Greek text of the "Apology" was known all through the Middle Ages, when it was translated into all the European languages and English and even into Icelandic, and still exists in many manuscripts. It lay hidden in a religious romance, the "Life of Barlaam and Josaphat" (or Joasaph), which was itself a working over of the legend of Buddha. In this romance the "Apology," put into the mouth of an old man, is the means of converting an Indian king and his people. There are thus in hand now three sources for the text of the "Apology,"—the Greek text used for the purposes of a romancer, the Syriac version, and the portion of an Armenian version (of which two MSS. are now known). But a comparison of these, which has been made somewhat elaborately by Dr. Richard Raabe in a recent issue of the "Texte und Untersuchungen," seems to show that they have all suffered seriously from the hands of editors and transcribers.

The first question in regard to the "Apology" relates to its address. Eusebius and the Armenian fragment say that it was addressed to Hadrian. The Syriac has a title with the name of Hadrian, but this is followed by a longer and apparently more original address to Titus Hadrianus Antoninus. The text of the second address is in confusion, and although one disputed word has been cleared up recently by Professor Nestle, some emendation must be made in any case. There seems every probability, as nearly all have now agreed, that Antoninus Pius was meant, and that Eusebius and the Armenian version were both somehow misled. There is no evidence that Eusebius ever saw the "Apology" itself. This conclusion besides convicting Eusebius of some incidental errors brings the date of the "Apology" down at least to 138 A. D.

The "Apology" itself resembles other apologetic writings of the second

century. The writer develops the argument with system and much force. He opens with a general statement of the necessary attributes of God, who, the *πρῶτον κινούμεν*, although incomprehensible, is yet known to be eternal and immortal and above human needs and passions. The apologist then divides mankind into classes by religions, first the heathen of various sorts, then Jews, then Christians. He takes up the several forms of heathenism, the nature-worship of the East, the mythology of the Greeks, the religion of the Egyptians. All these evidently fall short of the idea of God set up in the opening section, and lead to immoral living. After rejecting the theories of the heathen poets and philosophers, the apologist takes up the Jews. The Syriac version is here probably nearer the original, and the Greek has doubtless been altered out of hostility to the Jews. The monotheism of the Jews and their high standard of morality are praised, but "they, too, have gone astray from accurate knowledge," for their ritual observances are really "service to angels and not to God." The Christians, then, alone, have found the truth. They have an entirely spiritual conception of the one God, and their purity, brotherly kindness, honesty, sobriety, devoutness and modesty, which are described in a charming passage, prove the divineness of their religion. There is a brief account of Christ, and for further knowledge of the Christians the emperor is referred to their sacred writings. The "Apology" does not end, as might be expected, with an appeal for milder treatment, and indeed contains no clear allusion to great persecution. There is only a rebuke of those who malign the Christians, and an invitation in view of the coming judgment to all men to approach unto "the gateway of light."

The value of the "Apology" is somewhat lessened at present by the unsatisfactory condition of the text. The Syriac and Armenian versions resemble each other in general and in many particulars, but their points of difference prove that they were made independently from a Greek original, which evidently differed considerably from the Greek text as we have it in "Barlaam and Josaphat." The great difference between these two types of text is in the classification of the heathen religions. The Syriac and Armenian divide into barbarians and Greeks, and the Egyptians are added as a sort of appendix to the Greeks without any mention at the beginning of the discussion. The Greek divides the polytheists formally into Chaldeans, Greeks, and Egyptians. This division so plainly lies at the basis of the actual discussion as it is worked out, and is so much more logical and consistent, that it seems almost certainly the original. This is denied by Zahn and Hilgenfeld on what seem *a priori* grounds, and by R. Seeberg with more careful argument, but is asserted by Harris, Harnack, and now by Raabe, whose careful examination seems to prove it. This conclusion gives rise to a certain presumption in general in favor of the text from the Greek romance as against the Syriac translation. The Syriac is about half as long again as the Greek. It contains some passages and many sentences which are not in the

Greek; on the other hand, the Greek contains what is not in the Syriac. Raabe's comparison, section by section, shows that in some cases the Syriac is certainly or probably expanded; in others the Greek has been altered from the original. In very many cases it is impossible to do more than offer suspicions. In some sections, especially that taking up the views of the poets and philosophers, neither text is very comprehensible. The section on the Jews has been wholly rewritten for "Barlaam and Josaphat." The interesting section on the Christians and the conclusion are very much longer in the Syriac, and it cannot readily be determined whether the additional material is original or not, although the appendix-like character of some of the sentences strongly suggests that they are interpolations. It proves thus to be impossible to construct a satisfactory text of the whole "Apology."

Harris and Robinson accompanied their edition with some notes containing chiefly parallels from other early writers, and with elaborate discussions of various topics connected with the "Apology." Harris thinks he sees in it the reflection of some eight clauses of the "Apostolic Symbol." Harnack doubts this speculation, and it is made still more uncertain by Raabe's criticism of the text. There are also parallels in the "Apology" to the "Didache," which Robinson thinks may be due to the use by Aristides of the "Two Ways."

The most interesting of these discussions is that by Robinson of the possible relation of the "Apology" to the lost "Preaching of Peter." He finds that to all but one of the "indisputable" fragments of the "Preaching of Peter" there are striking parallels in the "Apology," running through all its main topics. The Sibylline Oracles, also, and the "Epistle to Diognetus" contain parallels to the "Apology" which suggest another writing common to all three, and Robinson conjectures that the common material may all have come from the "Preaching of Peter." If this were so, it might clear up some of the difficulties in connection with the additional material of the Syriac "Apology," and also explain the fact that Aristides in some places is less explicit and takes more for granted (as in the allusion to the worship of angels) than would be natural in a wholly independent writing addressed to a heathen.

The allusions to the New Testament books are very few, the only undoubted allusions (in Harnack's view at least) being to the first chapter of Romans.

The most interesting discussion so far of the general bearing of the "Apology" is that by Harnack in the "Theologische Literaturzeitung" for June 13 and 27, 1891. He points out that the fact that the "Apology" supplies no new information confirms our confidence in the idea of second century Christianity which we draw from the more important sources, Clement of Rome, the "Didache," Justin, etc. Aristides is chiefly remarkable for his appreciation of the actual Jewish religion (in distinction from the Old Testament) as worthy and noble. He does not consider the problem of Greek philosophy as Justin does; his great idea is that of a spiritual

monotheism; and the substance of the new religion, which they alone have who believe in Christ, is God, the holy life, and the future kingdom. His Christianity is less Pauline than that of Clement of Rome or Justin. He shows the passage of heathen monotheism into Christian monotheism.

Dr. Raabe, who has translated the "Apology" into German, has added, besides his discussion of the text, elaborate notes full of a rather ostentatious learning, especially in matters of heathen religion, but furnishing much that is useful and to the point.

Mrs. Rendel Harris, in her pretty little book, has given with the translation of the more interesting parts of the "Apology" a description (with a good photograph) of the Convent of St. Catharine at Mount Sinai, and some discussion of the doctrine (especially as to the divinity of Christ) and of the ethics of the book, which she has illustrated by quotations from various church fathers. She has made a capital book for Sunday afternoon reading to young people, and for the Sunday-school library.

James Hardy Ropes.

ANDOVER.

THE GENESIS OF GENESIS: A Study of the documentary sources of the first book of Moses in accordance with the results of critical science illustrating the presence of Bibles within the Bible. By BENJAMIN WISNER BACON. With an Introduction by GEORGE F. MOORE, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Pp. xxx, 352. Hartford: The Student Publishing Company. 1892.

This book is not intended for students only. It aims to present certain methods and results of recent critical study of the Old Testament in a form available for those who are not acquainted with the Hebrew language or with modern Biblical criticism. The book of Genesis has always been the favorite field for Old Testament critics, partly because of its own importance and interest, and partly because the phenomena which gave rise to the theory of a composite narrative were here first observed, and are now, generally speaking, most easily followed. The present volume aims to give, in a form as concrete and objective as possible, the results of modern criticism of this book. For this purpose, a twofold device is employed; first, a graphic exhibition of the composite text in different kinds of type; and second, the printing of the separate documents, each by itself as a connected whole. With the former expedient we are already pretty well acquainted. Kautzsch and Socin's little book (1888, second edition, 1891) is the best-known example. The latter device is much less familiar to us. Lenormant's "Genesis" (English translation, 1886) attempted both analysis and synthesis, but each only on a limited scale. The Priestly document, all or a part, has been printed separately (for example, by Wellhausen); Budde has attempted to restore the sources of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. And now, during the past year, three works in the English language have appeared almost simultaneously, whose main purpose is distinctly constructive.

Two, at least, of the three authors are pastors in active service. Fripp's little book, "The Composition of the Book of Genesis," is similar in aim and scope to the "Genesis of Genesis," though on a smaller scale. The first volume of Addis's "Documents of the Hexateuch" (David Nutt, London. 1892. Publisher also of Fripp's book) contains the document JE, styled "The Oldest Book of Hebrew History," restored throughout the Pentateuch and Joshua. Each of these three books marks an important advance in the direction of constructive criticism, and in some respects our author has attempted more than either of the other two. Of course the difficulties of such an undertaking are very great, and no one may claim to have said the last word. The analysis stands not seldom on very insecure footing, and is often apparently reduced to mere splitting of hairs. It is because of Mr. Bacon's appreciation of this uncertainty that he terms his book "a study." By previous work in the same line he has demonstrated his fitness for the present task.

That the book is intended for the general public is not the least important fact connected with it. Its mission here will, I think, be apparent. The fact, referred to by the author in chapter i., that so many Hebrew scholars and professors in America and England, besides nearly all those on the Continent of Europe, accept the results of the analysis with substantial agreement, has an importance of its own, which no one will be disposed to deny to it. On the other hand, the "general public" will certainly and inevitably regard the whole matter with suspicion, so long as they are shut out from it. In the present volume, process and outcome are brought directly before their eyes. Whether the whole attempt is well-grounded or mistaken, such a graphic, almost startling presentation of *results* as the one before us can only do good. If the analysis rests on false and arbitrary principles, this is the quickest and surest way to kill it; if it is sound at heart, common sense will very soon recognize the fact in this objective demonstration, where a presentation of principles and arguments would not and could not make the slightest impression. There is no danger that the conservative side will not have a fair hearing. One need only refer, for example, to the series of able and acute essays by Dr. Green, now appearing in "Hebraica."

The Introduction, by Professor Moore, condenses into a half-dozen pages the history of Old Testament criticism.

Part I., occupying nearly a hundred pages, is of an introductory nature, setting forth briefly and clearly the principles and methods of the higher criticism as applied to the Hexateuch. Documentary analysis, the science which aims at recovering the sources of a composite writing, and historical criticism, which orders and explains the material thus gained, are discussed in separate chapters. A third chapter gives a bird's-eye view of the Hexateuchal analysis in its present state, following Dillmann. For a list of all divergences of the foremost critics from this analysis, the author refers to certain articles of his own published a few years ago in "Hebraica."

With Part II., a graphic presentation of the analysis of Genesis, begins that portion of the book on which rests its claim to be regarded as a positive contribution to Biblical criticism. The text of the Revised Version is used. Six varieties of type exhibit the three main documentary sources, — J (the Jahvist), E (the Elohist), and P (the Priestly document), and the three corresponding strata of editorial additions and alterations. The different kinds of type are well chosen, and the result is very satisfactory, as regards clearness.

The analysis is of course in the main that now substantially agreed upon by all who admit the possibility of a separation into documents. But the author has not contented himself with simply recording the work already done by others. The result of his own independent labor is constantly to be seen in real and important contributions to the analysis. He has carried the separation of the sources farther than any of his predecessors, and with a thoroughness and good judgment worthy of high praise. For examples, one may refer especially to his treatment of vi. 1-4, xv., xxvi. 33, etc. (changes also suggested in the second edition of Kautzsch and Socin), xxvii., the latter part of xxx., xxxi.-xxxiii., xxxv. 16-22, latter part of xli., xlv. 9-14. In these and all other cases where deviation is made from previous analyses, due notice is given in the foot-notes, with explanation that is sufficient for all general purposes. At the same time, the reader is constantly referred to articles published by Mr. Bacon in "*Hebraica*" (1890 and 1891) for a minute discussion of the critical questions involved. It is thus everywhere possible for the student to follow up and test the processes by which the author has reached his conclusions, while at the same time the book is relieved of a mass of critical matter that would have no interest or value for the general reader. The author submits the results of his independent analysis with diffidence, and he well may. Any complete, and at the same time satisfactory separation of the documents J and E is practically impossible; yet this is precisely the problem presented in the majority of the examples given above. But Mr. Bacon had set himself the task of printing separately the three documental sources in connected form, — that which he has accomplished in Part III. of the present volume, — and this left him no alternative but to carry through the analysis at all points. In this undertaking he has no predecessors, and whatever some may think of its advisability, his work should not be judged until it has been fairly examined, in analysis and synthesis. It must be admitted that he has performed his task thoroughly, and I think it will be seen that the result justifies the attempt. Caution has not been sacrificed to acuteness. It will be generally easier to find objections to his conclusions than to improve on them. And after all, the actual amount of space occupied by these notoriously troublesome passages in the book of Genesis is comparatively very small.

The value of this part of the book is greatly increased by the critical and explanatory notes appended to almost every page. These explain the various phenomena presented to the eye in the text, besides adding

much important matter. Another feature which all readers will appreciate is the large number of critical marginal references, carefully chosen, chiefly to passages in the Hexateuch.

As regards treatment of the Hebrew text, our author is everywhere conservative, — unnecessarily so, some will think, — never carried away by the temptation to propose new readings. His restoration of vi. 1-4 is well worthy of notice, also his suggestion to xxii. 14. The conjectural emendation of xlix. 24, contributed by Professor Moore, seems to be an excellent solution of a very troublesome passage.

One sometimes gets the impression that he is over-confident of the possibilities of the analysis. Compare, for example, the note on page 198 with Kautzsch and Socin's note at the beginning of chapter xli. The attempt to distinguish from each other the numerous redactors, except in a very general way, must be often mere guess-work.

The symbol J E is used by our author not only for the document resulting from the union of J and E (so pages 177, 182), but also to designate the editor who combined the two, thus pages 139, 140, 154, 161, 173, 174.

Part III., the documents J, E, and P separately restored, is the most interesting portion of the book, and the most important. It is the first attempt to present the three documents, each by itself, restored to connected narrative throughout the whole book of Genesis, and the result affords an excellent exhibition and test of the work of the higher criticism, and of Mr. Bacon's independent efforts in particular. Now that the work of dissecting has gone so far, it is time to begin restoring. Analyses "presented in varieties of type" leave the impression of a mass of disconnected fragments. Such an apparent ruin is not calculated to arouse enthusiasm, and only scholars would be likely to get much instruction from it.

The documents are presented "in a revised translation according to the emended text, and with conjectural readings of good authority." Some patches and junctures are of course needed to fill gaps caused by the dropping out of matter from one or another of the sources in the process of combining them. This supplemental material (always enclosed in brackets) is sometimes supplied from related passages in the same document or in other sources, near or remote, sometimes obtained by mere conjecture. Thus, after xlii. 7, in J, the narrative is continued by means of matter supplied from xliii. 7 f. and xliv. 18 ff. (both J); in chapter xxi. (E) an apparent gap is filled in accordance with xxvi. 17-23 (J) and xxi. 25 (E). It will certainly be a surprise to all, even to scholars thoroughly familiar with the analysis, to see how few such "patches" are needed. A better answer to the so-called "fragment hypothesis" could not be imagined.

Naturally, the intended exhibition of the separate documents will be somewhat handicapped by the use of a translation that was made on the supposition of uniformity. Still, the text of the Revised Version is for

the most part adhered to, the principal variations from it having been generally anticipated in the critical notes to Part II.

One can hardly help wishing that the translation could have been made a special end in itself, though this would have involved a great amount of additional labor. Besides the obvious advantages of a special translation in connection with the analysis, it would have given the author an opportunity to show his sympathy with his sources and the history they embody, such as the almost microscopic investigation of the present work does not afford.

We have been accustomed to hear, from the various authorities on the analysis, where this and that passage, verse or half-verse should be placed; now we have them before our eyes, in the surroundings claimed for them, and can judge for ourselves. In a very few cases the result apparently discredits the theory. For example, vi. 3, which has been transplanted to chapter iii. (following Budde), looks uncomfortable and out of place in its new connection. The proposed restoration of i. 1 will hardly be accepted by all as wholly satisfactory.

Two Appendixes are added. In the first, the story of the Creation and the Flood, as given in the first chapters of Genesis, is placed in juxtaposition with the narratives of the well-known Chaldean tablets, with added notes. The comparison, which is very interesting, is thus greatly facilitated.

Appendix II. contains the few Hebrew notes that could not well be omitted. Students of Hebrew will certainly not confine themselves to these. It is to be hoped that one effect of this whole discussion will be to incite to a wider and more careful study of the original text. I trust the book will have a wide circulation.

Charles C. Torrey.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By HANS HINRICH WENDT, D. D., ord. Professor of Theology, Heidelberg. Translated by Rev. JOHN WILSON, M. A., Montreux, Switzerland. Vol. i., ii. Pp. 408, 426. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

This book is a translation of the second and constructive part of Dr. Wendt's elaborate monograph on the teaching of Jesus. This part was published in 1890. The first part, which contained a critical discussion of the sources of Jesus's teaching, was published in 1886. It is a matter of regret that the publishers did not feel warranted in putting the earlier along with the later volume before the English and American public. The correctness of the critical processes employed in the former is assumed in the representation of our Lord's teaching given in the latter. And as the material used in the representation is in important respects the product of the criticism (as for example, the version of the Beatitudes and the Parousia discourse), one who has not seen the criticism cannot rightly estimate the merit of the picture of Christ's ideas which is drawn from it.

Dr. Wendt is an able and candid scholar. He is also rather venturesome in his criticism, as appears in the fact that he alone has undertake present are construction of the Logia, and in the further fact that he is one of the few contemporaneous New Testament scholars who advocate a composite authorship for the fourth Gospel.

This ought to be remembered in reading the present work, the form of which depends in no small degree upon his distinctive critical views. This the author feels, for he says in the preface which he has written for the present volumes :—

"I greatly regret that this independent critical part of my work has not been included in the English translation. Certainly for many readers the brief summary of the results of my critical examination, which I have given in the introductory section of this book, will be sufficient. But I would very urgently press upon theologians, who would arrive at and pronounce an independent judgment upon my treatment of the contents of the teachings of Jesus, not to fail to consider the first part of my German work."

The "Teaching of Jesus" is one of the most important contributions to Biblical theology which have been made of recent years. It is comprehensive in its point of view; giving an account of contemporaneous Jewish thought as a background to Jesus's teaching, and presenting the latter in its relation to our Lord's person and life. Among the more original features of the book are its account of the external characteristics of Jesus's teaching; its discussion of our Lord's ideas as regards nature and history, and its comparison of the teaching attributed to Jesus in the fourth Gospel with that preserved in the synoptic tradition.

The work is written in a style having an ease and vividness rarely seen in a German theological treatise, and is one of the most interesting books ever put before the English and American public by the Messrs. Clark and the Messrs. Scribner. The present writer cannot undertake here to discuss the theological positions of the work. He would venture to express his dissent from Dr. Wendt's presentation of the Christology of the fourth Gospel, which removes from it the preëxistent divine nature, which exegetes of all schools have generally found in it, and to say that the discussion is seriously defective here in lacking the examination of the Logos passage of chapter i., which is given in Dr. Wendt's untranslated first volume.

A word may be added with regard to the translation. It is more idiomatic than most of the translations published by the Messrs. Clark and Messrs. Scribner, and more accurate than some of them. It is, however, in spite of its revision by the author, open to criticism as regards accuracy. A few faults may be pointed out as examples: p. 31, line 23, "foundation" is not a good rendering of "*geschichtliche Anknüpfung*;" p. 34, line 2, "itself" should be "it;" p. 36, line 3, "will" should be "shall" (an error repeatedly fallen into); *ib.*, 3d line from

bottom, "foundation" is a bad rendering for "*Boden*;" p. 37, line 2, "narrow" is not the meaning of "*festen*;" p. 43, line 6 from bottom, "obliquity" is given as the meaning of "*Veraüßerlichung*," instead of "externalizing;" p. 59, line 17 from top, "a saving salt which . . . preserved it from philosophical petrefaction" (*sic*), the blunder is the translator's, — Wendt says nothing about salt.

Edward Y. Hincks.

BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX.⁷¹ *The Times, the Man and his Work. An Historical Study in Eight Lectures.* By RICHARD S. STORRS. Pp. xiv, 598. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892. \$2.50.

This is called a biographical study of St. Bernard, and so it is, in a most eminent degree. But it is more than that. It would hardly be extravagant to call it an intimate portraiture of the Middle Ages, of their very soul, and above all of their soul of goodness, of that in them which we in our modern self-sufficiency most need to apprehend, especially separated as we are from them by a great religious cataclysm. Dr. Storrs has studied the facts until he has penetrated into the very heart, and indicates the facts with that wise economy which reveals the inmost reality. If any one has that scattering knowledge of the Middle Ages which most educated people have, including clergymen, and reads this book attentively, with a reasonable share of historic sympathy, he may fairly be said to *know* the Middle Ages. Whatever enlargement of details he may require for particular generations or characters or topics, he may rest contentedly in the general illumination which this book will give him upon this great and fruitful, rude and revolting, noble and saintly era. The portraitures of Charlemagne, Anselm, Abelard, are more compressed than that of Bernard, but quite as distinct, and hardly less profound, and we could say almost as much of some of the slighter sketches, as of Thomas Aquinas. As to Hildebrand, his character, his aim, his work, we may say for ourselves that we have cast about among all sorts of writers for the key-word to them, and that this book affords it, to us, at least. The same may be said of the author's portrayal of Feudalism, in its relation to the declining and to the resurgent form of political society, breaking the fall of the former in its lapse towards anarchy, and too stubbornly delaying the birth of the latter. Chivalry is more easily understood, but the author's description of it is like the rest of the book, exceedingly satisfying. As to the subject proper, all that we can say in abatement is, that perhaps some of the harsher criticisms of Milman or others might be profitably read in connection with Bernard's relation to the heretics of the South, and to the Second Crusade. All the positive sides of the great abbot's character and activity are described as fully and interiorly as most of us have occasion to know them.

When we think of the illustriousness of Clairvaux, it is hard for us to detach our notion of it from that gorgeousness of setting which inheres in our very conception of mediæval Catholicism. Dr. Storrs, whose capability of exterior portraiture, and delight in it, quite equals his apprehension of the soul of things, never lets us forget the great abbey's want of all ornament, even in its church, its ragged rudeness, the intense Puritanism of its intense monasticism. We see how profoundly genuine was the Cistercianism of Port Royal, and Dr. Storrs does well to mention the Mère Angélique in speaking of St. Bernard. Had Bernard been her contemporary, he might very possibly have been as much suspected of Rome as she and her nuns were.

The author draws the line delicately between the assumption that Bernard really belonged to the tendency which more courageously developed itself in Waldensian dissent and the assumption that his adherence to Roman Catholicism was so vital as to make it certain that he would have stood by Rome at the Reformation. As the author portrays his view of Justification, it really seems to be in some respects superior to Luther's avoiding the somewhat bald character of our Protestant doctrine, without diverging into that subtle assumption of a previous merit in the creature as the ground of justification, in which Rome finally intrenched herself, against the protests of many such adhering sons of hers as Pole and Contarini. The author shows also how subordinate a place invocation of the saints and transubstantiation itself have in Bernard as compared with the enfeebling extravagance of the one and the coarse literalism of the other, as developed in later Roman Catholicism, which now, however, seems inclined to revert to his more spiritual conceptions of the real presence. Dr. Storrs points out also how the depth of Bernard's devotion to the Virgin (or to regenerate womanhood in her) never for a moment crossed the line which includes her among the fallen, how, while he was ready to acknowledge her as *purified* from original sin, he could not endure to hear it said that she was *preserved* from it. On the other hand, he was fully convinced that the dissenters from the Church, even the Waldenses, were leaving what was deepest in the economy of grace, on account of sins which did not touch its essence. Yet it by no means follows certainly that he would have thought the same four centuries later. Faith and righteousness were to him the ends, the Church the means; where he had found the largest energy of these, at a later date, he might have followed with them, even though it divorced him from that hierarchy and papacy which he resisted so fearlessly in his own time. Dr. Storrs distinguishes sharply between the largeness of mediæval Catholicism and the factious narrowness of its outworn stage, without at all denying, even to the latter, its eminent and peculiar share in the now divided inheritance. He sometimes almost makes us wish that we had been monks of Clairvaux, but he never makes us wish for Clairvaux, or Hildebrand, in our own time.

The author shows with remarkable distinctness how large a share preaching had in the religious life of the Middle Ages, especially of Bernard and his time, how far the great priests were from being absorbed in "functions." Charles Borromeo, consecrating three hundred altars in his diocese, and spending eight hours over each altar, may have been matched by earlier bishops, but the picture seems better to belong to the alarmed ceremonialism of the counter-reformation. Bernard prepared the way for St. Louis, and for his declaration that he preferred Preaching to the Mass. The Church of Rome, to do her justice, has never censured, except in practice, Massillon's later declaration, that Preaching is a greater mystery than the Eucharist.

The author gives us an admirable gauge of the measure of power which lay in this one man, that is, in Christ manifested through him, by comparing the dying out of the schism between Innocent and Anacletus, which seems to have been as dangerous as that between Urban VI. and Robert of Geneva, with the wide-wasting and long-continuing havoc wrought by the latter. There was no Bernard to stay the Forty Years' Schism.

The author's description of the great contest between Bernard and Abelard leaves the palm where a Christian, one would think, must of necessity assign it, with the monk of Clairvaux. He shows that Bernard was not in the least a timid and irritated obscurantist, but one to whom the religious reason must necessarily have a force for the things of faith which he could never concede to the indifferent and really irreligious reason. The author's quotations from Guizot, Cousin, and Abelard's own biographer, Rémusat, show how far these enlightened men are from exaggerating the merit or depths of Abelard's performances. At the same time, Dr. Storrs cordially allows that "the heat of piety and the colder if clearer light of speculation" may well be apprehended as "united at last in the instant and perfect vision of God." The author's descriptions of Aletta and Heloise are most engaging side-pieces to those of the son of the one and the husband of the other. They show how large a range and power, and how high an honor, womanhood, both in its devouter and its more secular cultivation, was capable of attaining to in that time.

As we apprehend it, the author has fallen into *one* serious error, and only one. It could easily be corrected. Speaking, on p. 105, of the effects of an interdict, he says that "under the terms of such decrees the new-born babe received no baptism, the penitent sinner no absolution, the dying no saving viaticum." This implies, what is incredible, that a Christian church has ever undertaken to forbid what is absolutely, or even presumably, necessary to the salvation of souls. We perceive that Roman Catholic theology declares that an interdict permits: Baptism, *etiam solemniter*; Confirmation; Penance; the Viaticum; Matrimony *sine*

benedictione. In danger of death, as is known, any one may baptize, and any priest may absolve any penitent from any sentence whatever. If any Pope — which we do not suppose — has ever undertaken to restrain absolutely necessary sacraments, he has simply become for the time being a destroying demon.

We notice one slight slip, on p. 108, in the statement that Guibert, Hildebrand's rival, was "consecrated Pope," meaning *crowned*. Guibert, being already a bishop, could receive no new consecration. Perhaps, however, in the Middle Ages *consecrare* was used even of a non-sacramental inauguration, as it still is, in English at least, when applied to an abbot.

The over-elaboration of style, and somewhat too intentional ornamentation, which makes some of the author's works a little hard to read, are not found in this. It is a really wonderful book, and any one who reads it may feel that, except for special occasions, he has mastered the course of the regenerate life of mankind for a thousand years, as concentrated in the supreme, celestial beauty of this one life.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

AN AMERICAN MISSIONARY IN JAPAN. By Rev. M. L. GORDON, M. D. Pp. xxiv, 276. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.; The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1892.

It would be difficult to say too much in praise of this clear, compact, and graphic representation of Christian missionary work in Japan. Rev. Dr. Griffin, in a felicitous "Introductory Note," justly commends it as a "contribution both to the literature of knowledge and power." Its literary style has the merit which marks the best popular scientific writing of the day, and which consists of a distinct perception of objective truth and a conveyance of this perception by a few discriminating and characteristic marks to the mind of the reader.

Dr. Gordon has been an active participant in the remarkable missionary work in Japan which he describes, almost from its beginning. He knows it thoroughly, and he has the analytic and reflective power, and literary skill to convey this knowledge, in a way which constantly impresses the mind of the reader with the conviction that he is receiving information from a competent and trustworthy authority, who knows enough at every point not to say either too much or too little, and who never wearies by prolixity nor disappoints by insufficiency. A book whose charm and power consist so much in a choice selection and grouping of incidents, which imply and suggest great principles, cannot be suitably reviewed either by an analysis or summary of its contents. It tells its own story, and only from the book itself can the story and its burden of instruction and motive be gained. We may say in general

that the author takes the reader into his confidence in his first anticipations of missionary life, and then carries him on from step to step through the successive stages of his own experience in the unfolding of this life, and this in so modest and skillful a way that the guide is quite lost sight of in the interest which is constantly excited in the scenes and events which come to view in swift succession, and the story of what one man has seen and helped to accomplish broadens out into a vivid representation of the whole process through which Japan has come into contact with the resources and powers of a living Christianity. The book attracts first of all by its clear account of what the gospel is doing in Japan for the moral and spiritual needs of men. It presents a record which stirs the Christian mind and heart in the same way that it is moved by the narratives of the book of Acts. It shows the same power working to-day in Japan that first went out from Palestine to Asia Minor and Greece and Italy, to the islands of the Mediterranean and along its peopled coasts. We feel that we are in touch with it as a present power and vital as ever. The book has also many other attractions. It offers studies of the Japanese people, their language, social characteristics, aspects of their civilization, literary traditions and habits, moral and political condition, which, though incidental to the main purpose of the book, are full of suggestion and interest. One chapter, and a noteworthy one, is devoted to "Comparative Religion as a Matter of Experience," a phase of this subject which ought to receive greatly increased attention, and which is indispensable to any just development of this growing and important science.

The Japanese missionaries have had the judgment and insight to study and appreciate the conditions under which their work must be prosecuted. To a remarkable degree they have understood that it is not their function or prerogative to transplant an Occidental type of Christianity, and still less a provincial or transitory phase of theology. They have tried to impart to men Christianity as a faith and a life, and to open the way for those who received their message to its resources of wisdom and power. They have appreciated the many-sidedness of the gospel, and have felt that God loves men, and that all that is truly human is dear to Him, and should be to his followers. That miserable theory of missions which by resolving it into a narrowly conceived evangelistic work has sometimes so crippled the work of missionaries in other Oriental lands has not ruled in Japan. It was, perhaps, from this point of view alone, fortunate that missions began in Japan so late. They could and must be better begun. Dr. Gordon's book deserves to be carefully studied by all who have a voice in the direction of foreign missions, and the wider its circulation the more intelligent and vigorous and hopeful must be the interest in their prosecution.

We add but one further remark, and this to notice the noble spirit of

Christian fellowship and unity which this book emphasizes. The author often writes with weighty terseness, but in these words, which we italicise, he seems almost to surpass himself: "*Desire for union is strongest either in the newly converted or in the mature Christian. An intermediate stage of experience is the best soil for the growth of the denominational spirit.*"

Egbert C. Smyth.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

George H. Ellis, Boston.

- CROTHERS, S. M. *Members of One Body.* Pp. 132. 75 cents.
 FOOTE, H. W. *Insight of Faith.* Pp. 115. 50 cents.
 HINCKLEY, F. A. *Afterglow.* Pp. 81. 50 cents.
 SAVAGE, M. J. *Evolution of Christianity.* Pp. 178. \$1.00.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston.

- ADAMS, M. *Creation of the Bible.* Pp. 313. \$1.50.

Cong. S. S. and Publishing Co., Boston and Chicago.

- BITTINGER, J. Q. *A Plea for the Sabbath and for Man.* Pp. 236. \$1.25.
 GATES, C. F. *A Christian Business Man. Biography of Deacon C. F. Gates.* Pp. 200. \$1.00.
 PILGRIM SERIES of S. S. LESSONS. *Study of the Life of Jesus the Christ. Three Grades.*

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York.

- STOKES, G. T. *Expositor's Bible. Acts of the Apostles.* Pp. xvi. 480. \$1.50.

Henry Holt & Co. New York.

- HYDE, W. D. *Practical Ethics.* Pp. ix, 208.

Hunt & Eaton, New York.

- ROADS, C. *Christ Enthroned in the Industrial World.* Pp. 287. \$1.00.
 YOUNG, E. R. *Stories from Indian Wigwams and Northern Camp-Fires.* Pp. 293. \$1.25.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

- BARTLETT, E. T., and PETERS, J. P. *Scriptures, Hebrew and Christian, arranged and edited as an Introduction to the Study of the Bible. Vol. III. Christian Scriptures.* Pp. xii, 601. \$2.00.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

- DRIVER, S. R. *Sermons on Subjects Connected with the Old Testament.* Pp. xix, 232. \$1.75.
 HALL, NEWMAN. *Divine Brotherhood.* Pp. 281. \$2.00. (Published by T. & T. Clark.)

Am. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, New York.

- OUR ANIMAL FRIENDS. *An Illustrated Monthly Magazine.* Vol. xix. Pp. 286.

